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1. ABSTRACT
1.1 OBJECTIVE
Inferential confiision is a reasoning process observed in obsessive compulsive 
disorder (OCD) which is defined by a distrust of reality-based information in favour 
of imagined possibilities. Studies have shown inflated self-reported inferential 
confusion in mixed-anxiety populations. The current study hypothesised that 
individuals high in social anxiety (HSA) would be more influenced by possibility- 
based information than those low in social anxiety (LSA).
1.2 DESIGN
A quasi-experimental design was utilised. Participants completed the Inference 
Processes Task (IPT) that required them to make probability-based judgements 
(inferences) based upon possibility- and reality-based information for situations that 
typically trigger worries regarding social anxiety, OCD, and non-disorder based 
scenarios. Participants also completed self-report measures of social anxiety, 
inferential confusion, OCD symptoms, and general distress.
1.3 PARTICIPANTS
On the basis of a self-report measure of social anxiety, participants were classified as 
either high (n = 102) or low (n = 68) in social anxiety. Participants were recruited 
using online advertisements on internet forums and social media websites.
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1.4 RESULTS
Participants in the HSA group doubted significantly more than the LSA group after 
the introduction of possibility- and reality-based information on the social anxiety- 
and OCD-based scenarios of the IPX. The groups did not differ regarding the impact 
of reality or possibility information on the non-disorder based scenario, although 
both groups were markedly influenced by possibility-based information. The HSA 
group scored significantly higher than the LSA group on the self-report measure of 
inferential confusion.
1.5 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
High levels of social anxiety appeared to be associated with increased reliance upon 
possibilities and a dismissing of reality in threatening situations, suggesting 
inferential confusion. This implies that inferential confusion may be the result of a 
cognitive threat response rather than a symptom of a mental health condition. Future 
research and treatments implications are discussed.
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2. INTRODUCTION
Inferential confusion is a reasoning process that has been witnessed principally in an 
obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) population (O’Connor & Robillard, 1995). 
Inferential confusion was conceptualised from the observation that people with OCD 
distrust sensory information (i.e. the five bodily senses) in favour of imagined 
possibilities. This prioritisation of possibility-based information produces doubt 
within the individual, a key feature in OCD (Pelissier & O’Connor, 2002), and is 
therefore postulated to become the trigger for a compulsion. For example, if an 
individual thinks “did I leave the oven hob on?” it is likely they will review the 
incident in their memory regarding turning the oven hob off (sensory-based 
information) but also an imagined possibility of the oven hob burning unattended. 
These conflicting pieces of information are theorised to cause doubt within the 
individual, and a series of consequential inferences, based upon the imagined 
possibility, form the obsession. The inference-based approach (IBA), furthermore, 
proposes that intrusions are inferences, as opposed to the traditional view that they 
are ‘automatic processes’ (Salkovskis, 1989), that are the result of 
inductive/deductive reasoning (O’Connor, 2002). The result of this process, the 
inference, is proposed to be retained as a spontaneously arising response to a specific 
trigger, explaining why obsessional thinking in OCD only occurs in specific 
situations.
Research investigating inferential confusion has focused predominantly upon its 
presence within the OCD and general populations. A self-report measure, the
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Inferential Confusion Questionnaire (ICQ; Aardema, O'Connor, Emmelkamp, 
Marchand, & Todorov, 2005), now updated and renamed the Inferential Confusion 
Questionnaire -  Expanded Version (ICQ-EV; Aardema et ah, 2010), has 
demonstrated significant positive correlations with OCD symptoms (Aardema et al., 
2005, 2010; Aardema, Kleijer, Trihey, O’Connor, & Emmelkamp, 2006a; Wu, 
Aardema, & O’Connor, 2009; Yorulmaz, Dirik, Karaali, & Uvez, 2010) and beliefs 
(Aardema et al., 2006b; Aardema, Randomsky, O’Connor, & Julien, 2008; Wu, 
Aardema & O’Connor, 2009; Yorulmaz et al., 2010) as measured by the Obsessive 
Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 
2001, 2003). Furthermore, the ICQ and ICQ-EV have also demonstrated the 
explanation of additional variance beyond that of the OBQ in predicting obsessive- 
compulsive symptoms (Wu, Aardema, & O’Connor 2009). For example, Polman, 
O’Connor and Huisman (2011) found that 38.5% of participants diagnosed with 
OCD were categorised as scoring minimally in all belief areas of the OBQ but in the 
average range for inferential confusion. The validation of the inferential confusion 
construct has led to the conceptualisation of a treatment named Inference Based 
Therapy (IBT; O’Connor & Robillard, 1995; O’Connor & Aardema, 2012), which 
utilises inferential confusion principals in the treatment of OCD. Trials evaluating 
the effectiveness of IBT in treating OCD have demonstrated a significant reduction 
in OCD symptoms, 0 CD-related beliefs, depression, anxiety, and inferential 
confusion as measured by the Inference Processes Task (IPT; see below; O’Connor 
et al., 2005; Aardema et al., 2010; Aardema & O’Connor, 2012). IBT was also
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shown to be as effective as cognitive therapy and exposure and response prevention 
in treating OCD (O’Connor et al., 2005).
Experimentally, inferential confusion has been explored through the use of reasoning 
paradigms, comparing OCD populations with non-clinical control groups (Pelissier 
& O’Connor, 2002; Pelissier, O’Connor & Dupuis, 2009; Aardema, O'Connor, 
Pelissier, & Lavoie, 2009). In order to explore doubting in anxious and non-anxious 
groups, a reasoning paradigm, termed the IPT, was designed. The IPT requires 
individuals to infer the likelihood of an event occurring at several time points 
following the introduction of possibility- and reality-based information and is 
thought to provoke doubting similar to that seen in OCD (Aardema et al., 2009). In 
the IPT, participants are presented with an OCD-related and non-OCD related 
scenario in order to investigate the theoretical postulation that individuals with OCD 
are more likely to become inferentially confused as a result of an OCD-based trigger. 
Aardema et al. (2009) found that when compared with a non-clinical population, the 
OCD group was significantly more affected by the possibility-based than reality- 
based information. Levels of doubt and the impact of possibility-based information 
were related to symptom severity. Other studies have attempted to operationalise 
doubt and observed that participants with OCD had higher levels of doubting than 
non-clinical controls, especially when alternatives to the inferences made by 
participants were provided by researchers, as opposed to self-generated alternatives 
(Pelissier, O’Connor, & Dupuis, 2009).
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Although the research to date has provided evidence for the role of inferential 
confusion as a reasoning process that is an intrinsic feature of OCD, there has been 
no research that has investigated whether this process is relevant to other anxiety- 
based disorders. Results from surveys have revealed that OCD groups score higher 
than mixed-anxiety groups and non-anxious participants on the ICQ-EV and ICQ 
(Aardema et al., 2005, 2010; Yorulmaz et al., 2010) which, in part, has prompted a 
theoretical postulation towards placing OCD and the inferential confiision reasoning 
process within a ‘belief-based’ group of mental health problems alongside psychosis 
and body dysmorphic disorder (O’Connor, 2009; Taillon, O’Connor, Dupuis, & 
Lavoie, 2013). However, the mixed-anxiety groups within studies that measured 
inferential confusion scored significantly higher on the ICQ and ICQ-EV than the 
non-anxious control groups (Aardema et al., 2010) indicating elevated levels of 
inferential confusion within these samples. Furthermore, the use of heterogeneous 
samples has its limitations as anxiety disorders present with differing symptom 
presentations (Clark & Beck, 2010) and therefore intergroup differences may be 
masked when treated as a homogenous group. Therefore, one possibility is that 
individuals with particular anxiety disorders may utilise inferential confusion as 
fi-equently as OCD populations.
The measurement of inferential confusion has been assessed principally using the 
self-report ICQ and ICQ-EV on participants with OCD and non-clinical control 
groups. The theoretical position of the inference-based approach places OCD outside 
the phobic anxiety disorders (e.g. social anxiety, panic disorder; O’Connor & 
Robillard, 1995) due to the cause of the anxiety being the obsessional thought rather
9
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than the object itself. For example, someone who obsesses about contamination does 
not fear bacteria in the same way an individual with a fear of cats fears seeing a cat. 
This theoretical position regarding inferential confusion produced the ICQ and ICQ- 
EV which contains global questions that are not specific to the particular phobia of 
other anxiety disorders. The result may be that when individuals with social anxiety 
disorder answer such questions, the content may not be as relevant to the scenarios in 
which they become inferentially confused, and hence the lower ICQ and ICQ-EV 
scores for the mixed anxiety groups when compared to the OCD groups to date. 
Given the limitations of the studies investigating inferential confusion that have been 
discussed, it is possible that inferential confusion may also be the product of 
reasoning for individuals with anxiety disorders other than OCD.
Social anxiety disorder is an exaggerated fear of social situations that is typically 
triggered when meeting people, talking in groups, eating and drinking in front of 
others, and during performances such as presentations to the public (NICE, 2013). 
Anxiety typically takes the form of worrying about acting in a manner that the 
individual believes is embarrassing such as blushing, sweating, shaking, or appearing 
incompetent, which often leads to the avoidance of such situations. This affliction 
can have a deleterious impact on quality of life, often resulting in poor social 
relationships, impaired performance at work and the misuse of drugs and alcohol 
(Schneier et al., 2010). The point prevalence of social anxiety disorder has been 
measured as 4.4% in a US sample (Ohayon & Schatzberg, 2010) with over half of 
individuals with lifetime social anxiety disorder reporting at least one other mental 
health problem and over a quarter reporting three or more lifetime mental health
10
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problems (Charrier, Walker, & Stein, 2003). Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), 
is the NICE recommended treatment for social anxiety disorder (NICE, 2013) in the 
UK. However, this exposure-based approach typically has high levels of dropout due 
to its anxiety-provoking nature (Eskildsen, Hougaard, & Rosenberg, 2010).
The distress social anxiety disorder causes can have a major impact upon the 
fiincrioning of individuals. Therefore, it is imperative that an understanding of the 
way in which social anxiety disorder develops and is maintained is researched. 
Anxiety is an evolutionary survival mechanism that affects the body physiologically 
(e.g. increased heartbeat, swearing, and breathing), cognitively, behaviourally, and 
emotionally, in order to facilitate the reaction of the individual to a threat in the 
environment (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Ijzendoom, 
2007). During this bodily response, there is a shift in attention towards potential 
dangers to the self, accompanied by a fear of catastrophe, which can occur in spite of 
objective feedback that contradicts such fears (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998). The 
most prominent models of social anxiety disorder (Clark and Wells, 1995; Heimberg, 
Brozovich, & Rapee, 2010; Hofinann, 2007) suggest that the fear is typically of 
potentially acting or speaking in a manner that is humiliating or embarrassing with a 
shift of attention to their internal state and the construction of an impression of 
themselves (often an image) which they assume is how others view them (e.g. “I am 
mumbling and stuttering my words. People think I look stupid”). Therefore, one 
possibility is that when individuals with social anxiety disorder are presented with an 
anxiety-provoking social situation they may become confused between reality (e.g. 
“when I looked in the mirror I was not blushing”) and possibility (e.g. “I feel as if I
11
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am blushing, people must think I am embarrassed”), hence becoming inferentially 
confused. This process may form a component of the ‘processing of self as a social 
object’ in the Clark and Wells (1995) model and the cognitive areas (e.g. ‘mental 
representation of self as seen by audience’) in the Heimberg, Brozovich and Rapee 
(2010) model, as within these areas there is the potential for inferences based upon 
internal information (i.e. possibilities) to be given credence over external evidence 
(i.e. reality). Establishing how individuals with social anxiety disorder think in 
anxiety-provoking contexts will aid our comprehension of this condition and may 
provide a path to efficacious treatments such as utilising IBT for social anxiety 
disorder.
The current study explored whether individuals with elevated levels of social anxiety 
became more inferentially confused when compared with a group exhibiting minimal 
levels of social anxiety symptoms. A group classification of high social anxiety 
(HSA) and low social anxiety (LSA) was utilised, as opposed to a diagnostic 
approach compared with a control group, because of the high levels of comorbidity 
present in populations of anxious individuals (Chartier, Walker, & Stein, 2003). A 
‘pure’ social anxiety group may not contain individuals who would represent the 
typically pervasive distress individuals with social anxiety experience in the general 
population. Inferential confusion in HSA and LSA groups was measured using an 
experimental task designed to measure the impact of reality- and possibility-based 
information whilst reasoning about imagined scenarios (i.e. the IPT). It was 
hypothesised that the HSA group would be influenced more by possibility-based 
information than the LSA group on social anxiety related scenarios. A second
12
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hypothesis was that the HSA group would be more influenced by possibility-based 
information than the LSA group on the OCD-related scenario as the HSA group was 
more likely to have greater levels of general distress, including elevated OCD 
symptoms, and to be more provoked by an OCD-based scenario than the LSA group.
3. METHOD
3.1 DESIGN
All aspects of the study were completed by participants using online survey software. 
A mixed quasi-experimental design was utilised. Following Aardema et al. (2009), 
each of the four scenarios was analysed separately where there were two independent 
variables: anxiety group (between-participants factor), which had two levels (HSA 
and LSA) and information type (within-participants factor), consisting of two levels 
(reality and possibility). The dependent variable was level of doubt (i.e. probability 
ratings on the IPT).
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of the HSA and LSA groups
Demographic HSA group LSA group
Gender
Male 32 17
Female 70 51
Age
Mean (years) 32.8 (SD = 11.6) 33.9 (SD = 9.8)
Range (years) 18-62 23-60
Education Level
No qualifications 3.9% 0%
GCSE/0 Level/CSE 12.7% 7.4%
A LeveEAS Level 14.7% 2.9%
Diploma 23.5% 10.3%
Degree 25.5% 35.3%
Postgraduate degree 23.5% 44.1%
Employment
13
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Full-time 33.3% 64.7%
Part-time 17.6% 16.2%
Student 14.7% 4.4%
Retired 1% 1.5%
Full-time parent 2.9% 0%
Unemployed 22.5% 5.9%
Other 7.8% 7.4%
Ethnicity
White British 72.5% 85.3%
White Irish 7.8% 5.9%
Other White 9.8% 5.9%
White and Asian 1% 1.5%
Other mixed background 1% 0%
Other Black background 1% 0%
Indian 3.9% 1.5%
Any other background 2.9% 0%
Self-report diagnosis
Depression 53.9% 19.1%
Social anxiety 44.1% 2.9%
OCD 4.9% 4.4%
Generalised anxiety 28.4% 8.8%
Phobia 5.9% 1.5%
Post-traumatic stress 4.9% 5.9%
Panic disorder 15.7% 4.4%
Bipolar disorder 3.9% 2.9%
Personality disorder 3.9% 1.5%
Other 9% 3%
3.2 PARTICIPANTS
The demographic data for the HSA and LSA groups are presented in Table 1. In 
total, 170 of 323 participants completed the study (attrition rate = 47.4%). The 
groups were formed based upon scores on the Social Phobia Inventory, a self-report 
measure of social anxiety (SPIN; O’Connor et al., 2000; see Measures section). 
Participants were allocated to the HSA group if they scored >19. This cut-off was 
established by O’Connor et al. (2000) and could distinguish between individuals with
14
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and without social anxiety disorder at accuracy level of 79%, specificity of 84% and 
sensitivity of 73%. All those scoring <19 were allocated to the LSA group.
The information presented in Table 1 was explored to assess whether there were any 
demographic differences between the HSA and LSA groups. A Chi-square test for 
independence (with Yates Continuity correction) indicated no significant association 
between gender and social anxiety group, ( l , n =  170) = 0.53, p = t)A l,phi = 0.07. 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the mean age of the HSA 
and LSA group. There was no significant difference between the HSA group and the 
LSA group. The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean difference =1.13, 
95% Cl: -2.26 to 4.51) was very small (Cohen’s d = 0.11). Nearly twice as many 
participants in the LSA group were in full-time employment than in the HSA group. 
A greater proportion of the LSA group was educated to degree or postgraduate 
degree level. Given the high levels of self-reported mental health difficulties in the 
HSA group, these were expected differences between the groups.
3.3 MEASURES
Inference Processes Task (Appendix A). The IPT was designed by Aardema et al. 
(2009) and represents a reasoning paradigm that measures doubt at several time 
points on the basis of reality- (R) and possibility-based (?) information. Participants 
are presented with four written scenarios that lead to the requirement to make a 
subsequent inference regarding the likelihood of a particular incident occurring 
(participants are presented with a bar on a sliding scale from ‘improbable’ to 
‘certain’ on a range of 10-100). For example, the Job Scenario asks participants to
15
The Role o f Inferential Confusion in Social Anxiety: A Quasi-Experimental study
URN: 6198773
imagine a job interview where they feel anxious, with the subsequent statement 
prompting participants to infer how likely it is that others think they are making a 
fool of themselves by rating on a scale of ‘improbable’ to ‘certain’.’ Participants rate 
their level of anxiety on a sliding scale from ‘not anxious’ to ‘most anxious I could 
feel’ (0-100).
Table 2: Pairs of reality- and possibility-based information in the Job Scenario
Information type Job Scenario
R1 ‘No-one smirked or laughed when you responded’
PI ‘Maybe they were just thinking “what a stupid thing to
say’”
R2 ‘Nobody said anything about you being a fooT
P2 “But maybe they felt awkward and didn’t feel like talking
to you”
R3 ‘The others nodded to what you said and continued the
topic of conversation’
P3 ‘They may have nodded along as a way of getting you to
stop talking’
Then, participants are presented three pairs of reality and possibility-based pieces of 
information separately and at each point asked to re-rate the likelihood that the 
particular situation occurred (see Table 2), which, following Aardema et al. (2009) is 
designed to capture level of doubt that the situation had not occurred (e.g. in the Job 
Scenario, it is a measure of doubt that others are not thinking the participants have 
made fools of themselves). The four scenarios were presented to participants in a 
random order.
Two of the scenarios represented imaginary situations that were likely to trigger 
social anxiety-related worries. In addition to the Job Scenario described above the
16
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second was an imaginary situation in a pub where a group of people laugh as the 
participant imagines walking towards the exit. The third scenario was an OCD- 
related imaginary situation where the participant cooks chicken on a barbeque for 
friends but questions whether the food may still contain harmful bacteria. The final 
scenario was a non-disorder based scenario taken from Aardema et al. (2009) 
imagining a possibility that a bus strike may have occurred while the participant was 
waiting for a bus. The novel scenarios were designed through consultation with 
experts in the field of social anxiety and were piloted to test face validity. Social 
anxiety-related scenarios were utilised because of the theoretical postulation that 
inferential confusion is likely to be the product of situations that trigger doubt within 
participants and therefore are more likely to be relevant to the HSA group. The non­
disorder based scenario was used to assess differences between the HSA and LSA 
groups by presenting a situation that was unlikely to trigger a social anxiety-related 
worry. The OCD-related scenario was utilised to establish whether there were 
reasoning differences between the groups on a non-social anxiety, disorder-based 
scenario.
Social Phobia Inventory (O’Connor et al., 2000; Appendix B). This questionnaire is 
a self-report measure of social anxiety consisting of 17 questions presented on a five 
point Likert scale (0 = ‘not at all’ to 4 = ‘extremely’). Questions query the incidence 
and severity of symptoms such as avoidance of social situations, fear, and 
physiological manifestations. The SPIN has exhibited good convergent validity 
(compared to the Brief Social Phobia Scale (Davidson et al., 1997); r=0.57,p<0001), 
internal consistency(a = 0.82-0.90), and test re-test reliability (Spearman’s
17
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correlation coefficient = 0.89; p<0.001; O’Connor et al., 2000). In the current study, 
the SPIN demonstrated good internal consistency in the HSA group (a = 0.89) and 
adequate internal consistency in the LSA group (a = 0.64).
Inferential Confusion Questionnaire -  Expanded Version (Appendix C). This 
questionnaire is a 30 item, self-report measure of inferential confusion where 
participants complete items on a six point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 6 = 
strongly agree). The ICQ-EV has demonstrated good test re-test reliability (0.90; 
p<0.0010) and good internal consistency (a = 0.66-0.97). In the current study, the 
ICQ-EV demonstrated very good internal consistency in both the HSA (a = 0.97) and 
LSA (a = 0.98) groups. One participant did not complete the ICQ-EV.
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory -  Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002; Appendix D). 
This is an 18 item, self-report inventory of OCD symptoms. Participants rate the 
incidence and severity of their distress over the past month on a five point Likert 
scale (0 = ‘not at all’ to 4 = ‘extremely’). The OCI-R has exhibited excellent 
convergent validity (as judged against the Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive 
Inventory (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977); r=0.65), good test re-test reliability (r = 
0.70), and internal consistency (a=0.88; Hajack, Huppert, Simons, & Foa, 2004). In 
the current study the OCI-R demonstrated good internal consistency in both the HSA 
(a = 0.87) and LSA (a = 0.89) groups. The cut-off score differentiating an OCD case 
fi*om a non-OCD case was determined to be 21 with a sensitivity of 65.6% and a 
specificity of 63.4% (Foa et al., 2002).
18
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The depression and anxiety suhscales o f the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; Appendix E; Appendix F). The depression and 
anxiety scales consist of 14 self-report items on a four point Likert scale (0 = ‘did not 
apply to me at all to 3 = ‘applied to me very much or most of the time’). Participants 
are required to score themselves on the prevalence of symptoms over the past week. 
The anxiety scale has achieved good concurrent validity (as compared to the Beck 
Anxiety Inventory (Beck & Steer, 1990); r = 0.85) and internal consistency (a =
0.92; Anthony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998). In the current study, the 
anxiety scale demonstrated very good internal consistency in both the HSA (a =
0.92) and LSA (a = 0.88) groups. The depression scale has demonstrated good 
concurrent validity (as compared to the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961); r = 0.77) and internal consistency (a = 0.97).
In the current study, the depression scale demonstrated very good internal 
consistency in both the HSA (a = 0.97) and LSA (a = 0.96) groups.
3.4 ETHICS
The current study was approved by the Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics 
Committee at the University of Surrey (Appendix G). Participants provided informed 
consent to participate in the study with the right to withdraw at any point by closing 
the web browser via which they could participate. There were also online links to 
sources of support in the debrief section of the study.
19
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3.5 PROCEDURE
3.5.1 RECRUITMENT OF PARTICIPANTS
Participants were recruited to the study via two methods. In order to recruit a sample 
varying in levels of social anxiety, adverts were posted on a range of anxiety forum 
websites (e.g. anxiety-central.com, nomorepanic.co.uk, social-anxiety.org.uk, and 
socialanxietyforums.com) with an online link to the study. Participants were also 
recruited through a snowball technique where details of the study were posted onto 
social media websites (e.g. Facebook) and other individuals reposted the information. 
A link was also provided at the end of the study for individuals to forward to other 
people to complete.
3.5.2 PROCEDURE FOR THE STUDY
A flow diagram is presented in Appendix H to illustrate the study design.
Participants were presented with information regarding the nature of the study and
asked to give their consent to take part (Appendix I illustrates the actual design
participants utilised for each part of the study). Participants were informed that they
could withdraw at any time. Next, participants completed questions regarding
demographic data: ethnicity, employment status, age, any mental health diagnoses,
qualifications, and gender. Then, participants completed the four scenarios from the
IPT (randomised for each participant) followed by three pairs of reality- and
possibility-based information in each case. At each point, participants were asked to
make an inference as to the likelihood the particular incident occurred. Next,
participants completed the questionnaires (which were presented to all participants in
20
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the same order): SPIN, OCI-R, ICQ-EV, and the depression and anxiety scales. 
Finally, participants were presented with a debrief screen where the hypotheses of 
the study were explained in more detail and information was provided for sources of 
support (e.g. the Mind website). The study took approximately 20 minutes to 
complete.
4. RESULTS
As the HSA and LSA groups were established using the suggested cut-off for the 
SPIN, the initial part of the results section explores differences between these groups 
to establish the validity of this classification.
4.1 ESTABLISHING THE VALIDITY OF THE HSA AND LSA GROUPS
An independent samples t-test was used to assess the difference in mean score on the 
SPIN for the HSA and LSA groups as the data were judged to be normally 
distributed (Appendix J). There was a significant difference in scores between the 
HSA group (M = 39.72, SD = 12.73) and the LSA group (M = 9.37, SD = 4.69; 
t(137.75) = -21.94, p = <0.001. The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean 
difference = -30.45, 95% Cl: -33.08 to -27.61) was very large (Cohen’s d = 3.37). As 
expected, the HSA group had significantly higher mean SPIN scores than the LSA 
group.
The HSA group scored significantly higher than the LSA group on the SPIN, with 
the HSA group scoring well above the cut-off threshold determining a social anxiety 
disorder case (mean HSA score = 39.72; cut-off score >19) and the LSA group
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scoring markedly below the cut-off (mean LSA score = 9.37). The HSA group scored 
similarly to the original social anxiety disorder group using the SPIN determined by 
O’Connor et al. (2000; M = 41.1; SD = 10.2), as did the LSA group compared to the 
control group used by O’Connor et al. (2000; M = 12.1; SD = 9.3).
As some of the data from the questionnaires was non-normally distributed in each 
group, a non-parametric equivalent was used to assess the differences between the 
HSA and LSA groups (see Table 3). Table 3 shows that the HSA group had 
significantly higher OCI-R, Depression Scale, and Anxiety scale scores than the LSA 
group.
Table 3: Median, mean, range, and Mann-Whitney U tests on questionnaires by 
HSA and LSA group
Measure HSA group LSA group Mann- 
Whitney U 
test
Median Mean Range Median Mean Range p-value
OCI-R 17 18.77 53 5 7.91 37 <0.001
Depression
Scale
19 20.41 42 4 5.53 40 <0.001
Anxiety 12 12.89 39 0 2.13 15 <0.001
Scale
As Aardema et al. (2009) established that OCD symptoms were related to inferential 
confusion as measured by the IPT, the OCI-R was utilised to assess differences 
between the HSA and LSA groups on OCD self-report symptoms. Table 3 illustrates 
that the HSA group scored significantly higher than the LSA group on the OCI-R. 
However, the HSA group OCI-R mean score did not meet the recommended cut-off 
of 21 for differentiating an OCD case from a non-OCD case established by
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Abramowitz and Deacon (2006). Furthermore, these authors established an OCD 
group with a mean score of 27.02 (SD = 13.20) which is higher than the HSA group 
in the current study (M = 18.77, SD = 11.59). These points illustrate that although 
there were elevated levels of OCD symptoms in the HSA group relative to the LSA 
group, they did not meet OCI-R cut-off criteria for a clinical OCD sample.
The HSA group scored significantly higher on the Depression and Anxiety scales 
than the LSA group (see Table 3). As depression and anxiety are often co-morbid 
(Chartier, Walker, & Stein, 2003) it is expected that the HSA group would score 
significantly higher than the LSA group on these measures. An additional gauge of 
anxiety is that measured after the presentation of each of the four scenarios of the 
IPT with the question “how anxious would you feel in the above situation?” So to 
further compare the HSA and LSA groups, levels of anxiety were examined using t- 
tests for the OCD and non-disorder based scenarios (Table 4).
Table 4: Differences between mean baseline anxiety on tbe OCD and Bus 
Scenarios between tbe HSA and LSA groups
Scenario HSA group________LSA group_____________ T-test______
 M (SD)___________M (SD)_______ t-value_____ p-value
OCD 54.85 (27.94) 29.25 (24.07) -6.18 <0.001
Bus____________ 49.42 (29.25) 28.44 (22.23) -5.30 <0.001
Non-parametric measures were used for the Job and Pub Scenarios due to non- 
normally distributed data (Table 5).
23
The Role o f Inferential Confusion in Social Anxiety: A Quasi-Experimental study
URN: 6198773
Table 5 : Differences between mean baseline anxiety on the OCD and Bus 
Scenarios between the HSA and LSA groups
Scenario HSA group LSA group Mann-Whitney U 
test
Median M (SD) Median M (SD) p-value
Job 84.50 81.30(16.20) 64.50 59.37 (19.06) <0.001
Pub 76.50 72.33 (23.88) 30.00 33.99(24.12) <0.001
As expected, the HSA group scored significantly higher baseline anxiety than the 
LSA group on all four scenarios (Table 4 & 5). The two highest baseline anxiety 
measurements for the HSA group were on the social anxiety-related scenarios, 
further establishing the validity of the HSA group.
4.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE HSA AND 
LSA GROUPS ON THE IPT
The descriptive results fi*om the four IPT scenarios are presented in Figures 1-4.
HSA group 
LSA group
Baseline R2
Type of information
R3
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Figure 1. Impact of reality and possibility information on probability ratings by 
social anxiety group on the Job Scenario.
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Figure 2. Impact of reality and possibility information on probability ratings by 
social anxiety group on the Pub Scenario.
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Figure 3. Impact of reality and possibility information on probability ratings by 
social anxiety group on the Bus Scenario.
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Figure 4. Impact of reality and possibility information on probability ratings by 
social anxiety group on the Contamination Scenario.
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All four scenarios showed the characteristic reduction in probability of the event 
occurring after the presentation of reality-based information and comparative 
increase in probability of the event occurring after the presentation of possibility- 
based information (except after the introduction of P2 on the job-related scenario for 
the LSA group), similar to that produced by Aardema et al. (2009). The HSA group 
rated the probability of the event occurring across the three ‘anxiety-based’ scenarios 
(i.e. Job, Pub, and Contamination) as higher than the LSA group at all the time 
points. This was likely to be due partly to the HSA group baseline probability ratings 
(i.e. participants were asked to rate the probability that the given incident had 
occurred immediately following the presentation of the scenario; see Appendix I) 
being higher than the LSA group. On the non-disorder based Bus Scenario the two 
groups rated the probability of the event occurring similarly across the seven time 
points.
Participants from the HSA group had more pronounced changes in their level of 
doubt than the LSA group after the presentation of reality- and possibility-based 
information on the three ‘anxiety-based’ scenarios. The changes in doubting on the 
non-disorder based scenario were more comparable between the HSA and LSA 
groups. The LSA group showed much greater increases and decreases in doubt 
following the presentation of reality- and possibility-based information on the non­
disorder based Bus Scenario when compared to the social anxiety and Contamination 
scenarios.
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4.3 HSA AND LSA GROUP INFERENTIAL CONFUSION SCORES
The ICQ-EV was utilised to assess self-reported levels of inferential confusion in the 
HSA and LSA groups. The data were judged to be normally distributed (Appendix 
K), and an independent samples t-test established that there was a significant 
difference between the HSA group (M = 103.03, SD = 35.04) and the LSA group (M 
= 60.04, SD = 30.42); t (167) = -8.21, p < 0.001. The magnitude of the differences in 
the means (95% Cl = -53.33 to -32.66) was large (Cohen’s d = 1.27). The HSA 
group in the current study scored similarly on the ICQ-EV to a diagnosed OCD 
group in the development of the ICQ-EV (M = 109.84; SD = 36.93; Aardema et al., 
2010).
4.4 ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF POSSIBILITY- AND REALITY- 
BASED INFORMATION
The current study hypothesised that the HSA group would be more influenced by 
possibility-based information on social anxiety-related issues than the LSA group. A 
second hypothesis stated that the HSA group would be more influenced by 
possibility-based information on the OCD-related scenario than the LSA group. 
Therefore the analysis aims to assess these differences as opposed to other 
differences between the HSA and LSA groups such as higher baseline anxiety and 
probability judgements at baseline. Therefore, the impact of both reality- and 
possibility-based information on level of doubt regarding the scenario incident 
occurring were included in the analysis.
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In order to establish the impact that possibility- and reality-based information had 
upon the level of participant doubt, a series of calculations was performed using the 
same method as Aardema et al. (2009). The impact of the three reality-based pieces 
of information for each scenario was calculated as follows: Impact of RI = B -  RI. 
Impact of R2 = PI -  R2. Impact of R3 = P2 -  R3. The impact of the three possibility- 
based pieces of information was calculated as follows: Impact of PI = PI -  RI. 
Impact of P2 = P2 -  R2. Impact of P3 = P3 -  R3. Both impact of P and impact of R 
calculations produce positive values. However, the positive value for the impact of R 
relates to magnitude of decrease whereas the impact of P value relates to the 
magnitude of increase in doubt that the incident did not happen (i.e. probability it 
had; see Figures 1-4 for direction of change in probability).
Data illustrating how the HSA and LSA groups scored on the impact of both reality- 
and possibility-based information on probability ratings for each of the four scenarios 
are presented in Tables 6-9. The social anxiety-related scenarios are presented 
separately as some of the assumptions of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) were 
violated for two of the scenarios (i.e. the Pub and Contamination scenarios). 
Therefore, a different analysis was undertaken with these scenarios. The ANOVAs 
described below analyse the main effect of social anxiety group, the main effect of 
information point (i.e. differences between information points I, 2 and 3), and the 
interaction between group and information point for possibility- and reality-based 
information separately. However, the main effect of information point is not essential 
to the hypotheses of the study and although it will be reported, no further analysis 
will be conducted on this element of the ANOVA.
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4.4.1 ANALYSIS OF THE JOB SCENARIO
Table 6: Impact of reality- and possibility-based information by HSA and LSA 
groups on the Job Scenario
Impact of information HSA LSA
M(SD) M(SD)
RI 11.38 (15.95) 10.60 (15.88)
R2 6.01 (12.64) 4.32 (14.54
R3 15.33 (16.20) 7.75 (13.46)
Cumulative R 32.73 (30.38) 22.68 (30.63)
PI 7.85 (12.84) 7.18(11.80)
P2 4.81 (13.38) -1.93 (17.02)
P3 8.38 (13.07) 4.74(11.88)
Cumulative P 21.05(28.85) 9.99 (26.22)
A mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to assess the impact of 
possibility-based information at three impact of information points (within factor) on 
probability ratings for the HSA and LSA groups (between factor) as the data was 
judged to be normally distributed (Appendix L & M). There was a main effect of 
group on cumulative impact of possibility-based information, F (1,168) = 6.45, p = 
0.012, partial eta squared = 0.037, indicating that impact of possibility-based 
information differed between the HSA and LSA groups. Table 6 shows that the HSA 
group shows higher levels of doubt at the impact of P2 and P3 cumulating in 
significantly higher levels of doubt overall. There was a significant main effect of 
information point, F(2, 336) = 12.48, p = 0.001, indicating that, across the whole 
sample, the impact of possibility-based information varied across the three 
information points. The interaction between group and information point was not 
significant (Wilks’ Lambda = 0.973, F(2, 167) = 2.276, p= 0.106, partial eta squared
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= 0.027), indicating that the three impact of possibility ratings did not differ between 
HSA and LSA groups.
A mixed ANOVA was conducted to assess the impact of reality-based information at 
three time points on probability ratings for the HSA and LSA groups. There was a 
significant main effect of group on cumulative impact of reality-based information, 
F(l,168) = 4.435, p = 0.037, partial eta squared = 0.026. This indicates that the HSA 
and LSA groups significantly differed in their cumulative ratings of doubt following 
reality-based information. Table 6 shows that at the impact of R3 the HSA group 
scored nearly twice the level of doubt as the LSA group in addition to higher levels 
of doubt at R2, which added to the cumulative impact of R differences between the 
groups. There was a significant main effect information point, Wilks’ Lambda = 
0.856, F(2, 167) = 14.09, p<0.001, partial eta squared = 0.14). The impact of reality- 
based information significantly differed across the three time points for the whole 
sample. The interaction between group and information point was not significant 
(Wilks’ Lambda = 0.967, F(2, 167) = 2.822, p = 0.06, partial eta squared = 0.033). 
Doubt did not differ by group across the three different information points.
4.4.2 ANALYSIS OF THE BUS SCENARIO
The following part of the analysis focuses on differences in levels of doubt between 
the HSA and LSA groups on the non-disorder based Bus Scenario. There was a 
significant difference in homogeneity of variance between the HSA and LSA group 
at the impact of RI. However, it was decided that a mixed ANOVA would be
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completed as Levene’s test was marginally significant and the data were judged to be 
normally distributed (Appendix N & O).
Table 7: Impact of reality- and possibility-based information by HSA and LSA 
groups on the Bus Scenario
Impact of information HSA LSA
M(SD) M(SD)
RI 26.60 (19.49)* 31.80(23.23)*
R2 16.67 (16.50) 10.01 (14.55)
R3 14.87 (18.91) 17.44(18.63)
Cumulative R 63.34 (39.53) 54.06 (33.63)
PI 13.36(18.02) 8.32 (14.57)
P2 11.99 (16.36) 10.09 (17.07)
P3 7.93 (15.70) 6.43 (12.71)
Cumulative P 33.28 (34.43) 24.84 (29.96)
*Levene’s homogeneity of variance test p = 0.04.
The main effect of group on cumulative impact of possibility-based information was 
not significant, F(l,168) = 2.718, p = 0.101, partial eta squared = 0.016. This 
indicates that there was no significant difference between anxiety groups in their 
cumulative levels of doubt following the introduction of possibility-based 
information. There was a significant main effect of information point, Wilks’ 
Lambda = 0.958, F(2, 167) = 3.667, p = 0.028, partial eta squared = 0.042. Impact of 
possibility information differed across the three information points for the whole 
sample. The interaction between information point and group was not significant, 
Wilks’ Lambda = 0.992, F(2,167) = 0.683, p = 0.507, Partial eta squared = 0.008. 
The impact of possibility-based information on doubt at the three information points 
did not differ between the social anxiety groups.
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A mixed ANOVA was conducted to assess the impact of reality-based information 
by social anxiety group. The main effect of group on cumulative impact of reality- 
based information was not significant, F (1,168) = 2.529, p = 0.114, partial eta 
squared = 0.015. There was a significant main effect of information point, Wilks’ 
Lambda = 0.695, F(2,167) = 0.001, partial eta squared = 0.305. Impact of reality- 
based information on doubt differed across the three time points for the whole 
sample. There was a significant interaction between group and the impact of reality 
at the three information points, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.961, F(2, 167) = 3.402, p =
0.036, partial eta squared = 0.039. Post hoc analysis revealed that at the impact of 
R2, the HSA group (M = 16.67, SD = 16.50) had significantly higher levels of doubt 
than the LSA group (M = 10.02; SD = 14.55; F (1, 168) = 7.28, p = 0.008). An 
additional post hoc analysis was conducted to assess differences within each group 
across the three impact of reality-based information points. A one-way ANOVA 
revealed a significant effect between time points in the LSA group, Wilks’ Lambda = 
0.64, F(2, 66) = 18.34, p<0.001. Pairwise comparisons revealed that impact of RI 
differed significantly fi*om impact of R2 (M difference = 16.59, p<0.001) and impact 
of R3 (M difference = 9.16, p = 0.018), and impact of R2 differed significantly from 
impact of R3 (M difference = 7.43, p = 0.015). A one-way ANOVA revealed a 
significant difference effect between time points in the HSA group, Wilks’ Lambda = 
0.68, F(2, 100) = 23.97, p<0.001. Pairwise comparisons revealed that impact of RI 
differed significantly from impact of R2 (M difference =15.14, p<0.001) and impact 
of R3 (M difference = 16.93, p<0.001). Impact of R2 did not differ from impact of 
R3 in the HSA group. Table 7 illustrates that from R2 to R3 in the HSA group the
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impact of information decreased in the level of change in doubt, whereas in the LSA 
group, impact of information was significantly greater at R3 than impact of R2.
4.4.3 ANALYSIS OF THE PUB SCENARIO
Due to significant differences in variance between the HSA and LSA groups on the 
Pub and Contamination Scenarios (see Tables 8 & 9) it was not feasible to conduct 
parametric analyses of these two scenarios. T-tests were considered as an alternative 
analytic method for comparing the two anxiety groups in cumulative impact of either 
possibility or reality based information as unequal variances can be managed in this 
analysis. However, Dancy and Reidy (2007) suggest that if the largest within group 
variance is more than three times the smallest, which was the case in the current 
study, and group sizes are not approximately equal, then a non-parametric alternative 
should be utilised. Therefore, the cumulative impact of reality- and possibility-based 
information was calculated as follows: Cumulative-P = (PI -  RI) + (P2 -  R2) + (P3 
-  R3). Cumulative R = (B -  RI) + (PI -  R2) + (P2 -  R3).
Non-parametric tests were used to analyse the differences in cumulative-P and 
cumulative-R between the HSA and LSA groups on the Pub and Contamination 
Scenarios.
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Table 8: Impact of reality- and possibility-based information by HSA and LSA 
groups on the Pub Scenario
Impact of 
information
HSA LSA
M(SD) Median Range M(SD) Median Range
RI 13.15 (17.72)* 10.00 117.00 8.07 (12.10)* 3.50 77.00
R2 7.99 (14.14) 5.00 106.00 0.94 (18.03) 1.00 132.00
R3 12.46 (16.03)* 8.50 121.00 6.16(9.14)* 4.00 55.00
Cumulative 33.60(31.86)* 27.50 209.00 15.18 9.00 113.00
R (21.52)*
PI 6.60 (13.31) 3.00 79.00 4.07 (10.92) 1.00 72.00
P2 8.47 (13.04) 3.00 69.00 0.54 (12.26) 1.00 101.00
P3 11.10(16.36)* 5.00 115.00 4.01 (11.66)* 1.00 93.00
Cumulative
P
26.17 (32.40)* 17.50 134.00 8.63 (19.40)* 3.00 134.00
Levene’s homogeneity of variance test p<0.05
Table 8 illustrates the impact of both reality- and possibility-based information on 
probability ratings on the Pub Scenario. The impact of both reality and possibility- 
based information, measured by the median, had a minimal effect upon doubt for the 
LSA group. For both the LSA and HSA groups, the impact of possibility-based 
information, as measured by the median, had a modest impact upon doubt. A Mann- 
Whitney U test was conducted in order to assess whether there was a difference 
between anxiety groups in the cumulative impact of possibility-based information. 
There was a significant difference in scores between the HSA group (Md = 17.50) 
and LSA group (Md = 3.00; p<0.001) indicating higher cumulative levels of doubt as 
a result of the introduction of possibility-based information in the HSA group when 
compared to the LSA group. A Mann-Whitney U test comparing cumulative impact 
of reality-based information between groups revealed a significant difference in 
scores between the HSA group (Md = 27.50) and LSA group (Md = 9.00; p<0.001).
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This suggests that the HSA group doubted cumulatively less than the LSA group as a 
result of the introduction of reality-based information.
4.4.4 ANALYSIS OF THE CONTAMINATION SCENARIO
Table 9 illustrates the impact of reality- and possibility-based information on 
probability ratings on the Contamination scenario for the HSA and LSA groups. For 
the LSA group, both reality- and possibility-based information, as measured by the 
median, had minimal impact upon level of doubting. A Mann-Whitney U test was 
conducted to compare anxiety groups on the cumulative impact of possibility-based 
information.
Table 9: Impact of reality- and possibility-based information by HSA and LSA 
groups on the Contamination Scenario
Impact of 
information
HSA LSA
M(SD) Median Range M(SD) Median Range
RI 2.19(9.26) 1.00 55.00 2.79 (12.92) 1.00 104.00
R2 15.62 (20.46) 14.00 115.00 8.71 (16.56) 7.00 103.00
R3 9.56 (19.49)» 5.50 159.00 3.01 (12.90)* 0.00 110.00
Cumulative
R
27.36 (33.55) 24.00 228.00 14.51 (28.18) 8.00 189.00
PI 7.81 (13.04)* 5.50 74.00 3.44 (8.69)* 1.00 66.00
P2 5.42 (20.86)* 1.00 153.00 1.90 (12.57)* 0.00 108.00
P3 8.19(16.16)* 3.50 112.00 4.01 (10.46)* 1.50 88.00
Cumulative
P
21.42 (32.83)* 15.00 222.00 9.35 (22.03)* 5.00 168.00
Levene’s homogeneity of variance test p<0.05
There was a significant difference in scores between the HSA group (Md = 15.00) 
and LSA group (Md = 5.00; p = 0.009) suggesting that the impact of possibility- 
based information in increasing doubt was stronger for those higher in social anxiety.
A Mann-Whitney U test comparing the anxiety groups on the cumulative impact of
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reality-based indicated a significant difference in scores between the HSA group (Md 
= 27.50) and LSA group (Md = 9.00; p = 0.006). This suggests that the HSA group 
doubted cumulatively less than the LSA group after the introduction of reality-based 
information.
5. DISCUSSION
The current study was conducted in order to assess whether individuals with high 
levels of social anxiety were more likely than individuals with low levels of social 
anxiety to doubt more as a result of possibility-based information in anxiety 
provoking situations. This hypothesis was tested through the utilisation of the IPT, a 
paradigm that was previously shown to measure doubt arising from an OCD 
population (Aardema et al., 2009). Overall, the results show that the HSA group was 
significantly more affected by the impact of both possibility- and reality-based 
information than the LSA group on both social anxiety-related scenarios and the 
OCD-related scenario. However, there were few differences between the groups 
when the impact of reality- and possibility-based information was measured using a 
non-disorder based Bus Scenario. Although there was an interaction effect on the 
Bus Scenario, this was only the case at one impact of reality point, which was not the 
case for the two other impact of reality probability ratings or the cumulative impact 
of reality main effect indicating a general lack of differences between the groups.
Inferential confusion is the notion that individuals pay greater credence to 
possibility-based information with a distrust of sensory-based information in 
triggering situations, causing doubt within the individual (O’Connor & Robillard,
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1995). The present study demonstrated that individuals with high levels of social 
anxiety, when presented with imaginary situations that are socially threatening, pay 
more credence to possibility-based pieces of information than individuals with low 
levels of social anxiety. This was the case for both social anxiety scenarios in the 
present study (Job and Pub Scenario) as measured by the cumulative impact of 
possibility. Interestingly, there was a greater reduction in levels of doubt in the HSA 
group than the LSA group after the presentation of reality-based information on the 
social anxiety-related scenarios. When individuals become inferentially confused, it 
is theorised that possibilities are favoured at the expense of reality/sensory-based 
information (O’Connor & Robillard, 1995). Within the current study, whilst reality- 
based information reduced doubt, possibility-based information continued to have an 
effect in the HSA group (as indicated by the characteristic decline and rise in doubt) 
by comparison with the LSA group. For example, levels of doubt reduced in both 
groups as a result of RI in the social anxiety-related scenarios, but following this the 
effect of either type of information seemed not to affect doubt in the LSA group, but 
the imagined possibilities were still able to trump reality for the HSA group.
With regard to the Contamination Scenario, there were some issues with 
homogeneity of variance, with a greater degree of variance within the HSA group 
(see Critique section below). However, the cumulative impact of reality and 
probability was calculated and yielded similar results to the social anxiety-related 
scenarios. The HSA group was more sensitive to the effects of both reality- and 
possibility-based information in making inferences about the fictional situation. 
Analysis of the self-report questionnaires indicated that the HSA group was
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composed of individuals that not only have a higher level of general distress, as 
measured by higher levels of depression and anxiety, but also higher levels of OCD 
symptomology. This is not an unexpected finding given that high levels of distress 
typically manifest in comorbid mental health conditions (Ohayon & Schatzberg, 
2010; Chartier, Walker, & Stein, 2003). The participants who experience 
contamination as threatening are more likely to have increased levels of doubt when 
confronted with the Contamination Scenario. Furthermore, the HSA group may have 
interpreted the Contamination Scenario as a socially threatening situation (making a 
friend ill), increasing the likelihood of anxiety, doubt, and potential inferential 
confusion observed in the social anxiety-related scenarios.
With regard to the Bus Scenario, a non-disorder based imaginary situation, there
were few differences between level of group doubt in response to the impact of both
reality- and possibility-based information. This is consistent with the findings of
Aardema et al. (2009) comparing an OCD and non-OCD group. However, as was
illustrated in Figure 3, both reality- and possibility-based information had an effect
on the way in which both HSA and LSA participants inferred the likelihood of the
bus strike occurring (the inference that the participants were required to make after
each piece of information on the Bus Scenario) as illustrated by large variations in
probability ratings after the presentation of each piece of information. In relation to
the LSA group, these large variations in probability ratings following the
presentation of reality- and possibility-based information did not occur when this
group was presented with social anxiety- related situations, yet when presented with
the possibility of a bus strike occurring, the LSA group was affected by both types of
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information. The LSA group inferred similar changes in probability ratings following 
both reality- and possibility-based information as the HSA group did following the 
social anxiety- and OCD-related scenarios.
One potential difference between the social anxiety and Bus Scenarios for the LSA 
group is that with the Bus Scenario participants were forced to consider changing 
their behaviour in response to the situation (i.e. if the bus they were about to catch 
was not going to arrive, they would have to find an alternative behaviour/solution) 
whereas when presented with the social anxiety-related scenarios, the LSA group did 
not appear to find the situation as threatening as the HSA group (as measured by 
lower probability ratings and levels of doubt) and therefore may not have inferred the 
need to react. This may have had the effect of causing the LSA group to negate all 
types of information in the social anxiety-related scenarios as if they were not a 
threat, whereas in the Bus Scenario, the LSA group inferred the need to react and 
therefore engaged in the reality- and possibility-hdiSQ& information causing deviations 
in their probability ratings and therefore higher levels of doubt. This finding suggests 
that the sustained effect of possibility-based information on both the HSA and LSA 
groups observed in the non-disorder based Bus Scenario represents participants 
becoming inferentially confused. Therefore, it implies that inferential confusion is 
not necessarily only associated with mental health issues but that it occurs in threat- 
inducing situations, especially for those individuals who are anxious to a greater 
degree.
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It is plausible that the level of threat that participants inferred from scenarios at 
baseline and the prominence they gave to those beliefs contributed to the way in 
which the fiirther reality- and possibility-based information was interpreted and the 
degree of impact this could have on doubt. That is, high salience would likely result 
in a high baseline doubt and then increased susceptibility to both possibility- and 
reality-based information. Low levels of interpreted significance of the scenario at 
baseline might produce a lack of sensitivity to both reality- and possibility-based 
information. The LSA group inferred low levels of baseline probability that the 
incident in the social anxiety- and OCD-related scenarios occurred. This influenced 
the way in which the further possibility- and reality-based information was 
interpreted, in that there was little change to levels of doubt across the different 
information points (in effect, if doubt was low at the outset, there was little scope for 
it to change). However, on the non-disorder based scenario, the LSA group inferred a 
high probability that the incident had occurred, causing elevated levels of doubt, and 
therefore the characteristic response to reality- and possibility-based information (i.e. 
high levels of doubt). Therefore, when the results from the social anxiety-related 
scenarios and the OCD-related scenario are taken into account, it appears that when 
situations are interpreted as threatening or of significant importance (i.e. high 
probability judgements in the scenarios), susceptibility to doubt is increased, and 
judgements are influenced by both possibility- and reality-based information in a 
manner similar to the HSA group when completing the social anxiety-related 
scenarios, and both the HSA and LSA groups when confronted by the non-disorder 
based Bus Scenario.
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Anxiety is an evolutionary response to a potential threat in the environment where 
the body reacts physiologically, cognitively, behaviourally, and emotionally (Bar- 
Haim et al., 2007). Under this set of circumstances, attention is shifted towards 
potential threats and this process is accompanied by a heightened sense of vigilance 
and a fear of catastrophe. This fear that disaster may arise can occur in spite of 
objective feedback to the contrary (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998). In the current 
study, it appears that inferential confusion may be the cognitive result of an implied 
threat that is interpreted as salient by an individual. For individuals who experience 
high levels of social anxiety, it is social situations that provoke an interpretation of 
threat, causing anxiety, which appears to trigger inferential confusion.
As a further exploration of inferential confusion in high levels of social anxiety, the 
self-report ICQ-EV was utilised. The HSA group scored significantly higher than the 
LSA group on the ICQ-EV indicating that on a self-reported basis, elevated levels of 
social anxiety are associated with increased inferential confusion. Utilising the IPT, 
the current study has found that the interpretation of threat and salience in situations 
is associated with increased inferential confusion. As the HSA group had higher 
levels of social anxiety symptoms, OCD symptoms, and general distress than the 
LSA group, it is likely that the HSA group experienced the interpretation of threat to 
a greater degree than the LSA group, and therefore reported higher levels of 
inferential confusion in response to the self-reported ICQ-EV questions. Therefore, 
although the ICQ-EV was designed primarily for an OCD population, individuals 
with elevated levels of social anxiety self-reported significantly higher levels of
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inferential confusion than the LSA group and similar scores on the ICQ-EV to a 
diagnosed OCD group from a previous study (Aardema et al., 2010).
5.1 CRITIQUE
The current study represents a successful operationalisation of the IPT using social 
anxiety-relevant scenarios. The IPT has previously only been used to assess doubt in 
relation to OCD-relevant and non-disorder based scenarios. However, the 
Contamination and Pub scenarios in the current study demonstrated within-group 
variability with regard to doubt. With reference to the contamination scenario, the 
HSA group varied considerably in doubt as a consequence of possibility- and reality- 
based information. Although the group as a whole had elevated levels of OCD 
symptoms, the group OCI-R mean score did not meet the cut-off for a diagnosis of 
OCD, although 21.8% of the HSA group did meet the criteria for OCD. One 
potential reason for this heterogeneity may be the specificity of the contamination 
scenario. The OCD-relevant IPT scenario utilised by Aardema et al. (2009) was a 
general scenario (e.g. a driving situation where an accident could be inferred) that 
was not likely to be specific to a particular anxiety disorder (i.e. intrusive thoughts 
are a universal phenomenon; Salkovskis, 1989). As the contamination scenario in the 
present study focused on a specific subtype of OCD, a proportion of the participants 
with elevated OCD symptoms may have been more affected by the contamination 
scenario and hence rated the probability of the incident occurring as higher than 
those in the HSA group that were not anxiously affected by the contamination 
scenario. This may have caused the heterogeneity within the HSA group.
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As has been discussed, there appear to be salient reasons as to why the 
Contamination Scenario yielded such heterogeneous within-group probability 
ratings. However, the Pub Scenario, designed as a social anxiety-provoking 
imaginary situation, also provoked greater heterogeneity within the HSA group than 
the LSA group. The Pub Scenario is an imaginary situation where participants rate 
the likelihood that the other people in the scenario are laughing at them. Although 
this is a common fear for individuals with social anxiety (e.g. the fear of negative 
appraisal by others) it is possible that within the HSA group, the heterogeneous 
probability ratings could be the result of an uncontrolled variable such as high levels 
of paranoia in some HSA group participants. Given that greater levels of distress are 
linked with a higher preponderance of mental health difficulties (Chartier, Walker, & 
Stein, 2003), a higher level of paranoia may be likely in the HSA group than in the 
LSA group. This within-group variability might suggest the need either to measure 
and look at the effects of other variables or to exclude other mental health conditions 
in the study. However, through using ‘pure’ mental health conditions the groups are 
less likely to constitute a valid representation of mental health distress as is 
experienced in the general population or in clinical samples given the high levels of 
comorbidity associated with mental distress (Chartier, Walker, & Stein, 2003). That 
is, people with high levels of social anxiety are likely to experience other types of 
mental health distress too.
A potential limitation of the current study is that the IPT presents participants with a 
series of forced pieces of reality- and possibility-based information. What is not 
known is whether either the HSA or LSA groups would use these types of
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information in this way when presented with such a situation in everyday life. It may 
be that the HSA group, when in a socially threatening situation, may only rely upon 
imagined possibilities, using reality-based information far less than in a non­
threatening situation. The IPT, however, forces the participants to pay attention to 
this information. The IPT also forces participants to alternate between reality- and 
possibility-based information, which again may not be representative of how people 
who are socially anxious reason when presented with such situations. A more 
ecologically valid paradigm for measuring doubt within anxiety-provoking situations 
would remedy this limitation. However, measuring thoughts and interpretations in 
vivo as inferential confusion occurs would have its own limitations and measurement 
difficulties.
Although the three types of scenarios used in the current study (social anxiety, 
contamination, and non-disorder based) were designed to measure separate issues it 
is likely that there may have been overlap in the anxious responses that were elicited 
in participants. For example, the Contamination Scenario contained an event where 
the participant had to imagine worrying that they had given their friend food 
poisoning and in the non-disorder based Bus Scenario the participant had to imagine 
being potentially late meeting friends because of a bus strike. Both of these scenarios 
could potentially be perceived as a social anxiety trigger by participants and 
therefore may have measured, for some participants, inference processes related to 
social anxiety and not the construct (e.g. OCD or a non-disorder based anxiety) they 
purportedly measured. This may have had the effect of causing the HSA and LSA
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groups to score in a more similar pattern to the social anxiety-based scenarios than 
would be expected.
A fiirther potential limitation was the formation of the HSA and LSA groups using 
the recommended SPIN cut-off. Some participants scored just above and just below 
the cut-off forcing them into the separate groups where in reality there may have 
been minimal differences between these participants. Furthermore, as the test re-test 
reliability of the SPIN has been demonstrated to be good (Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient = 0.89; p<0.001; O’Connor et al., 2000), participants may have been 
recruited to different groups if they had been retested. The result of these limitations 
may have had the effect of limiting the differences between the groups on the study 
measures (the IPT and self-report questionnaires) because of the potential overlap in 
levels of social anxiety between the HSA and LSA groups. One potential method of 
ameliorating this issue would have been to only use the highest and lowest scorers on 
the SPIN in order to limit the potential similarities in levels of social anxiety between 
the groups.
The current study was piloted through requesting clinicians with substantial 
experience in mental health issues to judge whether they believed the scenarios were 
high in face validity and then the study was initially tested with several participants 
to assess whether the scenarios were measuring what they purported to measure, 
whether the study was workable, and to gather some preliminary data. This process 
appeared to suggest the scenarios were acceptable and therefore recruitment was 
initiated. However, a more rigorous pilot study with data analysis may have captured
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the limitations with some of the scenarios (e.g. some of the limitations as described 
above) and would have provided an opportunity to amend them and re-pilot the study 
to improve the quality of the scenarios.
5.2 APPLICATION OF THE FINDINGS
Inferential confusion has principally been researched using an OCD population 
(Aardema et al., 2010). One of the main applications of this approach has been in the 
conception of Inference-Based Therapy for OCD (O’Connor & Aardema, 2012).
This approach was found to be as efficacious as cognitive therapy and exposure and 
response prevention (O’Connor et al., 2005; Aardema et al., 2010; Aardema & 
O’Connor, 2012). The present study has found that inferential confusion may well 
be a prominent reasoning style present in socially anxious individuals when 
presented with anxiety-provoking situations. This observation opens the possibility 
that individuals with social anxiety disorder may well benefit fi’om an adapted form 
of IBT. Such an intervention could provoke clients with high levels of social anxiety 
to evaluate the inferences they make in social anxiety-provoking situations. For 
example, individuals with social anxiety may benefit from questioning the credence 
they pay to possibilities such as “I am blushing so people must think I am a fool” in 
spite of objective feedback that contradicts such inferences (e.g. looking in the mirror 
and seeing they are not blushing; friends in the same situation commenting on how 
good it was to see them). Further research into the potential benefits of IBT for social 
anxiety disorder would be necessary and might provide a possible non-exposure 
based alternative to CBT. Given that one of the findings of the current study is that
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inferential confusion may transcend anxiety-based mental health problems, IBT 
might potentially be applied as a treatment for a range of mental health conditions.
6. CONCLUSION
Individuals with high levels of social anxiety are more likely to pay credence to 
possibility-based information and negate reality-based information than individuals 
with low levels of social anxiety symptoms when presented with threat-inducing 
situations. Furthermore, the current study suggests that inferential confusion may be 
the product of a cognitive threat response, rather than a product of a belief-based 
disorder such as OCD. This suggests that further research to investigate the efficacy 
of IBT for social anxiety disorder is recommended.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A -  INFERENCE PROCESSES TASK
SCENARIO 1 -  PUB SCENARIO (SOCIAL ANXIETY)
You are at the birthday party of a work colleague in a local pub on a Friday night. It 
was your first day at work today and you haven’t met any of your colleagues before. 
You are sitting in a group and people are talking to each other around you. You get 
up to go to the toilet and as you are walking towards the exit, everyone starts to 
laugh.
How likely is it that the others are laughing at you?
Pair 1 : Objective: The group do not look at you as they are laughing
Possibility: But maybe they don’t know you are still in the room
Pair 2: Objective: You ask someone what they were laughing at and they say 
someone told a joke
Possibility: Maybe they just said that to protect your feelings
Pair 3: Objective: You have had many nice conversations with your work colleagues 
this evening
Possibility: Maybe they were just waiting until you left so they could say 
what they really thought
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SCENARIO 2 -  JOB SCENARIO (SOCIAL ANXIETY)
You are in an interview for an important job. Someone asks you a question you are 
not sure of the answer to. You feel your heart beating quicker, your palms start to 
feel moist, your face starts to feel hot, and your mouth dries up. The others look at 
you. You clear your mouth and then answer the question abruptly.
How likely is it that the others think you are making a fool of yourself?
Pair 1: Objective: No one smirked or laughed at you when you responded
Possibility: Maybe they were just thinking “what a stupid thing to say”
Pair 2: Objective: No one said anything about you being a fool
Possibility: But maybe they felt awkward and didn’t feel like talking to you
Pair 3: Objective: The others nodded to what you said and continued the topic of 
conversation.
Possibility: They may have nodded along as a way of getting you to stop 
talking
SCENARIO 3 -  BUS SCENARIO (NON-DISORDER BASED)
You are on your way to a restaurant for an evening out with your friends. You have 
decided to take the bus to save some money even though the possibility of a bus 
strike was announced on the news yesterday. Once you arrive at the bus stop you 
wait for 20 minutes with several people standing beside you and still no bus has
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arrived. Then you overhear something about “a strike.” Soon afterwards most of the 
people around you disappear.
What do you consider to be the probability that there is a bus strike under these 
circumstances?
Pair 1 : Objective: At the end of the street you see a bus driving on what appears to 
be a different route.
Possibility: Maybe the bus was out of service since you could not see whether 
there were any people in it.
Pair 2: Objective: A person tells you he took the bus earlier in the day.
Possibility: The strike may have only started earlier in the day.
Pair 3: Objective: You call the information service and get an automated message 
with no mention of any strike.
Possibility: Maybe the bus company doesn’t give out this type of information 
that quickly.
SCENARIO 4 -  CONTAMINATION SCENARIO (OCD BASED)
You invite a good friend to your home to have a BBQ. You decide to cook a new 
chicken kebab recipe. The recipe book you are using reminds you to be careful to 
cook the chicken properly as salmonella is sometimes present. As you are using the 
BBQ you are so rushed that you forget to time the cooking but give the food to your 
friends anyway as the food appears to be hot enough.
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What do you consider the probability that you have given your friend salmonella 
poisoning?
Pair 1: Objective: The BBQ coals were very hot when you cooked.
Possibility: But maybe the BBQ was only hot enough in some places. 
Pair 2: Objective: The chicken did not look pink on the inside.
Possibility: Maybe not all undercooked chicken looks pink.
Pair 3: Objective: You had a chicken kebab and it was cooked properly.
Possibility: Maybe your chicken kebab was on a hotter part of the BBQ.
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APPENDIX B -  SOCIAL PHOBIA INVENTORY
Name.
P lease  indicate how much the following problems have bothered you during the past w eek. 
The numbers in this column refer to the following labels:____________________________________
Not at all A little Moderately A lot Extremely
1 . 1 am afraid of people in authority. 0 1 2 3 4
2. I am bothered by blushing in front of people 0 1 2 3 4
3. Parties and social events scare me. 0 1 2 3 4
4 . 1 avoid talking to people I don’t know. 0 1 2 3 4
5. Being criticised scares m e a lot. 0 1 2 3 4
6. Fear of em barrassment c a u ses  m e to avoid 0 1 2 3 4
doing things or speaking to people.
7. Sweating in front of people ca u ses. 0 1 2 3 4
m e distress
8 . 1 avoid going to parties. 0 1 2 3 4
9 . 1 avoid activities in which I am the centre of 0 1 2 3 4
attention.
10. Talking to strangers scares m e. 0 1 2  3 4
11.1 avoid having to give sp eech es . 0 1 2 3 4
1 2 . 1 would do anything to avoid being criticise. 0 1 2 3 4
13. Heart palpitations bother m e when I am 0 1 2 3 4
around people.
1 4 . 1 am afraid of doing things when people 0 1 2 3 4
might be watching.
15. Being em barrassed or looking stupid are my 0 1 2 3 4
worst fears.
1 6 . 1 avoid speaking to anyone in authority. 0 1 2 3 4
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17. Trembling or shaking in front of others is 0 
distressing to me.
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APPENDIX C -  INFERENTIAL CONFUSION QUESTIONNAIRE -  
EXPANDED VERSION
Please rate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements using this 
scale:
Scale: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree Strongly
disagree disagree agree agree
1 .1 am sometimes more convinced about what might be there than by what I actually 
see.
2 .1 sometimes invent stories about certain problems that might be there
3. Sometimes certain far-fetched ideas feel so real they could just as well be 
happening
4. Often my mind starts to race and I come up with all kinds of far-fetched ideas.
5 .1 can get very easily absorbed in remote possibilities that feel as if they are real.
6 .1 often confuse different events as if they were the same.
7 .1 often connect ideas or events in my mind that would seem far-fetched to others 
or even to me.
8. Certain disturbing thoughts of mine sometimes cast a shadow on to everything I 
see around me.
9 .1 sometime forget who or where I am when I get absorbed in to certain ideas or 
stories.
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10. My imagination is sometimes so strong that I feel stuck and unable to see things 
differently.
11.1 invent arbitrary rules, which I then feel I have to live by.
12.1 often cannot tell whether something is safe, because things are not what they 
appear to be.
13. Sometimes every far-fetched possibility my mind comes up with feels real to me.
14.1 sometimes get so absorbed in certain ideas that I am completely unable to see 
things differently even if I try.
15. In order to tell whether there is a problem or not I tend to look more for that 
which is hidden than what I can actually see.
16. Even if I don’t have any actual proof of a certain problem, my imagination can 
convince me otherwise.
17. Just the thought that there could be a problem or something wrong is proof 
enough for me that there is.
18.1 can get so caught up in certain ideas of mine that I totally forget about 
everything around me.
19. Often when I feel certain about something a small detail comes to mind that puts 
everything into doubt.
2 0 .1 sometimes come up with far-fetched reasons why there is a problem or 
something wrong, which then suddenly starts to feel real to me.
21.1 often cannot get rid of certam ideas, because I keep coming up possibilities that 
confirm my ideas.
22. My imagination can make me lose confidence in what I actually perceive.
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23. A mere possibility often has as much impact on me as reality itself.
24. Even if I have all sorts of visible evidence against the existence of a certain 
problem, I still feel it will occur.
25. Even the smallest possibility can make me lose confidence in what I know.
2 6 .1 can imagine something and end up living it.
27 .1 am more often concerned with something that I cannot see rather than 
something I can see.
2 8 .1 sometimes come up with bizarre possibilities that feel real to me.
29 .1 often react to a scenario that might happen as if it is actually happening.
30 .1 sometimes cannot tell whether all the possibilities that enter my mind are real or 
not.
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APPENDIX D -  OBSESSIVE COMPULSIVE INVENTORY -  REVISED
The following statements refer to experiences that many people have in their 
everyday lives. Circle the number that best describes HOW MUCH that experience 
has DISTRESSED or BOTHERED you during the PAST MONTH.
The numbers refer to the following verbal labels;
Not at all A little Moderately A lot Extremely 
0 1 2  3 4
1 .1 have saved up so many things that they get in the way.
2 .1 check things more often than necessary.
3 .1 get upset if objects are not arranged properly.
4 .1 feel compelled to count while I am doing things.
5 .1 find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been touched by strangers 
or certain people.
6 .1 find it difficult to control my own thoughts.
7 .1 collect things I don’t need.
8 .1 repeatedly check doors, windows, drawers, etc.
9 .1 get upset if others change the way I have arranged things.
10.1 feel I have to repeat certain numbers.
11.1 sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I feel contaminated.
12.1 am upset by unpleasant thoughts that come into my mind against my will.
13.1 avoid throwing things away because I am afraid I might need them later.
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14.1 repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches after turning them off.
15.1 need things to be arranged in a particular way.
16.1 feel that there are good and bad numbers.
17.1 wash my hands more often and longer than necessary.
18.1 frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting rid of them.
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APPENDIX E -  DEPRESSION SCALE
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how 
much the statement applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Do not spend too much time on any statement.
The rating scale is as follows:
0 Did not apply to me at all
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time
2 Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time
3 Applied to me very much, or most of the time
1 I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all
2 I just couldn't seem to get going
3 I felt that I had nothing to look forward to
4 I felt sad and depressed
5 I felt that I had lost interest in just about everything
6 I felt I wasn't worth much as a person
7 I felt that life wasn't worthwhile
8 I couldn't seem to get any enjoyment out of the things I did
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9 I felt down-hearted and blue
10 I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything
11 I felt I was pretty worthless
12 I could see nothing in the future to be hopeful about
13 I felt that life was meaningless
14 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things
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APPENDIX F -  ANXIETY SCALE
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how 
much the statement applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Do not spend too much time on any statement.
The rating scale is as follows:
0 Did not apply to me at all
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time
2 Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time
3 Applied to me very much, or most of the time
1 I was aware of dryness of my mouth
2 I experienced breathing difficulty (eg, excessively rapid breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion)
3 I had a feeling of shakiness (eg, legs going to give way)
4 I found myself in situations that made me so anxious I was most 
relieved when they ended
5 I had a feeling of faintness
6 I perspired noticeably (eg, hands sweaty) in the absence of high 
temperatures or physical exertion
7 I felt scared without any good reason
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8 I had difficulty in swallowing
9 I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical
exertion (eg, sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat)
10 I felt I was close to panic
11 I feared that I would be "thrown" by some trivial but 
unfamiliar task
12 I felt terrified
13 I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make 
a fool of myself
14 I experienced trembling (eg, in the hands)
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APPENDIX G -  ETHICAL APPROVAL LETTER
University of Surrey 
29^  ^January 2013 
Dear Graham
Reference: 853-PSY--12
UNIVERSITY OF
Professor Bertram Opitz
Chair: Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics 
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Thank you for your submission of the above proposal.
The Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics Committee has now given a 
favourable ethical opinion.
If there are any significant changes to your proposal which require further scrutiny, 
please contact the Faculty Ethics Committee before proceeding with your Project.
Yours sincerely
Professor Bertram Opitz 
Chair
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APPENDIX H -  FLOW DIAGRAM OF THE STUDY
Consent form -  participant agrees or disagrees to take
part
Demographic information section -  participant fills in 
their details by selecting appropriate answers
Introduction section detailing th e credentials o f the  
author, the right to  withdraw and ethical considerations
Scenario 1 is presented in written format. Participant is 
asked to rate their level o f anxiety and rate their level o f 
certainty as to  w hether an incident has occurred
Details about the study, participant rights, data 
protection, risks and benefits in taking part, and the  
authors contact details
Orientating information to  let participant know they will 
be presented with scenarios and will be required to make 
judgem ents based upon that information
Participant presented with reality-based information (Rl) 
and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the incident 
has occurred
Participant presented with possibility-based information 
(PI) and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the  
incident has occurred
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Scenario 2 is presented in written format. Participant is 
asked to  rate their level o f anxiety and rate their level o f  
certainty as to  w hether an incident has occurred
Participant presented with possibility-based information 
(PI) and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the  
incident has occurred
Participant presented with reality-based information (Rl) 
and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the incident 
has occurred
Participant presented with reality-based information (R2) 
and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the incident 
has occurred
Participant presented with reality-based information (R2) 
and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the incident 
has occurred
Participant presented with reality-based information (R3) 
and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the incident 
has occurred
Participant presented with possibility-based information 
(P3) and then asked to  re-rate the likelihood that the  
incident has occurred
Participant presented with possibility-based information 
(P2) and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the  
incident has occurred
The Role of Inferential Confusion in Social Anxiety: A Quasi-Experimental study
URN: 6198773
76
Participant presented with possibility-based information  
(P2) and then asked to  re-rate the likelihood that the  
incident has occurred
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Scenario 3 is presented in written format. Participant is 
asked to  rate their level o f anxiety and rate their level o f  
certainty as to  w hether an incident has occurred
Participant presented with possibility-based information 
(P3) and then asked to  re-rate the likelihood that the  
incident has occurred
Participant presented with reality-based information (Rl) 
and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the incident 
has occurred
Participant presented with possibility-based information  
(PI) and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the  
incident has occurred
Participant presented with reality-based information (R2) 
and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the incident 
has occurred
Participant presented with possibility-based information 
(P2) and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the  
incident has occurred
Participant presented with reality-based information (R3) 
and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the incident 
has occurred
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Scenario 4 is presented in written format. Participant is 
asked to rate their level o f anxiety and rate their level o f 
certainty as to  w hether an incident has occurred
Participant presented with possibility-based information 
(P2) and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the  
incident has occurred
Participant presented with possibility-based information 
(PI) and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the  
incident has occurred
Participant presented with reality-based information (R2) 
and then asked to  re-rate the likelihood that the incident 
has occurred
Participant presented with reality-based information (R3) 
and then asked to  re-rate the likelihood that the incident 
has occurred
Participant presented with reality-based information (Rl) 
and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the incident 
has occurred
Participant presented with possibility-based information 
(P3) and then asked to re-rate the likelihood that the  
incident has occurred
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Participant presented with th e anxiety scale and asked to  
com plete the questions
Participant presented with the depression scale and 
asked to com plete the questions
Participant presented with the OCI-R and asked to  
com plete the questions
Participant presented with the ICQ-EV and asked to  
com plete the questions
Participant presented with reality-based information (R3) 
and then asked to  re-rate the likelihood that the incident 
has occurred
Participant presented with possibility-based information 
(P3) and then asked to  re-rate the likelihood that the  
incident has occurred
Participant informed they  will now be asked about their 
mental health using multiple choice questions. Participant 
presented with the SPIN and required to  answ er each  
question
Participant presented with the debrief screen giving more 
information regarding the hypotheses o f the study. 
Participants are also presented with som e information for 
sources of support
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APPENDIX I -  SCREEN SHOTS OF THE STUDY DESIGN
Introduction to the study:
HOW DO PEOPLE THINK IN SOCIAL SITUATIONS? f  uWFRSrwOF
%  5UI% EYMy name is Graham Jensch and I am a trainee clinical psychologist based in 
the School of Psychology at the University of Surrey. This means I am
undertaking a doctorate level qualification in clinical psychology and part of this course requires me 
to undertake research on some aspect of mental health. I would like to invite you to take part in 
my research study.
As a potential research participant, you have the right to be given information regarding my study 
and make an informed decision about whether to participate. The first few screens will give you this 
information so after reading these please take time to think about whether you would like to take 
part. If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me by email: 
q.iensch@sunrev.ac.uk.
This study has undergone review by the University of Surrey Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences 
Research Ethiœ Committee and has been given a favourable ethical opinion. This means that a 
group of experienced researchers have assessed my research study and deemed it suitable to be 
used with participants.
80
The Role o f Inferential Confusion in Social Anxiety: A Quasi-Experimental study
URN: 6198773
Further introduction to the study:
WHAT 1& THE e r w r r  A m o u r?
1 # m  jn v w N g a iu m g  m *  w a y  k  w h fd *  p a o p i#  A lm k  k  a  m n g a  o f  a * * u a u a n a  a n d  h o w  A # y
# s e  k b n n a w o n  t o  m a k a  d a c w o n a ,  R a a a a r c h  ahow m  t h a t  w h a n  p a o p l a  a m  m ax io u a  K  ( a n a *  #  
c h a n g e  t h e  w a y  in  w W ch  t h e y  m a a o n  ( h o w  p a n p f a  t h k k ,  u m d a m ta n d  k f o m n a d M ,  a n d  m a k e  
j w d o e m M t s )  a n d  Î  a a n  i n t e r e s t e d  in  c a m p a r tn g  h o w  d W Ih m n t p e o p le  m a s o n  w h a n  p m a a m ta d  W th  
s i t u a t i o n s  a n d  a r e  a s k e d  t o  m a k e  a  J u d g e m e n t .  S p e s d h te a iy ,  I a m  to o k » ig  t o  k v a a d g a t a  h o w  p e o p l e  
w h o  a r e  s o c ia i iy  a n x io u s  o o m p a m  to  t h e  f s n e r a i  p o p u l a t i o n  w h e n  t h e y  m a s o n .  T h e  Ê n à n g s  ot t h i s  
m s e a f e h  will h o p e fu d y  in fo rm  o u r  u n d # # a n à n §  o f  t h e  w a y  in  w tW A  p e o p le  t h a t  a r e  m a a l l y  
a n x io u s  t h k k  ( ^ i h o u g h  t h #  s t u d y  r e q u i r e s  p o o p *  v rh o  a m  n o t  s o e la h y  a n x io u s  t o o )  a n d  im fo rm  
t m a t m e n t s  f o r  t h i s  I s s u e .
WHAT W aJL THE STUDY IN W Ô LV #
I f  y o u  d e c id e  t o  t a k e  p a r t  y o u  w d l h e  p r e a a n t a d  w #  f e y r  a o e n o h o o  a n d  a a k o d  t o  m a k e  a  i w m b e r  c# 
J u d g e m e n t s .  T h e m  a m  a l s o  s o m e  q o e s h o m e  a b o u t  w h a t h o f  y o u  e x p e r le m p a  w ia d a ty  o r  d o p r e s a lo n .
T h e  s tu d y  s h o u ld  t a k e  a fao ïA  2-0 m in u t e s  t o  m m p le & e  a k h o u p h »  f u r  s o m e  p e o p le ,  R m a y  t a k e  k m g e r  
t h a n  t h i s .
T h r e e  o f  t h e  s c e n a r i o s  y o u  w id  h e  a s k e d  t o  im a g in e  o o u ld  twi a r o d a ty  p r o v o k in g  ( o n e  r o t a t e s  t o  f b o d  
p o lao iW n g  a n d  tw o  o t h e r s  r e g a r d in g  d d h o u A  s o c ia l  s t t u a tk m s X  I f  y o u  t h k k t h a t  i n w k f d k g  t h e s e  
k i n d s  o f  s o e m a r lo s  c o u ld  b e  t o o  d i s t r e s s i n g  p l e a s e  d o  n o t  t a k e  p a r t .
Y ou m u s t  h e  W #  y e w o  © id t o  t a k e  p o r t  i n  t h i s  s t u d y .
YOUR RM M TS IN  T W i  *TUDY
Y ou h a v e  t h e  d g h t  t o  w i th d r a w  a t  a n y  U m e , e v e n  *  y o u  h a v e  c o m p l # e o  p a r t  o f  t h e  s tu d y .  T h e  
I n f o r m a t io n  p r o v id e d  h y  p a rh tip a n b s w W B  h e  k ^  c o o A d a n h a l .  Y o u  w È  n « à  n e e d  t o  p r o v id e  a n y  
p a r s o n a d y  id e n u m a h le  i n f a r m a d o n  ( s u d s  a s  y o u r  n a m e )  h o w e v *  y o u  w ill b e  a s k e d  to  p r o v id e  s o m e  
d e m o g r a p h ic  in f o r m a t io n  s u c h  a s  a p e ,  g e n d w ,  o c r u p e h o n ,  e t h n l d t y  a o d  l e v e i o f  e d w c a tlo m . A d  
d w n o g m p M c  d a t a  p r o v id e d  t i y  p a r d c i p a n ta  w d l h e  k e p t  ç o ô A d e n d s l .
H O W  W IL L  D A T A  M tO V ID D O  I N  T H I S  S T U D Y  am  W SD D ?
T h e  k i f o r m a t lo n  p r o v ld a d  b y  p a i t l c i p a n t s  w ill b e  # o r e d  o n  a  a e œ o  d s t s f e a s e  a t  t h e  U n iv e r s i ty  o f  
S u r r e y .  T h e  d a t a b a s e  w d l o n ly  b *  a c c e s s ib l e  b y  a  p a s s w o r d  k n o w n  b y  m y s e l f  a n d  m y  re s e a r c h  
su p e rv W o ir ( O r  L a u r a  S k n o rK b ;, l e c t u r e r a t y * U r « h m r # y p f S u m e y ) .  T h e  d a t a  p ro v id e d  b y  
p a rW d p e n tB  m a y  b e  s h a r e d  w i th  o t t i e r  r a s e a r c h w s  h o w e v e r  y o u  w o u ld  n o t  b e  p a r s a n a l l y  
W e n t l f l a h le .
ARE THERE ANY R ^ K E  IN  TA K IN # PART?
A s a l r e a d y  m e n t i o n e d ,  s o m e  o f  t h e  s o e n a d o s  m a y  b e  r b a t r e s a in g  f o r  s o m a  p e p f d e  t o  i m a g i n e ,  i f  y o u  
d d n k  t h i s  I s  s o m e t h in g  t h a t  w ill d isb n e e s  y o u  p lo B s e  c o n s l d a r  n o t  t a k i n g  p a r t  i f  a f t e r  p w h d p a d i r g  
y o u  w o u ld  i i t e  s o m e b o d y  t o  t a l k  t o ,  t h e r e  a r e  c o n t a c t  d e t a i l s  f b r  o r g a m s e t i o r r s  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  
s tu d y .
ARM T H R M  AMY D m N ^IT R  IN  TAXI MU PARTY
$ y  t a k i n g  p a r t  m  s t u d y  y o u  w dl b e  ^ d k g  r e s e w o h  in to  u n d e r s t a n d in g  t h e  w a y  In  w h ic h  p e o r d e  th a d c  
w R h  a m d e t y  p r o b le m s  a u d i  a s  s o d a l  a m s ie ty ,  w h ic h  h a s  a  M attnm e p re v a lo r ro e  o f  a r o u n d  i 2 %  o f  t h e  
g e n e r a l  p o p w la tlo e i,
MY CONTACT DETAILS 
G r a h a m  J e rre c h  
T r a in e e  CUmical P s y c h o lo g is t  
S c h o o l  o f  P s y c h c d o g y
U n iv e rs i ty  of Surrey
G u d d b r d
G U Z T X H
;Ç : ^ e n a c h iD a u r re v . » r  u k
81
The Role of Inferential Confusion in Social Anxiety: A Quasi-Experimental study
URN: 6198773
Consent form:
Consent Form i-' uisnvwarYOF
%  SURREYI have read and ur»dersttK>d the information provided on the previous pages. I
have been given a full explanation by the investigators of the nature,
purpose, location and likely duration of the study, and of what I will be expected to do.
% understand th a t I do not have to take part in this study and th a t if I want to  ^ o p  taking part a t 
any point during completing the survey I can do so without having to explain why.
I agree th a t if I do not fully complete the study, the data I have inputted can be used when 
writing-up the study.
I have been advised about any discomfort and any il I-effects on my health and wellbeing th a t may 
result.
1 have been given an opportunity to ask questions on all aspects of the  study and have understood 
the  advice and information given as a result.
Î understand th a t all personal data relating to volunteers is held a processed in the strictest 
confidence, and in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). I agree that I will not seek to 
restrict the use of the results of the study on the understanding that my anonymity is preserved.
I confirm th a t I have read and understood the above and freely consent to participating in this 
study. I have been given adequate time to consider my participation and agree to  comply with the 
instructions and restrictions of the study.
If you would like to take part in the study, please click 'yes' below to continue.
If you do not wish to take part please click 'no ' below.
iî“ g!.T.ilYes
2 Consentez I^  '  No
Orienting information for participants:
You will now be presented with four scenarios and will be asked to rate the probability of the event 
occurring in each scenario.
Six new pieces of information will then be presented following each scenario and you will be asked 
to re-rate the probability of the event occurring in response to this new information.
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Example situation:
@  Please Imagine you are in this situation
You are at the birthday party of a work colleague in a local pub on a Friday night. It was your first 
day at work today and you haven't met any of your colleagues before. You are sitting In a group
and people are talking to each other around you. You get up to go to the toilet and as you are
walking towards the exit, everyone starts to laugh.
How anxious would you feel in the above situation?
(Please click on the bar below to Indicate your level of anxiety)
Most
Not ' ” - ————  anxious
anxious    I could
feel
How likely is it that the others are laughing at you?
(Please click on the bar below to indicate your level of certainty)
Improbable ' '  " ' ‘ Certain
Example reality-based information:
The group do not look at you as they are laughing.
;q3si;
How likely is It that the others are laughing at you?
(Please click on the bar below to indicate your level of certainty)
Improbable • Certain
Example possibility-based information:
But maybe they don't know you are still in the room.
q 4 s l ;
What do you consider the probability that others are laughing at you?
Improbable      ' "" Certain
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Presentation of SPIN (the words and numbers inside the blue boxes were not visible 
to participants):
Q  Next, you will be asked a  se t of multiple choice questions regarding your mental health. 
Please indicate how much the following problems have bothered you during the past week.
Nor at all A little Moderately A lot Extremely
I am afraid of people in authority. |grkil_rl=l|
u V,
I am bothered by blushing in front of 
people.
'gridl_r2=T g-dl r2=3* tgr1dl_r2-4
1, , » I 4 :gridl_J-2=5|ki  «» »  ^ »«« t
W
Parties and social events scare me. |gridi_r3=2|
s j
igridl_r3=4| fgridi r3=5j
" c ..........
I avoid talking to ueople I don't know. O'-iCl r4-2 ■.......................... * »• ,g^dl_r4=3 • ......................  » :gndl_r4=5tu
Being criticised scares me a lot. |gridl_r5=l|u
jgridl_r5=2| 5giidl_r5=3r
Q
Sgridi_rS=4|
w
Ïgridî_r5=5;
Presentation of OCI-R:
The following st^em ents refer to experiences that many people have in their everyday lives. Circle 
the number that best describes HOW MUCH that experience has DISTRESSED or BOTHERED you 
during the PAST MONTH.
I have saved up so many things that 
they get in the way.
I check things more often than 
fiecessary.
I get upset if objects are not arranged
property.
I feel compelled to count wh.ie I am 
doing things.
I find it difficult to touch an object 
when I know it has been touched by 
strangers or certain people.
Not at all A little
|qrid2 r i= 2 |sgrid2 r l = i -
u
 ......
:ghdZ_r4=l!
■ # '
■ ilM ill
1 find it d.fficult 
thoughts.
control my own
|gr»d.2_r5=î5
■grKi2_»6=l » « > » • «
;qrid2_!2=2;
igr id 2_r3=2|
2""T' ,
ig r id 2  r4=2: 
■■ :  ■
|grid2_r
Moderately
;gritl2 r l= 3 t  
W
Îgrid2_r2 = 3;
S '  >
\J
!grid2 r3 = 3 |
" "  J ..............
sgrid2_r5=3| 
gr.c2 r6 = 3
A lot
igridZ r l= 4 j 
;grid2_r2=4 ; 
rgndl2 r3= 4;
V
;grid2_r4=4E » •
|gr id 2_r5= 4 |
EïdTïMnely
•gridZ r i= 5 |  
ignda i2=S;* ' • '  '  r r .  '  *
.g M d 2 _ :4 = 5 ;
■w^
b rid 2_r5= 5;
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Presentation of ICQ-EV:
Please rate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements.
rgrid3_rî=l|; ;gr»d3_rl=2| ;grid3_rl=3| jgrid3_ri=4| |grid3_rl=5 g ;grid3_ri=6i
Ü " 'c r -   ... CT""
strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
disagree Disagme dis=w^ agree Agree agree
convinced about what 
might be there than by
what I actually see.
I sometimes invent 
problems that might be
Sometimes certain far­
fetched ideas fee! so real Jgrid3_r3=l;’ :gnd3_r3=2: :gnd3_r3=3i Êgrid3_r3=4î Sgrid3_r3=5; jgrid3_r3=6;
g r id 3 _ '? = t;  g'-ki3_r2=2; _gnd3_t2=3; : g -.d3_ '2= 4  ;g ’ id3_-2 = .'s ; ,gnd3_ r2= 6
they CMjId just as well be ^  
happening.
Presentation of Depression scale:
U w
Please read each statement and choose the response which indicates how much the statement 
applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much 
time on any statement.
Did not apply 
to me at all
Applied to me 
to some 
uegree, or 
some of tne 
time
Applied to me 
to 3 
considerable 
degree, or a 
oooa part of 
time
Applied to me
most or the 
rime
I couldn't seem to experience any Igrkl4 rl=l; |gnd4_rl=2| ;grid4_r:l=3|
positive feeling a t all 
I just douMnt seem bo get going
........0  _ _
;grid4_r2=3| 'Tgrid4_r2^ 4^
I felt that I had nothing to look forward 
to
Ïgrid4_r3=îj
u
îgrid4_r3=3i
w
|giid4_r3=4i
Li)
Presentation of Anxiety scale:
Please read each statement and choose the response which indicates how much the statement 
applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much 
time on any statement.
Did not a p p ^
to me at all
Applied to me
ÎO sDifie
degree, or 
some of the 
time
Applied to me 
to a 
considerable 
d-y;'r;e, or a 
part of 
time
Applied to me 
very much, or 
most of the 
time
I was aware of dryness of my mouth : grids rl=lj
Ü
'grids rl=2s »gjid5_rl=3{ »grid5_ri=4;
I experienced breathing difficulty {eg, 
excessively rapid breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of 
physical exertion)
i(jri.35_r?=i ; gnciS_r2-2 g"dS_'2-3.' ;gnd5_‘?=A:
I had a feeling of shakiness (eg, legs 
going to give way)
1 grids r3=l| 
__ ___
: grids r3=2|
U  __
s grids r3=4|Bi- •; f « B
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Debrief screen:
DEBRIEF SCREEN ^ ^
Thank you for partidpaling in the study. This screen is an opportunity to ^
explain in more detail about the hypotheses of the study.
As mentioned at the beginning, the purpose of this study is to investigate how people who are 
socially anxious compare to other people when they are asked to reason (how people think, 
understand information, and make judgements). Previous research has shown that people with 
obsessive compulsive disorder tend to doubt their reasoning when compared to people without such 
difficulties. The current study is interested in whether this increased doubting is also a problem for 
people who describe themselves as socially anxious. The scenarios you completed aimed to  assess 
how much you doubted yourself when presented with a variety of situations (e.g. a scenario where 
someone may become socially anxious).
To access support for distress and mental health problems the following numbers may be useful. If 
you are concerned for your health you are advised to contact your General Practitioner.
Mind
Phone: 0845 765 0163 (Monday -  Friday 9am to 5pm)
Email:infoPmind.oro.uk 
Website: httP://www.mind.om.uk
Saneftne
Phone : 0845 757 8000 (6pm -  11pm daily) or 020 7375 1002 
Email: sanemail@sane.oro.uk 
Website: http : /  /  www.sane.oro. u k
A list of further self help organisations can be accessed at: http: / /www.ukselfhefp.info
If you know of anyone over the age of 18 years old who would be willing to complete this research,
I would be grateful if you could direct them to this online link: 
http : / / su rvevs .fahs.surrev.ac. u k/socia I situado ns
Thank you for taking the time to complete my research.
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APPENDIX J -  NORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS FOR T-TEST EXPLORING
DIFFERENCES IN MEAN SCORE ON THE SPIN
Histogram 
for Social  anxie ty  group= high
20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00
total SPIN
Mean = 39.72 
Std. Dev. = 12.731 
N = 102
60.00 70.00
Histogram
for S o c ia l a n x ie ty  group= L ow
10.00 15.00
total SPIN
= 9.37 
Std, Dev, = 4,693 
N = 68
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APPENDIX K -  NORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS FOR T-TEST EXPLORING 
DIFFERENCES IN MEAN SCORE ON THE ICQ-EV
50,00
Histogram
for Sodal_anxiety_group= Low
Mean = 60.04 
Std. Dev. = 30,425 
N = 67
100.00 
total ICQEV
150.00
Histogram
for S o c ia l_ a n x ie ty _ g r o u p =  h igh
Mean = 103.04  
Std. Dev. = 35.042  
N = 102
40.00 60.00 80.00 100.00 120.00 140.00 160.00 180.00
total ICQEV
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APPENDIX L - NORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS FOR ANOVA CONDUCTED 
ON THE JOB SCENARIO FOR THE HSA GROUP 
IMPACT OF REALITY:
Histogram 
for Socia l  an x ie ty  group= high
Mean = 11.38 
Std. Dev. = 15.951 
N = 102
□  n p
20.00 40.00 60,00-40.00 -20.00
job_BminusR1
Histogram 
for S ocia l an xiety  group= high
^  20
Mean = 6.01 
Std. Dev. = 12.536 N = 1Q2
20.00 40.00
job_P1minusR2
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Histogram
for Social anxiety groups high
cr 10
20.00 40.00
j o b _ P 2 m i n u s R 3
= 15.33 
Std. Dev. = 16.195 
N = 102
IMPACT OF POSSIBILITY:
Histogram
for  S o c ia l_ a n x ie ty _ g r o u p =  h ig h
-40.00 -20.00 20.00 40.00
j o b _ P 1 m l n u s R 1
60,00
isan = 7.BS 
Std. Dev. = 12.844 
N = 102
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Histogram
for Social anxiety groups high
r  2D
Mean = 4.81
Std. Dev. = 13.379
N = 102
-40 .DO Z3.00
j o b _ P 2 m i n u s R 2
40.00 60.00
Histogram  
for S o c ia l  a n x ie%  g r o u p s  h igh
u  30
Mean = 8.38 
Std. Dev. = 13.07 102
20.00
j o b _ P 3 m in u s R 3
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APPENDIX M - NORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS FOR ANOVA CONDUCTED 
ON THE JOB SCENARIO FOR THE USA GROUP
IMPACT OF REALITY:
Histogram 
for S oc ia l a n x ie ^  group= Low
25.00 50.00
job_BminusR1
75.00
Mean = 10.60 
Std. Dev. = 15.876 
N = 6B
Histogram 
for S o c ia l a n x ie ty  g r o u p s  L ow
t r  20
20.00 .00 20.00 40.00
jo b _ P 1 m in u sR 2
60.00
Mean = 4.32 
Std. Dev. = 14.543 = 88
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Histogram
for S oc ia l_anx ie ty_group=  Low
Mean = 7.75 
Std. Dev. = 13.458 
N-68
-40.00 - 20 .0 )  
job_P2minusR3
IMPACT OF POSSIBILITY:
20-
c0)
I
Histogram
for Socia l  a n x ie ty  g roup=  Low
— I—  
- 20.00
T
.00 20.00 
job_P1minusR1
Mean = 7.18 
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N = 68
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Histogram
for Social anxiety group= Low
O- 20
Mean = -1.93
Std. Dev. = 17,022
N = 68
Tr“ [■
-40.00 -20.00 .00
j o b _ P 2 m in u s R 2
r
40.00
Histogram
for  S o c ia l  a n x ie ty  g r o u p s  Low
«  IS
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APPENDIX N -  NORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS FOR ANOVA CONDUCTED 
ON THE BUS SCENARIO FOR THE HSA GROUP 
IMPACT OF REALITY:
Histogram
S o c ia l a n x ie ty  group= h igh , for S o c ia l a n x ie ty  g ro u p s  high
Mean = 31,80 
Std. Dev. = 23.232 
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-20.00 .00 20.00 40.00 60.00 80.00
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Histogram
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Histogram
.00
b u s  P2minusR3
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Histogram
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APPENDIX O -  NORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS FOR ANOVA CONDUCTED 
ON THE BUS SCENARIO FOR THE USA GROUP 
IMPACT OF REALITY:
Histogram
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INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL RATIONALE
Inferential confusion is a term that has been used to describe a reasoning process 
seen within obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD; O’Connor & Robillard, 1995), 
whereby an individual relies upon imagined possibilities over sensory-based 
evidence. For example, an individual who leaves their home questions “is my door 
locked?”. When they look back upon the incident they have the memory of pulling 
the door shut and turning the key in the lock (sensory-based evidence) but also an 
imagined possibility of, for example, the lock mechanism not working. These 
conflicting pieces of information are thought to produce doubt, and a series of 
inferences follow and form an obsession (e.g. something bad is going to happen as 
the door is not locked properly).
A self-report measure titled the Inferential Confusion Questionnaire (ICQ; Aardema, 
O'Connor, Emmelkamp, Marchand, & Todorov, 2005), now superseded by the 
Inferential Confusion Questionnaire -  Expanded Version (ICQ-EV; Aardema et al., 
2010), has been developed to measure inferential confusion. Utilising these
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measures, inferential confusion has correlated positively with OCD symptoms 
(Aardema et ah, 2005, 2010; Aardema, Kleijer, Trihey, O’Connor, & Emmelkamp, 
2006a; Wu, Aardema, & O’Connor, 2009; Yorulmaz, Dirik, Karaali, & Uvez, 2010) 
and beliefs (Aardema et ah, 2006b; Aardema, Randomsky, O’Connor, & Julien, 
2008; Wu, Aardema & O’Connor, 2009; Yorulmaz etuh, 2010), indicating a 
relationship between inferential confusion and OCD. However, correlational designs 
do not imply causation, therefore inferential confusion could be a consequence of 
another factor rather than the cause of obsessionality.
There appears to be a grey area in relation to the role of inferential confusion in other 
anxiety-based disorders. Survey data has revealed that individuals with OCD score 
significantly higher than mixed-anxiety groups and non-anxious controls on the ICQ 
and ICQ-EV. However, one potential limitation of these group differences lies in 
using heterogeneous anxiety groups. The anxiety disorders present with different 
symptoms and therefore treating these individuals as a homogeneous group may 
mask intergroup differences of inferential confusion (e.g. individuals with social 
anxiety may score highly on the ICQ-EV whereas individuals with generalised 
anxiety disorder may score minimally). Furthermore, the homogeneous anxiety 
groups scored significantly higher than the non-anxious controls indicating elevated 
levels of inferential confusion.
The ICQ-EV has been specifically designed to measure inferential confusion within 
OCD obsessional thinking. Theoretically, the inference based approach views OCD 
as falling outside of the ‘phobic’ anxiety disorders, such as social anxiety (O’Connor
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& Robillard, 1995), due to the obsessional thoughts being the feared object rather 
than the object in itself being the anxiety triggering stimulus (as seen in other 
‘phobic’ anxiety disorders). Therefore, one possibility is that the global questions of 
the ICQ-EV do not link with the specific nature of the anxiety within other ‘phobic’ 
anxiety disorders, reducing the likelihood that answers are given in the affirmative 
for inferential confusion.
Experimental studies have also been conducted to measure inferential confusion 
within OCD (Pelissier & O’Connor, 2002; Pelissier, O’Connor & Dupuis, 2009; 
Aardema, O'Connor, Pelissier, & Lavoie, 2009). These studies found that the OCD 
groups doubted significantly more than the healthy control groups, especially when 
conclusions were given to the individual (i.e. not self-generated; Pelissier et al.,
2009) in response to a set of premises and when reasoning was based upon the 
accumulation of possibility-based information (as opposed to sensory-based) to a 
given scenario (Aardema et al., 2009). This suggests that inferential confusion plays 
significantly more of a role within OCD than non-anxious individuals. Despite the 
elevated levels of self-reported inferential confusion, no study to date has measured 
whether these findings are paralleled experimentally in other anxiety disorders (e.g. 
social anxiety).
Anxiety not only affects the human body physically (e.g. sweating and increased 
breathing) but it also affects how humans think (Greenberger & Padesky, 1995).
Such reactions come in the form of increased attention towards potential threats to 
the self and an often exaggerated fear of catastrophe, even with objective feedback to
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the contrary (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998). This occurrence is experienced by 
individuals struggling with social anxiety where a central symptom is the fear of 
potentially acting in a way that will be embarrassing or humiliating (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994). Therefore, this group of individuals, when exposed to 
anxiety provoking social situations, may become inferentially confused between a 
possibility (e.g. ‘people are laughing at me’) and the objective information of the 
situation (e.g. ‘people are laughing at the conversation’).
Gaining insight into how individuals who are socially anxious think in certain 
contexts may aid our comprehension of exactly how their reasoning changes. 
Secondly, the most prominent psychological treatment for social anxiety typically 
entails exposure-based interventions (National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence, 2011). These treatments are anxiety-provoking and therefore drop-out is 
high (Eskildsen, Hougaard, & Rosenberg, 2010). A novel non-exposure based 
treatment, termed Inference Based Therapy, has been designed based upon 
inferential confusion principals. This treatment has been found to be effective in 
treating OCD (O’Connor et al., 2005; Aardema et al., 2010; Aardema & O’Connor, 
2012), and could potentially be adapted for social anxiety should inferential 
confusion be a component of the disorder.
RESEARCH QUESTION
Is inferential confusion a process present in individuals with social anxiety?
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MAIN HYPOTHESES
1. The high social anxiety group will score significantly higher on the ICQ-EV 
than the low social anxiety group.
2. The high social anxiety group will score significantly higher on levels of 
doubt in the Inference Processes Task (IPT) than the low social anxiety group 
on the social anxiety related scenario.
3. The high social anxiety group will be influenced more by possibility-based 
information than the low social anxiety group on the social anxiety related 
scenario.
4. Scores on the ICQ-EV and Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 
2000) will be significantly positively related with the impact of possibility- 
based information in the high social anxiety group.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
The sample size will be approximately 182 participants (calculations using G*Power 
3; Paul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007).
Participants will be separated into two groups: a high social anxiety group and a low 
social anxiety control group. All participants will be aged 18+ years. Entry criteria 
for the social anxiety group will be a score of 19 and above on the SPIN, the clinical 
cut-off for social anxiety (O’Connor et al., 2000). Inclusion into the low anxiety 
control group will be through a score of <19 on the SPIN. Participants will be
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excluded from the experiment if there is evidence of substance abuse or severe 
mental illness such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or organic brain disorder.
They will also complete the Obsessive Compulsive Inventory - Revised (OCI-R; Foa 
et al., 2002) in order to establish that there are no significant group differences on 
obsessions and compulsions (as inferential confusion is already evidenced as present 
in OCD). Ideally, participants will have an equal variation in educational 
achievement, gender differences, age variation and from a number of different 
cultures of origin (recruiting from a diverse South London population will facilitate 
this).
Participants for the high social anxiety group will be from Lambeth Primary Care 
Psychological Therapies Service (Lambeth lAPT) and Croydon lAPT (who have 
already agreed to take part). Referrals number one hundred a week, with 
approximately 10% of these being social anxiety complaints. Therefore sufficient 
participants should be recruited from these sites. Advertisements will be circulated to 
several social anxiety websites (socialanxietysupport.com; social-anxiety- 
community, org; anxiety-support.org) with the email link to the study. As the study 
requires participants with both high and low social anxiety scores, participants will 
also be recruited from the general population where social anxiety scores are likely to 
be lower. An email will be sent to the University of Surrey population with a link for 
the study. A similar study using an OCD and non-anxious control group recruited 
224 participants using this method (L. Simonds, personal communication).
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DESIGN
Quasi-Experimental design 
MEASURES
IP T . Participants are presented with four brief scenarios which lead up to the 
participant needing to make a particular inference. After reading each vignette, 
participants are asked to rate the likelihood that the specific incident has occurred 
(rating probability from 10-100, where 10 is ‘improbable’ and 100 is ‘certain’) which 
equates to a measure of doubt that the target event has not occurred. Participants also 
rate how anxious they imagine they would feel in the given situation (rating from 0- 
100, where 0 is ‘not anxious’ and 100 is ‘the most anxious I could feel’). Participants 
are presented with pairs of objective and possibility based information on three 
occasions which represent reasoning responses to the root situation. At each time, 
participants are asked to re-rate the probability that the specific incident has 
occurred. In this study, one scenario is non-social anxiety and non-OCD based (taken 
from Aardema et al., 2009), two are social anxiety based, and one scenario is OCD- 
based. The presentation sequence of the four scenarios will be randomly sequenced 
across participants and completed on the internet.
SPIN. This is a 17 item, self-report measure of social anxiety. Participants rate on a 
scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely) on a variety of symptoms such as fear, 
avoidance and physiological symptoms over the past week. This measure has 
exhibited good test re-test reliability (Spearmans correlation coefficient = 0.89;
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p<0001), internal consistency (a = 0.82-0.90), and convergent validity (compared 
with the Brief Social Phobia Scale (Davidson et al., 1997); r=0.57,p<0001;
O’Connor et al., 2000).
Inferential Confusion Questionnaire -  Expanded Version (ICQ-EV; Aardema et al.,
2010). This is a 30 item self-report measure of inferential confusion. Participants rate 
each of the questions on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The 
ICQ-EV has achieved respectable internal consistency (a = 0.66-0.97) and test re-test 
reliability (0.90; p<0.001).
OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002). This is an 18 item self-report questionnaire where 
participants rate from 0 (‘not at all’) to 4 (‘extremely’) regarding whether they have 
been distressed by each statement in the past month. The OCI-R has demonstrated 
excellent internal consistency (Hajack, Huppert, Simons, & Foa; a=0.88), test re-test 
reliability (r=0.70), and convergent validity (compared with the Maudsley 
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977); ?^0.65).
The depression and anxiety subscales o f the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Both the depression and anxiety scales consist of 14 
self-report items on a scale of 0 (‘did not apply to me at all’) to 3 (‘applied to me 
very much or most of the time’). The depression scale has reported good internal 
consistency (Anthony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998; a= 0.97) and 
concurrent validity (compared with the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward,
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Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961); r=0.77). The anxiety scale has also 
demonstrated good internal consistency (a= 0.92) and concurrent validity (compared 
with the Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck & Steer, 1990); r=0.85).
PROCEDURE 
RECRUITMENT OF PARTICIPANTS
NHS recruitment will be achieved by visiting the two LAPT sites involved within the 
study. Visits to the sites will take place early to facilitate recruitment. As all service 
users entering LAPT services receive a telephone call to assess their difficulties, this 
would be an ideal opportunity for clinicians to ask the service user whether they are 
willing to take part in the study. If they consent, they can be sent the link for the 
experiment by email and access the study online.
To recruit from the social anxiety, advertisements for the study will be placed on 
each of the website’s discussion forums (e.g. socialanxietysupport.com has a specific 
topic thread for research studies) with a link to the study online.
Recruiting from the general population will consist of emailing a link of the study to 
the population of the University of Surrey.
PROCEDURE FOR THE STUDY
1. Once participants have accessed the study online they will be presented with 
information regarding: The title of the study, who I am (name, job title, place
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work study), how to contact me, and that the study has been approved by an 
ethics committee.
2. Participants will be then presented with information about the nature of the 
study (although there will be a level of deception involved; see ethics section) 
and why this research is being conducted, in lay terms.
3. Next, participants will be given information about what the study generally 
involves (e.g. reading some scenarios and answering questions about them). 
They will also be forewarned that they will be asked to imagine situations 
which may be distressing to them (e.g. someone potentially being poisoned).
4. Participants will be informed that they can withdraw at any time from the 
study.
5. They will be informed that completing the study will take approximately 20- 
30 minutes (this may change once the experiment is tested).
6. Participants will be given information about how their information will be 
used and stored. No personally identifiable information will be collected from 
this study (described below).
7. Participants will be asked to give consent to take part in the study, and to 
allow their initial data to be used in the study results if they decide to 
withdraw part-way through.
8. Participants complete questions about their demographics characteristics: 
gender, education, years of schooling, previous diagnoses, where did they find 
out about the study, gender, age, employment, ethnicity, and in which country 
they reside.
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9. Participants then complete the IPT consisting of three scenarios each with 
three pairs of objective- and possibility-based pieces of information that 
follow.
10. Participants then complete the ICQ-EV, SPIN, OCI-R, depression scale, and 
anxiety scale.
11. Upon the completion of the questionnaires, participants will be presented with 
a debrief screen where participants will be given more information about the 
nature of the study. There will be a description of the previous research 
findings on inferential confusion and doubting in OCD and how this particular 
study aims to investigate doubting in social anxiety.
12. The participant will be asked to forward the link onto others who they think 
might be interested in taking part.
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Individuals are asked to imagine three scenarios where they may become distressed. 
However, care has been taken to limit the intensity of the scenarios and my details 
are given if participants feel they need to discuss the research. Furthermore, there is 
an element of deception involved in the study. Participants are not told about the role 
of hypothesis relating to how socially anxious people may use possibility-based 
information to a greater extent than people who are less socially anxious. However, 
this information will be provided in the debrief and should cause minimal distress, if 
any.
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R&D CONSIDERATIONS
The application will be submitted to South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation 
Trust R&D Office via the Integrated Research Application System.
PROPOSED DATA ANALYSIS
Data from the study will be analysed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS) using T-test, ANOVA and regression analysis. In relation to hypothesis one, 
a T-test will be used to measure differences between the low and high social anxiety 
group scores on the ICQ-EV. A between-subjects ANOVA will be utilised to 
measure differences between the high and low social anxiety groups on levels of 
doubting (hypothesis two) and influence fi*om possibility-based information 
(hypothesis three). To investigate the relationship between the ICQ-EV, SPIN and 
the impact of possibility-based information (hypothesis four), regression analysis 
will be used.
SERVICE USER INVOLVEMENT
There has been a telephone consultation with Barbara Riddell regarding service user 
and carer perspectives on this study. A pilot study will take place post-ethical 
approval and pre-participant recruitment to determine whether the study is suitable 
for participants, to assess whether the information about the study and consent forms 
are appropriate, and to evaluate whether the IPT measures doubting appropriately. 
Barbara Riddell will be consulted regarding the first two points and has agreed to 
comment.
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FEASABILITY ISSUES
1. There is a possibility the NHS will not approve this study. In this case I will 
recruit from charities and the general population.
2. There may be negotiations necessary for getting clients to access the study. 
For example, in accessing clients from lAPT services I will be asking 
clinicians to email the link to suitable clients. However, these sites may not 
be content with their staff taking time to explain my study and email the link 
to potential participants.
3. Another potential problem is that the scenarios I create for the IPT are 
inappropriate and do not appear to adequately provoke the participants to 
make inferences, some based upon probabilities. The pilot study will examine 
this issue.
DISSEMINATION STRATEGY
The major research project will be disseminated to an appropriate journal for 
publication (e.g. Behaviour Research and Therapy). This will ideally take place 
between June and September 2014.
STUDY TIMELINE
DATE ACTION
August 2012 Submit MRP proposal
September 2012 Complete Ethical approval forms to
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University or Surrey and NHS ethics
December 2012 - January 2013 Visit Lambeth and Croydon LAPT to 
discuss practical issues around recruiting 
participants
January 2013 Complete pilot study
February 2013 Advertise study on charity websites
February 2013 Start data collection from participants
May 2013 Complete draft introduction
May 2013 Begin data analysis
September 2013 Complete data collection
September 2013 -  November 2013 Analyse data
October 2013 Complete draft method section
November 2013 Complete draft results section
December 2013 -  January 2014 Write draft results section
End of January 2014 Submit full draft to supervisor
February 2014 -  March 2014 Make amendments to MRP
April 2014 Submit MRP
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June 2014 -  September 2014 Submit MRP to academic journal
June 2014 -  September 2014 Make arrangements on how to store data 
collected (as agreed by ethics 
committees)
SIGNATURES
University supervisor: Dr Laura Simonds
Signature of trainee: Signature of university supervisor
Date:
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ABSTRACT
The conceptualisation of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) has been most 
comprehensively represented by the cognitive appraisal model (CAM). This model 
asserts that intrusions are universally experienced and that it is the appraisal of the 
thought, based upon underlying maladaptive beliefs, that produces distress. A novel 
theory, termed the inference based approach (IBA), proclaims that intrusions are 
inferences and that individuals with OCD become confused between reality and a 
remote possibility (inferential confiision). This produces doubt and the subsequent 
formation of an obsession. The current review aims to critique the literature on the 
role of inferential confusion in obsessions and compulsions. A literature search 
identified 25 articles that focus on inferential confusion within obsessions and 
compulsions. Studies were split into three themes: theory of the IBA, empirical 
studies, and the effectiveness of inference based therapy. Inferential confusion 
broadly correlated with a range of OCD symptoms and beliefs and appears to play a 
key role in the relationship between OCD beliefs and symptoms. Inferential 
confusion also explained additional variance beyond that explicated by OCD beliefs. 
Experimentally individuals with OCD doubted significantly more and were affected 
more by possibility than reality in a reasoning task, concurring with IBA principals. 
Furthermore, IBT was more effective than both CAM and exposure and response 
prevention in ameliorating OCD symptoms when the level of conviction in primary 
inference was high. Future research possibilities include investigating the 
relationship between inferential confusion and meta-cognition, randomised 
controlled trials for IBT, and the role of memory in OCD.
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2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 OBSESSIVE COMPULSIVE DISORDER
The essential feature of OCD is the presence of repeated obsessions or compulsions 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Obsessions are thoughts, ideas, impulses 
or images that persistently recur for an individual causing them significant anxiety or 
distress. Compulsions are repetitive stereotyped behaviours (e.g. checking, ordering) 
or mental rituals (e.g. praying, counting in even numbers silently to a specific 
amount) that typically occur as a response to the obsession. The individual with OCD 
usually recognises that these symptoms are irrational and unreasonable, sensing that 
they are ego-dystonic, that is, they do not align with what the individual believes 
their thoughts should contain (see Foa & Kozak, 1995). OCD has been classified as 
an anxiety disorder within the two main classification manuals, the DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and the ICD-10 (World Health 
Organisation, 1992) because of the role of anxiety in response to the obsession and 
the reduction in anxiety when the compulsion has been completed (de Silva, 1986).
The most prominent theoretical conceptualisation of OCD has been the CAM
developed by Salkovskis (1985,1998). This model asserts that it is not the content of
the intrusion that causes distress for the individual but the appraisal or interpretation
based upon prior experience and context of the intrusion. Therefore, any thought can
potentially become obsessional if the thought is interpreted as having a sense of
personal responsibility regarding the content of the thought (e.g. a thought about
potential harm is appraised as indicating a personal responsibility for preventing that
125
The Role of Inferential Confusion in Social Anxiety: A Quasi-Experimental study
URN: 6198773
harm). Other features of this model place neutralising activities (e.g. rituals, mental 
activities), mood changes (e.g. increased anxiety), counterproductive safety strategies 
(e.g. thought suppression) and attention and reasoning biases (e.g. thought-action 
fusion, errors in decision making and responsibility bias) as prominent interrelated 
characteristics of OCD. Salkovskis (1985) proposed that a set of underlying beliefs 
or dysfunctional assumptions are triggered by intrusive thoughts and tend to fall into 
four areas: 1) thought control beliefs (e.g. attempts are made to regulate cognitive 
events), 2) thought-action fusion beliefs (e.g. thoughts are equivalent to performing 
actions), 3) responsibility beliefs (e.g. not attempting to prevent harm is the 
comparable to causing harm), and 4) neutralization beliefs (e.g. distressing thoughts 
should be neutralized in order to prevent harm). It is these beliefs that are thought to 
play a central role in the maintenance of OCD.
Based upon these assumptions, a cognitive behavioural approach was developed for
the treatment of OCD. This treatment is a structured, goal focused approach aimed at
normalising intrusions, modifying faulty appraisals of meaning, differentiating
obsessions from appraisals, managing excessive mental control, and exploring the
role of core dysfunctional beliefs. Used within cognitive behavioural therapy (CET)
but also as a stand-alone treatment, exposure and response prevention (ERP) is also
utilised (Clark, 2004). CET has been found to be an effective treatment for OCD
(National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2006) however studies have found
that 40% of individuals who began ERP dropped out of treatment (Emmelkamp and
Foa, 1983), 30% of individuals with OCD decline ERP (Kozak, Liebowitz & Foa,
2000) and as few as 25% of clients receiving CET for OCD recover symptomatically
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(Steketee, 1993). Furthermore, there is only limited evidence that changes in 
underlying beliefs are associated with successful treatment outcome (Emmelkamp, 
van Oppen & van Balkom, 2002; Adams, Riemann, Wettemeck, & Cisler, 2012) 
indicating Other variables play a role in the maintenance of OCD.
2.2 INFERENTIAL CONFUSION
Bom from clinical observations of clients with OCD, inferential confusion is 
proposed to be a process of doubting, where individuals make a series of inferences 
guided by a distmst of the senses and a reliance upon imagined information over 
reality-based evidence (O’Connor & Robillard, 1995). These inferences, based upon 
erroneous information, produce doubt in the individual which is a key feature present 
in individuals with OCD (Pelisser & O’Connor, 2002). Since these initial 
observations, a series of studies have been carried out, principally by a research 
group from the University of Montreal, Canada, investigating the role of inferential 
confusion in obsessions and compulsions. To date, a measure termed the Inferential 
Confusion Questionnaire (ICQ; Aardema, O'Connor, Emmelkamp, Marchand, & 
Todorov, 2005), now extended to the Inferential Confusion Questionnaire -  
Expanded Version (ICQ-EV; Aardema et al., 2010), has been created and research 
has been conducted in order to establish inferential confusion as a construct 
contributing to the development and maintenance of OCD. Further, a novel 
therapeutic approach aimed at treating individuals utilising inferential confusion 
named Inference Based Therapy (IBT; O’Connor & Robillard, 1995) has been
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developed and trials evaluating its effectiveness have been undertaken in treating 
OCD.
3. THE CURRENT REVIEW
3.1 AIMS
To date, one review has been written which focused on comparing the theories of 
IBT with CBT in treating OCD (Visser, van Megan, Oppen, & Balkom, 2009). The 
current review aims to provide a more comprehensive critique of the literature on 
inferential confusion within obsessions and compulsions, focusing on the empirical 
and theoretical research underpinning this concept. The literature will be split 
between three main areas of research surrounding inferential confusion: the 
theoretical basis of the inference based approach and how this conceptualisation fits 
in with the CAM, the empirical studies on the relationship of inferential confusion to 
obsessions and compulsions, and the effectiveness of IBT for OCD.
3.2 SEARCH STRATEGY
In order to identify the relevant literature a search of electronic databases was 
undertaken. Peer reviewed papers from Embase, Ovid, Web of Science, PubMed and 
CSA Illumina, written in English, were identified using the terms ‘inferential 
confusion’, ‘inference based approach’ and ‘inference based therapy’. There were no 
date restrictions placed upon the search as inferential confusion is a relatively novel 
area of research. From this search, 16 unique articles were extracted. Next, the 
reference lists of the unique papers were consulted and 9 more articles were added.
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Articles that did not focus on obsessions and compulsions in the context of 
inferential confusion were excluded e.g. inferential confusion as a process within 
psychosis. Furthermore, articles regarding inferential confusion as a process within 
compulsive hoarding (because of growing evidence that this disorder is distinct from 
OCD due to difference in ego-dystonicity; see Bloch, Landeros-Weisenberger, 
Rosairo, Pittenger, & Leckman, 2008) and body dysmorphic disorder (due to 
differences in phenomenology and its classification in the DSM-IV as a somatoform 
disorder) were not included in the sample. This resulted in a final sample of 25 
articles. Table 1 (see end of the review) illustrates the articles extracted in thematic 
format (theory of IB A, empirical studies of inferential confusion, and effectiveness 
of IBT).
4. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE INFERENCE BASED APPROACH
This section will focus on outlining the IB A and its theoretical stance on the 
processes proposed to be important in the understanding of obsessions and 
compulsions in addition to the content of IBT. These propositions will be compared 
to the CAM of OCD.
4.1.1 THE FORMATION OF OBSESSIONS
The IBA posits that the formation of obsessions are derived through a series of 
inferences governed by the process of inferential confusion (O’Connor, 2002). This 
chain of thoughts is initiated by a thought which typically takes the form of a doubt
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that is based upon the context of the situation (e.g. a person having left the house 
thinks ‘did I switch the oven off?’). This is followed by a primary inference (e.g. 
‘what if f  have left the oven on?’) and then a series of ftirther premises leading to 
imagined consequences (e.g. ‘iff  left the oven on the house will bum down’). This 
sequence of inferences becomes obsessional once the initial inference becomes a 
response to a specific context. That is, triggered by a memory, a specific task that is 
initiated, or a change in mood. Therefore, it is postulated that this specific context is 
why obsessions through inferential conftision in OCD are thematic and only occur in 
certain idiosyncratic situations (O’Connor, 2002).
The place and role of intrusions as theorised by the IBA contrasts the stance of the 
prominent CAM by Salkovskis (1985, 1998). A key feature of the CAM lies in the 
assumption that intmsions are common experiences for not only individuals with 
OCD but the general public too (Rachman & de Silva, 1978). They are viewed as an 
automatic process and that it is the negative interpretation and application of 
significance to the intrusive thought that produces an obsession and accompanying 
distress. However, the IBA proposes that obsessional ‘intrusions’ are not the start- 
point in the chain of obsessional formation but are actually inferences which, as the 
product from prior reasoning, are intrinsically emotionally laden (Aardema & 
O’Connor, 2007). This implies that, at some point, a conscious process has pre-fused 
the thought and emotion and it is not so much the appraisal of the intrusion at the 
present situation but the process of faulty reasoning that fuels the obsession.
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4.1.2 THE MAINTENANCE OF OBSESSIONS
The IBA approach asserts that it is the repetitions nature of invalid reasoning, 
through inferential confusion, which maintains the obsession. This process 
crystallises the obsessive response to certain stimuli, and a primary doubting 
inference (the point at which possibility-based information is prioritised over reality- 
based information) is followed by secondary inferences (the possible consequences), 
producing distress/anxiety and the desire to initiate a compulsion. The IBA approach 
does not discount the appraisal models. It is theorised that faulty inference process 
works at the intrusion aspect of the initial obsession, whereas the appraisal occurs 
post-obsession (Aardema, O’Connor & Emmelkamp, 2006b). Therefore it is 
proposed that these theories approach the obsessive chain at differing stages. 
Inference processes are proposed to be relevant to the development and maintenance 
of obsessions and therefore inferential confusion may well account for the 
relationship between the symptoms and underlying beliefs of OCD (as obsessions are 
the target that beliefs appraise and symptoms are the product of this appraisal 
process). Therefore, inferential confusion is theorised to be a critical component in 
the link between obsessive compulsive intrusions, obsessions, beliefs and symptoms 
(Aardema, Radomsky, O'Connor, & Julien, 2008).
Another factor in the IBA approach is absorption into the imaginative world of 
doubting (O’Connor, Koszegi, Aardema, van Niekerk, & Taillon, 2009). This 
process draws the individual away from the reality-testing the ‘normal’ population 
utilise during reasoning, and instead focuses attention on possibility-based scenarios
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‘evidenced’ through the use of inferential confiision. Often the compulsive ritual 
(e.g. cleaning repetitively), removes the individual even further from reality, as by 
performing the ritual they do not gather new information regarding the likelihood of 
the content of an obsessional thought occurring (O’Connor & Robillard, 1995).
The current cognitive behavioural approaches to OCD assert that it is the faulty 
appraisals and underlying beliefs of the initial thought/intrusion, followed by 
neutralising and thought controlling strategies that increase the salience of the 
intrusion and therefore heighten the likelihood that the intrusion will recur. 
Compulsions are proposed to only temporarily reduce the distress associated with the 
obsession and by carrying out the ritual it heightens the awareness of the obsession 
and therefore makes it more likely that the intrusion will return and maintain the 
obsessive compulsive symptoms. Overall, the DBA and CAM approach the 
theoretical maintenance of obsessions and compulsions from varying points in the 
obsessive chain. The IBA theoretically adds to the processes thought to be.relevant to 
obsessions and compulsions by the CAM with the addition of inferential confusion 
and imaginative processes.
4.1.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF INFERENTIAL CONFUSION
The process by which an individual forms their intrusions and subsequent obsessions 
is thought to be vital according to the IBA. This set of faulty reasoning devices has 
been termed inferential confusion, as described earlier. A key device is inverse 
inference where inferences about reality precede sensory information (e.g. ‘my 
carpet must be dirty because people have walked over it’; O’Connor & Robillard,
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1995). In valid inferences, an individual usually begins with an observation based 
upon the senses and infers from this evidence a particular hypothesis (e.g. ‘the carpet 
looks dirty therefore lots of people must have walked over if). Other devices 
proposed to constitute inferential confusion are; reasoning on the basis o f  purely 
imaginai events (where the person sequences a scenario together based upon fictional 
events) and overcategorisation (thinking that because one category of item or people 
is e.g. dirty, then another similar object or person must be too). Also, out-of-context 
facts (using non-pertinent knowledge and applying it to a situation e.g. ‘my kitchen is 
infected because E-coli survive on hard surfaces’) and apparently comparable events 
(believing because one event occurred another will too e.g. ‘a plane crashed into my 
friend’s house so one could hit mine too’; O’Connor et al., 2009). As well as, 
idiosyncratic associational networks (believing certain rules or associations without 
valid reason e.g. ‘touching the front door on each comer will prevent someone 
breaking in unless my wife uses the door after’) and distrust o f normal perception 
(ignoring sensory input in favour of other information).
Inferential confusion is therefore posited to be a multi-dimensional set of reasoning 
devices where individuals will utilise varying constituents as a part of obsessional 
thinking. These devices have been incorporated into the ICQ and expanded in the 
ICQ-EV. However, to date, no experimental studies have investigated to what extent 
each of these devices plays a role in varying presentations of OCD (e.g. washing, 
checking, and mental rituals) and whether focusing on separate devices within IBT 
produces superior effectiveness in treating OCD. Inverse inference is proposed to be 
the most prominent device produced during inferential confusion (O’Connor &
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Robillard, 1995) however experimentally no studies have examined this assertion 
even though it plays a central role during IBT -  indicating a need for further 
empirical research investigating these vital reasoning devices.
4.1.4 INFERENCE BASED THERAPY
Based on the premise that OCD is formed and maintained through the use of invalid 
reasoning processes, a novel therapeutic approach termed IBT was developed 
(O’Connor & Robillard, 1995, 1999). There are a series of steps to IBT. First the 
therapist explores with the client what the specific doubt entails with the aim of 
educating the client about the differences between what is an obsessional doubt and 
what is authentic doubting (i.e. the difference between a hypothesis and a 
probability). The primary and secondary inferences surrounding the doubt are 
constructed, termed the ‘reasoning narrative’ (O’Connor et al., 2009). That is, the 
steps of reasoning the client went through in order to form their specific obsession 
are constructed. The therapist then illustrates how this process goes against evidence 
based upon reality and the client is educated about the devices that constitute 
inferential confusion. Next, the strong influence that the imagination can have upon 
reasoning is experimented with through asking the client to recount similar situations 
in which a reasoning narrative has had an impact upon their obsessional belief. 
Practical techniques are then taught with the intent of enabling the client to infer 
during situations based upon sensory information and to explore alternatives to their 
current reasoning narratives. Aiding these techniques, the client engages in ERP and 
explores vulnerable-self themes (the fear that an individual may become or be related
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to the obsession; Aardema & O’Connor, 2007). Although later research utilising IBT 
do not employ ERP as a technique during sessions (Aardema & O’Connor, 2012).
4.1.5 ARE IBT AND CBT COMPLEMENTARY?
The IBA offers a new perspective on the understanding of obsessions and 
compulsions differing in many respects to that of the cognitive behavioural 
approaches. In CBT, it is explicitly advised that therapists do not engage in 
challenging the content of intrusive thoughts during treatment (van Oppen & Amtz, 
1994). IBT, conversely, hypothesises that it is the reasoning during the intrusive 
thoughts that fuels OCD and therefore the intrusive thoughts are the main focus of 
this approach. On the one hand, this appears to be a contradictory stance, given the 
opposing views on the nature of intrusions. However, focusing on the maintenance 
processes of inferential confusion and the important role of appraisals and underlying 
beliefs theoretically focus on different stages of the obsession (Clark & O’Connor, 
2004) and can be complementary processes. In addition, O’Connor (2002) speculate 
that a set of meta-cognitive schema could be the reason for both the faulty reasoning 
processes present in OCD and the maladaptive appraisals and beliefs, tying in both 
inference based and cognitive appraisal approaches to a similar common set of 
underlying principles.
Ego-dystonicity is thought to be a key defining symptom of OCD, the idea that the 
obsessions do not align with the sense of self or core values. The repetitious nature of 
intrusions accompanied by their ego-dystonicity can threaten the self-view of the 
individual often causing them to question their righteous character (Purdon, 2001).
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The CAM theorizes that ego-dystonicity arises due to the contrary nature of the 
intrusions that all individuals experience (Rachman & de Silva, 1978), being 
appraised in a way in which the individual feels personally responsible. However, 
research has questioned whether intrusions in individuals with OCD are as similar to 
the general population as the CAM proposes (Clarke & O’Connor, 2004; Rachman & 
Hodgson, 1980). The IBA, on the other hand, proposes that this ego-dystonicity, yet 
compulsive behaviours contrary to this, is the product of a near certainty that their 
intrusion is unsubstantiated and yet the near impossible intrusion is given primacy 
through the use of inferential confiision (O’Connor & Robillard, 1995). IBT aims to 
ameliorate this duality through the targeting of vulnerable self-themes (Aardema & 
O’Connor, 2007). This theoretical explanation provides further understanding to the 
obsessive compulsive profile in addition to that already explained through the CAM.
4.2 EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF INFERENTIAL 
CONFUSION TO OBSESSIONS AND COMPULSIONS
A series of correlational and experimental studies have been undertaken investigating 
the role that inferential confusion plays in our comprehension of OCD. Inferential 
confusion has been operationalized into a self-report questionnaire, the Inferential 
Confusion Questionnaire (ICQ; Aardema et al., 2005) which was later extended to 
include a greater variety of questions and named the Inferential Confusion 
Questionnaire -  Expanded Version (ICQ-EV; Aardema et al., 2010). Alongside a 
handful of experimental studies, at the present time, this questionnaire has been the 
principal measure of the role of inferential confusion in OCD. Research, to date, has
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focused upon the importance of beliefs in the comprehension of obsessive 
compulsive symptoms and has inspired the creation of the Obsessive Beliefs 
Questionnaire (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 2001, 2003). This 
measure is deemed to be central to understanding the maintenance of OCD as 
conceptualised by the CAM. Therefore, this section aims to evaluate whether 
inferential confusion adds to our understanding of obsessive compulsive symptoms 
in addition to the proposals of the CAM, in light of the empirical evidence.
4.2.1 CROSS-SECTIONAL SURVEY FINDINGS
Inferential confusion has been found to have significant correlations with a variety of 
OCD symptoms (Aardema et al., 2005, 2010; Aardema, Kleijer, Trihey, O’Conno, & 
Emmelkamp, 2006a; Wu, Aardema, & O’Connor, 2009; Yorulmaz, Dirik, Karaali, & 
Uvez, 2010) using the ICQ and ICQ-EV. Specifically, with the OCD symptom 
checklist, the Padua Inventory Revised (PI; Bums, Keortge, Formea, & Stemberger,
1996), significant relationships have been shown with the total score (r =0.35-0.53), 
impulses about harm (r =0.20-0.39), thoughts about harm (r =0.43-.72), 
contamination (r =0.23-0.45) and checking behaviours (r =0.26-0.53). Across these 
studies, very low correlations have been associated with dressing and grooming 
rituals (r =0.01-0.19). The ICQ and ICQ-EV have also been significantly correlated 
with depressive symptoms, as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory (r =0.26- 
0.42; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) and general anxiety, using 
the Beck Anxiety Inventory (r =0.34-0.48; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). In 
order to control for the influence that general distress can have on the relationship
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between inferential confusion and OCD symptoms, Aardema et al. (2010) controlled 
for these states and found that these relationships remained significant. This indicates 
that inferential confusion is related to OCD symptoms independent of general mood 
state. As OCD has been shown to have a variety of obsessive and compulsive 
presentations (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1998) the fact that inferential confusion is 
positively and significantly related to these broad symptom categories implies that it 
plays a role within the majority of symptom presentations.
As described earlier, the CAM of OCD proposes that specific beliefs are thought to 
play a major underlying role in the process of appraising intrusions. Studies 
investigating the role of these cognitive domains have sought to identify whether 
inferential confusion can explain any additional characteristics of OCD beyond that 
of the belief categories set out by the OBQ, the principal measure used in the studies 
found by the cross-sectional studies of examining inferential confusion (Aardema et 
al., 2006b; Aardema et al., 2008; Wu, Aardema & O’Connor, 2009; Yorulmaz et al., 
2010). Significant relationships were found between inferential confusion and the 
OBQ total (r =0.48-0.66), responsibility/ overestimation of threat (r =0.48-0.71), 
tolerance for uncertainty/perfectionism (r =0.29-0.48) and importance of 
thoughts/control of thoughts indicating a relationship with each of these important 
factors in OCD. Therefore, inferential confusion is significantly related to the 
severity of the underlying beliefs thought to maintain obsessive compulsive 
symptoms, further implicating the role of inferential confusion across established 
measures of OCD.
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In addition, the IBA theorises that inferential confusion plays a central role in the 
initial ‘intrusion’ and formation of obsessions. Therefore it also may play a role in 
the relationship between the obsessional beliefs and obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms. Aardema et al. (2006b) used partial correlations, firstly holding 
inferential confusion constant, and found that the majority of relationships between 
belief groups and OCD symptoms reduced substantially to non-significant levels (the 
PI total remained significantly related to the perfectionism/certainty domain as did 
checking compulsions, and the Pl-obsessions with OBQ total as well as the 
importance given to thoughts/control thoughts). Further, the authors then held all 
belief domains constant whilst investigating the relationship between inferential 
confusion and OCD symptoms and found the PI total, PI obsessions and PI 
contamination scales remained significantly correlated. However, the subscales of 
the PI measuring impulses and dressing were non-significant before holding the 
belief domain constant with the PI subscale checking reducing to a non-significant 
relationship, indicating inferential confusion may play less of a role in the prevalence 
of these symptoms. These findings suggest that inferential confusion plays a role in 
the relationship between obsessive beliefs, believed to be central to OCD, and 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms.
Further studies investigating the relationship between obsessive compulsive beliefs, 
inferential confusion and obsessive compulsive symptoms have been carried out by 
Wu et al. (2009) and Polman, O’Connor and Huisman (2011). Wu et al. (2009) found 
that inferential confusion explains additional variance beyond which is explicated by 
the OBQ. Using hierarchical regression, inferential confusion was a significant
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predictor of ritualistic behaviour, which only the belief group perfectionism/certainty 
could also achieve, and checking, where inferential confusion was the only domain 
able to predict these symptoms, however inferential confusion did not predict 
washing behaviours. Polman et al. (2011) further investigated relevant domains in 
OCD such as underlying beliefs and inferential confusion. Using hierarchical cluster 
analysis, they established that 38.5% of participants with a diagnosis of OCD were in 
a Tow beliefs’ subgroup where they scored minimally in all areas of the OBQ but in 
the average range on inferential confusion. These findings suggest that inferential 
confusion can account for features and characteristics of OCD that the traditional 
belief domains fail to account for fiirther substantiating the role of inferential 
confusion in OCD.
These findings appear to be consistent with the notion that inferential confusion 
plays an important role in the link between obsessive-compulsive beliefs and 
symptoms. However, inferential confusion does not appear to uniformly play an 
accountable role in some types of obsessive-compulsive symptoms such as 
dressing/grooming rituals. Further studies are needed to establish a reliable 
measurement of the role of inferential confusion in obsessive compulsive symptoms. 
In spite of the fact that there are currently few studies that have investigated the 
additional impact of inferential confusion, it clearly adds to our understanding above 
that which is provided by examining beliefs.
However, there is the issue of causal inference as a main weakness from these 
correlational studies. Because inferential confusion is showing a relationship with
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these particular domains of OCD it does not mean it is the cause of particular set of 
obsessive compulsive symptoms, only that these participants tended to score on 
questionnaires in the direction generally following the IBA propositions. 
Furthermore, correlational studies cannot establish precedence. That is, from the 
results of these studies it is not possible to determine whether inferential confusion 
preceded the obsessive compulsive symptoms or obsessive beliefs, a requirement 
needed to infer a causal relationship (Haynes & O’Brien, 2000). It is also not 
possible to exclude other mediating and/or moderating variables from playing a 
causal role in the relationship between inferential confusion, obsessive beliefs and 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms.
4.2.2 DISTINGUISHING THE ROLE OF INFERENTIAL CONFUSION 
WITHIN DIFFERENT DISORDERS AND CONTROLS
In order for inferential confusion to be established as a valid construct several studies 
have examined the prevalence of this reasoning process within groups of individuals 
with OCD, mixed-anxiety disorders, a delusional group and non-clinical participants 
(Aardema et al., 2005, 2010; Yorulmaz et al., 2010). All three studies found that the 
OCD groups scored significantly higher than the mixed-anxiety and non-clinical 
groups on inferential confusion. Aardema et al. (2005) found that the delusional 
group scored similarly to the OCD group (no other study used a delusional group).
As the IBA hypothesises, inferential confusion appears to be more prevalent in OCD 
than other mixed-anxiety disorders and non-clinical groups. That is, when an 
individual has OCD they report that they rely more upon possibilities than sensory
141
The Role o f Inferential Confusion in Social Anxiety: A Quasi-Experimental study
URN: 6198773
data, mistrust their senses to a greater extent, and agree that they reason in a manner 
that is representing inferential confusion (measured by the ICQ and ICQ-EV).
However, there are limitations to these findings. Firstly, in using various anxiety 
disorders as one homogeneous group, it is not possible to establish whether 
inferential confusion is a process relevant to any one diagnosis. Diagnoses such as 
social anxiety, health anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder and 
generalised anxiety disorder all have varying symptom presentations (Wells, 1997).
It is therefore possible that participants with the same diagnosis could have scored 
highly on inferential confusion, but because participants with other diagnoses have 
scored minimally, these scores were masked. Furthermore, inferential confusion 
could certainly be present in other non-anxiety based disorders not utilised within 
these studies, such as anorexia nervosa (e.g. an individual with anorexia nervosa 
when looking in the mirror may become inferentially confused between reality (the 
reflection) and an imagined possibility (an image of an overweight person)). 
However, the finding that participants with OCD score higher than other anxiety and 
student groups supports the IBA to conceptualising OCD.
4.2.3 EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES ON INFERENITAL CONFUSION AND 
DOUBT
A central proposition of the IBA is that inferential confusion gives rise to doubting 
within the individual through a process of giving more credence to hypothetical and 
possible information and dismissing sensory/reality based information (O’Connor & 
Robillard, 1995). Three studies have attempted to experimentally test the role of
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doubting within OCD (Pelissier & O’Connor, 2002; Pelissier, O’Connor & Dupuis, 
2009; Aardema, O'Connor, Pelissier, & Lavoie, 2009), comparing participants with a 
diagnosis of OCD with a non-clinical control group (and a group with generalised 
anxiety disorder in Pelissier & O’Connor, 2002) using tasks that require participants 
to make inductive and deductive inferences. In each study, participants with OCD 
had significantly higher levels of doubt than the other groups. This appears especially 
the case when possible conclusions to a set of premises are given to the individual (as 
opposed to self-generated; Pelissier et al., 2009) and when the inferences are based 
upon cumulative possibility-based information (i.e. not sensory data; Aardema et al., 
2009). However, given the controlled content of these experimental reasoning 
paradigms, these studies will not completely reflect valid everyday reasoning for 
individuals with OCD. For example, Aardema et al. (2009) used scenarios split into 
OCD-relevant and non-OCD relevant as the task for participants to make inferences 
from. However, as OCD is a heterogeneous disorder, with multiple belief and 
symptoms presentations (e.g. Polman et al., 2011), OCD-relevant scenarios will not 
necessarily equate with themes present in OCD symptoms for particular groups of 
participants (e.g. an individual who checks their front door repeatedly for security 
will not necessarily be affected by a task scenario about contamination).
Furthermore, as Aardema et al. (2009) found no group differences in doubting for the 
non-OCD scenario, it appears to be imperative that the theme of scenarios in these 
studies match with the everyday reasoning present in OCD obsessions of the 
individual.
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The IBA regards doubt as an important factor in the development and maintenance of 
intrusions and obsessions and these experimental studies reliably support this 
assertion when compared to healthy control groups. Further, the impact of 
imagination in the development of alternative possibilities seems to affect individuals 
with OCD to a greater extent e.g. when novel scenarios with a slight possibility are 
presented, individuals with OCD appear to struggle to distinguish between what is 
likely and what is not. This notion follows on from the correlational study that found 
processes such as imagination and immersion to be related to inferential confusion 
(Aardema & Wu, 2011). The role of doubting in OCD has not been addressed in the 
CAM of OCD, and given the complementary potential of the appraisal approach with 
the IBA, focusing on inferential confusion when attempting to comprehend OCD 
adds to our understanding of the relevant process involved in this disorder.
4.3 CLINICAL TRIALS INVESTIGATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IBT
Developed from initial observations of faulty reasoning processes in individuals with 
OCD, inferential confusion has become the central concept of therapeutic 
modification within a novel treatment termed IBT (see O’Connor & Aardema, 2012). 
If studies evaluating the effectiveness of IBT are shown to improve OCD symptoms, 
through the challenging of inferential confusion, then this will add weight to the 
proposition that inferential confusion is a central process in obsessions and 
compulsions.
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4.3.1 OUTCOMES ON OCD SYMPTOMS
Three studies have directly investigated the impact of IBT upon individuals with 
OCD (O’Connor et al., 2005; Aardema et al., 2010; Aardema & O’Connor, 2012) 
with positive results. Participants of these investigations improved significantly on 
measures of symptoms (e.g. PI), beliefs (e.g. OBQ), depression (e.g. BDI), anxiety 
(e.g. BAI), and inferential confusion (e.g. ICQ), indicating that targeting inferential 
confusion during the therapeutic treatment of OCD has a significant impact upon the 
symptoms OCD. As discussed previously, treatment utilising the CAM and ERP 
have been established as the treatment of choice for individuals with OCD.
O’Connor and colleagues (2005) compared IBT with CAM and ERP and found that 
there were no differences in the beneficial effects in the treatment of OCD with these 
approaches. However, when the authors focused on participants who had a high 
conviction in their primary inference, IBT was more effective in reducing scores on 
the Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (YBOCS; Goodman et al., 1989a, 
1989b), PI and the Cognitive Intrusion Questionnaire (Freeston, Ladouceur, 
Thibodeau, & Gagnon, 1992) than both the CAM and ERP. This indicates that 
individuals with higher levels of inferential confusion may benefit more from IBT 
over therapies such as ERP and CAM.
4.3.2 THE EFFECTS UPON REASONING PROCESSES
Aardema and O’Connor (2012) took these studies investigating the effectiveness of 
IBT one step further by incorporating the use of the Inference Processes Task (IPT). 
The IPT is an experimental paradigm that explores doubting at several time points
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after the introduction of reality- and possibility-based information. Participants are 
asked to rate their conviction in the probability that a given scenario has occurred 
and is thought to represent a similar process that individuals with OCD experience 
(Aardema et al., 2009). Aardema & O’Connor (2012) asked participants to complete 
the IPT both pre- and post-IBT to establish whether the treatment had a beneficial 
effect upon capacity to resolve obsessional doubt. After a course of IBT, participants 
(all of which had a diagnosis of OCD) exhibited a significant reduction in their level 
of doubting and an improvement in reasoning ability at the majority of points when 
either reality- and possibility-based information were presented. This evidence, based 
upon experimental research, adds to the self-report and observational data that points 
to the fact that the reduction in obsessive compulsive symptoms is associated with 
the targeting of inferential confusion and reasoning processes during treatment.
However, there were some conflicting findings resulting fi*om this study. A key 
assertion of the IBA is that individuals with OCD have a deficit in reasoning which 
produces excessive doubt due to an over-reliance on potential possibilities and a 
negation of sensory information. However, Aardema and O’Connor (2012) found 
that 20% of participants with a diagnosis of OCD included in the study were already 
able to resolve doubt produced by the DPT prior to the treatment intervention. These 
participants do not appear to fit this assumption of the IBA. When differentiating 
between the three groups identified by the authors as measured by their ability to 
resolve obsessional doubt on the IPT pre- to post-therapy (no resolution (both pre- 
and post-therapy), resolution (no resolution pre- and resolution post-therapy) and 
pre-resolution (resolution pre- and post-therapy)) the pre-resolution group pre-
146
The Role o f Inferential Confusion in Social Anxiety: A Quasi-Experimental study
URN: 6198773
intervention scored far lower (significance levels were not reported by the authors) 
on the baseline level of doubt, PI, BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996), BAI and the ICQ.
However, this group scored as severely on the YBOCS total and obsessive and 
compulsive subscales of the YBOCS as the resolution and no resolution groups 
indicating this group were comparable to the other groups in severity of 
symptomology. Yet this group did not score highly on inferential confiision which 
questions whether inferential confusion is as ubiquitous in different sub-groups of 
OCD as the correlational and theoretical studies outlined here have posited.
However, due to the low number of participants included in this study it is not 
possible to generalise this finding to all individuals with OCD. Future studies should 
investigate this group of individuals and further analysis of the initial data of this 
study will enable a more comprehensive profile of these individuals to be 
established.
4.3.3 CRITICISM OF METHODS
The majority of studies included in this section did not include a control group, with 
the exception of O’Connor et al. (2005), and therefore there is no comparison to the 
additive effect of challenging inferential confusion within OCD. However, O’Connor 
and colleagues (2005) did utilise CAM and ERP control groups alongside random 
allocation to the conditions. Although this is seen as a more robust design, issues 
within all of these studies may have had effects upon therapeutic outcome: These 
studies have all been conducted by the same research group and therefore there is the 
potential for ‘super therapist’ effects, where because these researchers are highly
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skilled in IBT they are far more likely to produce effective outcomes than therapists 
less experienced in these approaches (as is likely to be the case in general therapeutic 
settings such as the NHS). This point also may lead to the issue of whether 
participants of the CAM and ERP groups were treated equivalently to participants in 
the IBT group by the therapists, as the aim of the researchers (O’Connor et al., 2005) 
was to establish IBT as an effective treatment for OCD, especially as there was no 
blinding to the type of intervention delivered.
Furthermore, these initial studies have been with a relatively small sample size all 
originating from Canada, limiting the generalizability of the findings. Future studies 
must take into account a broader cultural, ethnic and non-Westem sample to counter 
this limitation. To date, no study evaluating the effectiveness of IBT has undertaken 
a follow-up to establish whether the benefits gained during the sessions have been 
maintained in the months following the completion of therapy. Future research must 
include follow-ups to demonstrate that the skills obtained by clients using IBT are an 
expertise that can be used to sustain improvements in OCD symptomology.
4.3.4 DO THESE FINDINGS CONCUR WITH THE THEORY OF IBA?
To date, studies investigating the effectiveness of focusing on inferential confusion,
as the main target of treatment in OCD, have produced encouraging results,
especially when participants appear to score in the severe range of inferential
confusion. This indicates that inferential confusion may play an important role in the
maintenance of obsessive compulsive symptoms. However, it is difficult to establish
exactly which elements of IBT are effective in the treatment of OCD. That is, when
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observing the steps of IBT, the early stages focus on the psychoeducational approach 
to understanding and noticing inferential confusion however the latter stages of 
treatment focus on the use of appraising the ‘intrusion’ (e.g. questioning the validity 
of the inference may be evaluating the underlying belief inadvertently). As IBT and 
CAM have been proposed as complementary, using appraisal approaches to aid 
treatment is substantiated. However, distinguishing between what are the active 
components and what are the benign constituents becomes clouded by the use of 
approaches grounded in different theories. Is challenging inferential confusion 
reducing OCD symptoms or are the appraisal exercises challenging the maladaptive 
beliefs maintaining the OCD? One way to answer this question is through the use of 
dismantling studies where the active condition is compared to a control condition 
that receives the same intervention minus one particular aspect.
5. FUTURE RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES
The role of inferential confusion is a relatively novel domain of research and there 
are many areas in need of investigation in order to delineate its function within 
obsessions and compulsions. This section will attempt to explore some of those areas 
and where the future of inferential confusion research may lie.
Metacognition is thought to play an important role in the maintenance of OCD 
(Wells & Matthews, 1994) referring to the process of thinking about thinking, that is, 
within OCD an individual may have beliefs about the purpose and meaning of 
intrusions. The IBA aims to challenge the maintaining cognitive processes at the 
intrusion level and the subsequent inferences following on from that initial doubt.
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However, another possibility is that challenging the reasoning processes at the 
automatic thought level also produces changes at the meta-cognitive level. For 
example, Wells (1997) proposed that individuals with OCD believe in the 
importance of neutralizing intrusions however IBT may shift the significance from 
the need to neutralize to the monitoring and challenging of the process of the 
intrusion (i.e. the proposed initial inference) and subsequent reasoning devices. This 
change in attention may subsequently make the thoughts about the importance of 
neutralizing cognitions less imperious. A study investigating the potential change in 
metacognition as a result of the challenging of inferential confusion with IBT would 
shed light upon this important process.
In order for IBT to be regarded as an efficacious intervention for OCD more rigorous 
research must be carried out. One such way is through the use of randomised 
controlled trials on a larger scale that recruit participants with greater cultural 
variability and from a number of different countries. Other studies investigating the 
components of IBT may also add knowledge to the different steps composing IBT. 
For example, inferential confusion currently consists of a number of different 
reasoning devices (such as inverse inference). However, apart from their inclusion 
within the ICQ and ICQ-EV, no specific research has investigated to what extent 
these specific devices are present in OCD. One hypothesis is that due to the 
heterogeneity of OCD individuals, representing varying sub-types of the disorder 
may utilise different reasoning devices, and a study evaluating the relationship 
between these facets would add to the potential for IBT to be uniquely tailored to 
each individual, supported by empirical research. It may also lead to the
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advancement of the IBT treatment protocol. This also raises the issue as to whether 
differing subgroups should be treated as separate groups in trials evaluating the 
effectiveness of IBT, especially if it is established that these groups respond 
differentially to the treatment (e.g. as may be indicated by Aardema and O’Connor 
(2012) with 20% of individuals able to proficiently reason pre-treatment).
One particular area that the potential role inferential confusion is yet to be explored 
is in the various other anxiety disorders. Although OCD is seen as differing from the 
phobic anxiety disorders due to its ego-dystonic nature and lack of fear associated 
with the object of intrusion (O’Connor & Robillard, 1995), the correlational research 
investigating inferential confusion found that ‘anxiety’ groups scored higher than 
control groups on the ICQ and ICQ-EV (Aardema et al., 2010). As previously 
discussed, using anxiety as one homogenous group limits the ability to establish 
whether inferential confusion is a process relevant to specific anxiety disorders. For 
example, asking participants to generally identify whether “I am more convinced by 
what might be there than what I actually see” (Aardema et al., 2005) may not be seen 
as a cognitive process they engage in. However, if a specific example situation that is 
relevant to the individual is provided, for example, with social anxiety where a 
feature of their apprehension is about blushing in a group situation even though they 
have just checked in the mirror and seen they are not, they may be more likely to 
answer in the affirmative to this aspect of inferential confusion. Therefore, research 
investigating other anxiety disorders such as social anxiety, health anxiety and post- 
traumatic stress disorder and the role of inferential confusion may be informative.
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Inferential confusion is currently seen in terms of a set of faulty reasoning devices 
that lead an individual to doubt. However, other processes such as imagination, 
dissociation and absorption have been implicated in obsessive compulsive symptoms 
(Aardema & Wu, 2011). Theoretically, an individual who is inferentially confused 
relies upon possibilities over sensory information and experimental data supports this 
assertion (Aardema et al., 2009). To what extent though, is inferential confusion the 
reason for this finding? The process of identifying a possibility (e.g. I have left the 
oven on) will probably rely upon imagination (e.g. an image or sound of the oven 
being on), which to some will dissociate the individual away from reality. Although 
correlational research has related these processes in a student sample (Aardema & 
Wu, 2011), experimental research, in controlled conditions, recruiting a clinical OCD 
sample will be able to establish the inter-relatedness of these processes. Further 
research also investigating whether these imaginary tendencies are present in other 
non-OCD activities would establish the specificity of these processes. If imagination, 
dissociation and absorption are found to be an important factor in inferential 
confusion states, this may provide a useful addition to the IBT protocol in an explicit 
way e.g. focusing on the influence of dissociation in obsessive compulsive 
symptoms.
A further factor that may influence inferential confusion is the role of memory in
OCD. Although imaginary processes have been empirically related to obsessive
compulsive symptoms, research has yet to identify exactly what constitutes these
processes. One possibility could be that what the person is imagining is, in fact, a
previous incident where they obsessively doubted and it is therefore a memory that is
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serving as the remote possibility and not a fictitious event. A memory such as this 
may be the product of inferential confusion in itself. For example, a mother with 
OCD who played with her son for the day questions whether she harmed him that 
morning. This question may lead to her remembering that she did not harm him but 
also producing the imagined possibility that she did (inferential confusion). The 
resulting doubt leads onto obsessive images of having possibly harmed her son and 
subsequent compulsions to neutralize this thought. The memory of the imagined 
scenario formed from this process (the mother harming her son) may serve as the 
possibility-based doubt the next time the mother worries about having harming her 
son. Inferential confusion may therefore function as a mediating/moderating factor in 
the relationship between obsessive and compulsions and memory formation of an 
obsessive-compulsive event. Research exploring this area could investigate the role 
of memory retrieval during doubting in OCD.
One of the key indicators of therapeutic improvement in OCD is a reduction in
inferential confusion, according to the IB A. To date, IBT has produced promising
results in symptom and inferential confusion reduction however Aardema et al.
(2005) also showed that cognitive behavioural therapy produces significant
reductions in inferential confusion. A study comparing the effects of IBT and therapy
using the CAM or ERP upon inferential confusion may provide insight into whether
specifically focusing upon inferential confusion produces more effective results than
the appraisal approach (as measured by the ICQ-EV). A central theorem of the IB A
is that it does not take away from the appraisal approach to treating OCD. Clearly,
some individuals with OCD find exposure with response prevention too distressing,
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which accounts for the high dropout rates experienced in this approach. However, 
these individuals may engage in and benefit fi*om IBT as an alternative given the 
highly cognitive nature of the IB A. Furthermore, an integrative approach using the 
IB A and the CAM may provide an interesting topic of experimentation in future 
research.
6. CONCLUSION
This literature review has explored the role of a reasoning process termed inferential 
confusion in obsessions and compulsions. The cross-sectional studies to date have 
found that inferential confusion broadly relates to the cognitive and behavioural 
processes established to be central to OCD but also that it explains additional 
variance beyond the beliefs central to OCD research and theoretical models (such as 
the CAM). Clearly, more experimental research is required beyond studies 
investigating doubting but the fact that IBT has been found to be effective in the 
treatment of OCD, especially those with high conviction in their primary inference, 
is promising. More rigorous research evaluating the efficacy of IBT is paramount and 
experimentation with individuals, for example, who have declined ERP or not 
recovered from CBT for OCD in attempting IBT, may prove fimitful. Although CBT 
has been proven to be effective for some, challenging longstanding beliefs in 
therapeutic treatment is widely regarded as challenging (Emmelkamp et al., 2002; 
Adams et al., 2012) and therefore the IB A may provide a vital alternative to the 
amelioration of obsessions and compulsions. The future of OCD treatment may well 
lie in more individualised and tailored approaches, given the heterogeneous nature of
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OCD, and the IB A provides a much needed complement to the challenging of beliefs 
and habituation to distress currently endorsed in the treatment of obsessions and 
compulsions.
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Table 1: Studies included in the literature review.
ARTICLE OUTLINE
INFERENCE BASED APPROACH THEORY
O'Connor & Outlines shortcomings o f the CBT approach and introduces the theory o f  the IB A.
Robillard
(1995)
O’Connor & Theorizes how imagination plays an important role in OCD and how it can lead to
Robillard maladaptive inferences. They describe how the IBA can complement CBT.
(1999)
O'Connor Outlines the IBA theory o f intrusions and compares this to the current appraisal
(2002) approach.
Aardema & Describes how meta-cognition is present in OCD and that inferential confusion could
O’Connor be present in this process.
(2003)
O'Connor & Focuses on the ego-dystonic nature o f OCD and how inferential confusion may
Aardema account for this.
(2003)
O’Connor, An in-depth book describing inferential confusion and IBT.
Aardema &
Pelissier
(2005)
Aardema & An account o f obsessions regarding blasphemy, aggression and sexuality from the
O’Connor view o f the IBA. Also focuses on self-themes.
(2007)
O'Connor et A theoretical description o f reasoning devices in inferential confusion and description
al. (2009) o f IBT with case examples.
O’Coimor & A clinician’s guide to IBT
Aardema 
(2012)
FOCUS SAMPLE METHOD RESULTS
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF INFERENTIAL CONFUSION
Emmelkamp The 305 non- Participants Inverse inference correlated
& Aardema relationship o f clinical administered with impulses (r=0.41),
(1999) cognitive participants. questionnaires washing (r=0.27), checking
domains (e.g. measuring (r=0.45), rumination
inverse obsessive- (r=0.65), precision (r=0.33).
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inference) compulsive beliefs. Multiple regression analysis
with obsessive symptoms and found inverse inference
compulsive depression. significantly related to
behaviours. Correlational 
analysis o f measures.
checking, rumination, and 
impulses (not washing & 
precision).
Pelissier & To investigate 3 groups of Participants No difference between
O'Connor inductive and participants: administered a OCD and control groups on
(2002) deductive 12 with OCD, battery o f tests deductive ability. OCD
reasoning 10 with designed to measure group took significantly
performance generalised inductive and longer to link two
in people with anxiety deductive reasoning statements and suggest why.
OCD. disorder, 10 ability. Results were The OCD group doubted
controls. analysed with an 
ANOVA to examine 
group differences.
their initial inference 
significantly more than 
other groups after 
generating alternatives.
Aardema et To validate the Four groups: Participants Inferential confusion was
al. (2005) ICQ. To OCD group completed a battery significantly related to a
investigate (85 o f questionnaires number o f OCD symptoms
whether participants), measuring obsessive independent o f  OCD
inferential delusional compulsive beliefs: PI total (r=0.32).
confusion group (16 symptoms, beliefs. thoughts about harm
contributes participants). thought-action (r=0.44), impulses about
uniquely to non-clinical fusion, inferential harm (r=0.09).
OCD control (51 confusion. contamination (r=0.28).
symptom participants), depression and checking (r=0.08).
variance. anxious anxiety. dressing/grooming (r=0.15).
control (31 Correlational Both the OCD and
participants). analysis between 
ICQ and other 
measures and factor 
analysis to determine 
structure o f ICQ.
delusional groups scored 
significantly higher than 
anxious and non-clinical 
groups (p<0.05).
Aardema, Are the 85 Participants Inter-correlations between
O'Connor & relationships participants administered a ICQ and OBQ total and
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Emmelkamp between OCD
(2006a)
Aardema et 
al. (2006b)
beliefs and 
symptoms 
accounted for 
by inferential 
confusion?
diagnosed 
with OCD.
Aardema,
Radomsky,
O'Connor & relationships
To investigate 
the
relationship
between OCD
behaviour,
schizotypal
thinking and
inferential
confusion.
To examine 
the
Julien
(2008)
between OCD 
symptoms and 
cognitive 
constructs 
such as 
obsessive 
beliefs and
108 non-
clinical
participants.
322 non-
clinical
participants.
battery o f  
questionnaires 
measuring inferential 
confusion (ICQ), 
OCD beliefs (OBQ- 
44), OCD symptoms 
(PI), and anxiety 
(BAI). Correlational 
analysis
investigating the 
relationship between 
measures.
Participants 
administered a 
variety o f  
questionnaires 
investigating 
inferential confusion 
(ICQ), schizotypal 
thinking and OCD 
behaviour.
Participants 
administered 
questionnaires 
measuring inferential 
confusion, obsessive 
beliefs, anxiety, 
depression, and 
OCD symptoms. 
Correlational 
analysis and factor
sub-scales ranged from 
r=0.29-0.71. When 
controlling for OCD beliefs, 
ICQ remained significantly 
related to a number o f OCD 
symptoms such as 
obsessions (r=0.46), 
contamination (r=0.36), and 
PI total (r=0.43) but not 
impulses (r=0.11), dressing 
(r=0.14) or checking 
(r=0.06). When controlling 
for ICQ many o f the 
correlations between OCD 
symptoms and beliefs were 
non-significant.
Both inferential confusion 
and schizotypal thinking 
were significantly 
correlated with OCD 
behaviour. Schizotypal 
thinking and inferential 
confusion had explainable 
variance in common but 
were also sufficiently 
independent.
Factor analysis used to 
establish underlying factor 
structure when combining 
the ICQ and OBQ-44 which 
derived a four-factor 
solution. Three factors 
mainly resulted from the 
OBQ-44 (factors 1, 3 ,4 )  
and one factor mainly 
derived from questions
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inferential
confusion.
analysis used. 
Regression analysis 
to establish whether 
cognitive constructs 
have predictive 
power for OCD 
symptoms.
Aardema, To investigate: OCD group Both groups
O'Connor, 1) doubting in (50 completed the
Pelissier & OCD participants) inference processes
Lavoie participants, 2) and non- task which is an
(2009). the reliance on clinical experimental
possibility- control group measure o f doubting
based (22 whilst considering
information. participants). possibility and
3) OCD reality-based
severity and information at a
its impact series o f stages using
upon doubting an OCD and non-
and use of OCD scenario.
possibility-
based
information.
Pelissier, To compare OCD group The groups
O'Connor & inductive (35 completed the
Dupuis reasoning in participants) Reasoning with
(2009) an OCD and and non- Inductive Arguments
non-clinical clinical Task which
group of control group measures the level o f
participants. (39
participants).
conviction when an 
inferenee is made 
about set statements. 
ANOVA and T-tests 
used to measure
constituting the ICQ (factor 
2). Regression analysis 
revealed the inferential 
confusion factor was the 
strongest predictor o f OCD 
symptoms whilst 
controlling for general 
distress (P=0.20-0.46).
The OCD group had higher 
levels o f  doubt, especially 
regarding the impact o f  
possibility-based 
information at several time 
points during the OCD 
scenario. No clear patterns 
emerged on the impact o f  
reality-based information 
between the groups. Using 
multiple regression 
analysis, the combined 
cumulative impact o f  
possibility and reality and 
the cumulative impact o f  
possibility alone predicted 
symptom severity.
The OCD tended to doubt 
more than the control group 
when alternatives to their 
inference were given as 
opposed to self-generated 
(F(l,71) = 3.42;p<0.069). 
The OCD group produced a 
similar number o f  
alternatives to their initial 
inference as the non-clinical 
group.
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Wu, To examine
Aardema & the
O'Connor relationships
(2009) between
inferential 
confusion and 
OCD
symptoms and 
beliefs.
317 non- 
clinical
group differences. 
Participants 
administered a
undergraduate battery o f  
students questionnaires
measuring inferential 
confusion, OCD 
beliefs, OCD 
symptoms, impulses, 
and general distress.
Dirik, 
Karaali &
To examine Three groups: Participants
the cross- OCD group completed a battery
cultural (51 of questionnaires
validity o f the participants). measuring inferential
ICQ in a anxiety group confusion (ICQ),
Turkish (21 OCD beliefs (OBQ-
sample. participants). 44), OCD
and non- symptoms.
clinical group personality traits
(190 students) (Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire 
Revised 
Abbreviated; 
Eysenck; Francis et 
al., 1992), anxiety 
and depression.
ICQ-EV significantly 
correlated with OBQ-44 
(1=0.48-0.62). ICQ-EV 
significantly related to OCD 
symptoms (r=0.43-0.55). 
Using hierarchical 
regression analysis, the 
ICQ-EV significantly 
predicted total OCD 
symptoms (t(306)= 
3.65;p=0.0003), checking 
(t(306)= 4.15;p<0.0001) 
and washing (t(306)= 3.70; 
p=0.0003) but not rituals 
(t(306)= 0.82; p=0.4129). 
The OCD group scored 
significantly higher on the 
ICQ than the anxiety group 
and control group. In OCD 
group, ICQ significantly 
correlated with PI (r=0.35), 
obsessive thoughts (r=0.48), 
obsessive impulses 
(r=0.35), OBQ-44 total 
(1=0.48),
responsibility/threat
(1=0.48),
importance/control o f  
thoughts (r=0.42), BDI 
(r=0.42), anxiety (0.61).
ICQ not significantly 
related to psychoticism 
(r=0.11), cleaning/washing 
(r=0.25), control (r=0.21), 
grooming (r=0.01) or
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Aardema et 
al. (2010)*
Aardema & 
W u(2011)
Validation o f 360 English Participants The OCD group scored
the ICQ-EV speaking completed a battery significantly higher than the
and its students, 90 o f questionnaires other groups on the ICQ-
relationship to French measuring OCD EV. In the OCD group, the
OCD speaking non- symptoms. ICQ-EV significantly
symptoms. clinical depression, anxiety. correlated with all measures
participants. and the ICQ-EV. and subscales (r=0.20-0.60)
16 French Correlational except the PI subscale
speaking analysis o f dressing and grooming
anxiety questionnaires. compulsions (r=0.03).
disorder When controlling for
group, 100 negative mood states only
French obsessional impulses o f
speaking harm to self and others
OCD group. became non-significantly 
correlated (r=0.08).
To examine 377 non- Participants The ICQ-EV correlated
the clinical completed a battery significantly with measures
relationships students. o f questionnaires: o f schizotypal personality
between Schedule o f (r=0.61), SCOPI total
imaginative, compulsions. (r=0.58), depersonalisation
dissociative obsessions, and (r=0.56), SCOPI checking
and pathological (r=0.54), and dissociation
schizotypal impulses (SCOPI; absorption (r=0.53). Using
processes with Watson & Wu, multiple regression
OCD 2005), Schizotypal analysis, the ICQ-EV
symptoms and Personality significantly predicted total
whether these Questionnaire - SCOPI score ((3=0.40).
proeesses Brief Version (Raine
predict OCD & Benishay, 1995),
symptoms. dissociation 
(Dissociative 
Experiences Scale; 
Carlson & Putnam, 
1993),
171
The Role o f Inferential Confusion in Social Anxiety: A Quasi-Experimental study
URN: 6198773
Polman, 
O'Connor & 
Huisman
(2011).
To understand 
belief 
subtypes in 
OCD and to 
examine the 
addition of  
inferential 
confusion in 
understanding 
this disorder.
174
participants 
diagnosed 
with OCD.
depersonalisation 
(Cambridge 
Depersonalisation 
Scale; Sierra & 
Berrios, 2000), 
immersion 
tendencies 
(Immersive 
Tendency 
Questionnaire; 
Witmer & Singer, 
1998), a measure o f  
presence in external 
reality (The Adapted 
Igroup Presence 
Questionnaire; 
Aardema et al., 
2009), ICQ-EV, and 
the Positive and 
Negative Affect 
Scale (Watson & 
Clark, 1994). 
Participants 
administered the 
ICQ, OBQ-44, BAI, 
BDI, and the 
YBOCS.
Cluster analysis revealed a 
2 and 6 factor model. Both 
models contained a Tow 
beliefs’ subgroup which 
scored low on the OBQ-44 
but similarly on the y-bocs 
to high beliefs group. 64.5% 
(2-factor) and 38.5% (6 
factor) o f participants were 
in the low beliefs group for 
the 2 models.
EFFECTIVENESS OF INFERENCE BASED THERAPY
Aardema, Is inferential 35
Emmelkamp confusion participants
Participants received Participants showed
4 assessment statistically significant
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& O'Connor related to
(2005)
O'Connor et 
al. (2005)
treatment 
outcome for 
partieipants 
with OCD 
receiving 
CBT?
diagnosed 
with OCD.
Evaluating the 
comparative 
efficacy of 
IBT, CAM 
and ERP and 
to gather 
information on 
reasoning 
processes in 
OCD.
54
participants 
diagnosed 
with OCD.
sessions then 20 
CBT sessions. 
Measured using the 
YBOCS, ICQ, BDI, 
BAI and clinician 
rated and self­
monitored inference 
processes. Analysis 
used pre- and post­
change in scores.
Random allocation 
to CAM, ERP or 
IBT. Treatment was 
20 sessions in 
length.
Partieipants 
completed the 
YBOCS, PI, a 
measure of 
intrusions, BAI, 
BDI, OBQ, clinical 
scale & self­
monitoring of 
inference and 
appraisal processes, 
both pre- and post­
therapy.
Results: pre-post 
differences on 
measures, also 
difference between
reduction on all measures 
pre to post (p<0.001, except 
BDI in which p<0.01). 
‘Responders’ to treatment 
had greater reduction on 
ICQ compared to ‘non­
responders’ but no 
difference on primary 
inference, only secondary 
inference.
Inferential confusion not 
related to level o f  
eonviction (appraisal) o f  
primary & secondary 
inference.
All 3 treatments sig reduced 
YBOCS scores. In high 
primary inference scorers 
(high scorers) there was a 
‘trend’ towards IBT being 
more effective than CAM. 
All 3 treatments sig reduced 
Padua scores. In high 
scorers on padua, CAM & 
IBT reduced sig., with IBT 
improving symptoms sig 
more than CAM.
All 3 groups sig reduced 
duration o f symptoms. High 
scores: reduced 
significantly in CAM &
IBT
Distress: 3 groups 
significantly reduced. High 
scores on primary 
inference: only CAM &
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group changes
Aardema et Investigate the 38 French
al. (2010)* changes in speaking
inferential participants
confusion and diagnosed
treatment with OCD.
outcome as a 
result o f IBT.
All participants 
completed 
questionnaires: PI, 
YBOCS, BDI-II, 
BAI, Mood and a 
measure o f anxiety. 
38 participants from 
the OCD group 
completed 20 
sessions o f IBT.
Pre to post scores on 
questionnaires for 
IBT were used to 
analyse effectiveness 
of treatment.
IBA reduced.
Intrusions: significantly 
reduced scores in the 3 
groups. High scorers: 
significant reduction in both 
IBT & CAM. Greater in 
IBT.
Significant pre to post 
reduction in OCD 
symptoms, general distress, 
ICQ & OBQ. Post treatment 
OCD scores similar to 
student control.
Participants split into 
‘responders’ and ‘non­
responders’ to treatment. 
Using t-tests, participants 
could only be differentiated 
on the measures o f the OBQ 
subscale
responsibility/threat (t(31)= 
2.54; p=0.016) and the 
ICQ-EV (t(31)= 2.06; 
p=0.047).
Aardema &
O'Connor
(2012)
Is
improvement 
in ability to 
resolve 
doubting in 
OCD 
associated 
with treatment 
outcome?
35
participants 
diagnosed 
with OCD.
All participants 
offered 24 week IBT 
course.
Participants 
administered the 
YBOCS, Padua, 
BDI-II, BAI and 
ICQ. The IPT was 
administered pre- 
and post-therapy.
There was a significant 
reduction on all measures 
pre-post IBT.
On the IPT, level o f doubt 
had significantly reduced 
pre- to post-IBT.
22 participants post 
treatment compared to 8pps 
pre-treatment were able to 
resolve doubt -  defined by a
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cut-off established in a 
previous study.
Participants split into 
groups: resolution, no 
resolution, pre-resolution 
(of doubt).
All groups improved on 
YBOCS significantly. 
Obsessions: All groups 
significantly improved, 
resolution group improved 
significantly more than 
others.
Compulsions: All groups 
significantly improved. No 
interaction effects.
PI: Resolution group 
improved significantly more 
than others. All groups 
improved sig over time. 
ICQ: Overall significantly 
decreased. Resolution group 
improved significantly more 
than other groups.
Impact o f possibility: Trend 
towards groups to lessen 
impact o f possibility 
following treatment 
(p=0.09) & also trend 
towards pre-resolution & 
resolution lessen in impact 
o f possibility.
Impact o f reality:
Significant impact o f  
reality. Participants 
impacted less by reality
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information post-treatment. 
Pre-resolution and 
resolution groups 
significantly less impacted 
than non-resolution.
'Article in two sections of the table
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ABSTRACT
In 2004 a mentoring scheme for trainee clinical psychologists was set-up at a 
university in the south of England. The scheme was designed as a means for trainees 
to improve their reflective practice through one-to-one meetings with a qualified 
clinical psychologist where personal and professional issues can be discussed with a 
confidential relationship. The current study represents an evaluation of the trainees’ 
and recently qualified clinical psychologists’ perspectives of the mentoring scheme 
using both open and closed questions. The study involved 56 participants who each 
completed an internet-based questionnaire. Overall, 91% of participants found the 
scheme useful, 46.4% were ‘very satisfied’ with the interactions with their mentor, 
87.5% experienced their mentor as ‘moderately’ or ‘very approachable’, and 72.7% 
indicated they would continue with the scheme if given the choice. An inductive 
content analysis was utilised to evaluate the two open-ended questions. When 
commenting upon the usefulness of the scheme, participant responses were 
categorised around ‘gaining new perspectives and ideas’, the ‘therapeutic’ nature of 
the relationship, and the importance of having matching ‘interests’ with their mentor. 
When asked about how to improve the scheme, participant responses focused upon 
giving the trainees more flexibility and choice with the scheme, and providing 
training and information to the trainees. The implications of these results are 
discussed, such as the recommendation that the scheme is continued with more 
training and choice for trainee clinical psychologists. Further research suggestions 
are also indicated.
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INTRODUCTION
Reflective practice is regarded as an important aspect in the training of clinical 
psychologists (Lavender, 2003) and forms a central skill of the ‘reflective scientist- 
practitioner’ role clinical psychologists utilise (Cushway & Gatherer, 2003). In order 
to learn, Imel (1992) proposed that there is a requirement to integrate experience 
with reflection. Therefore it is an essential part of the learning process as it provides 
an opportunity to make sense of subjective experiences. Lavender (2003) proposed 
that there are four processes involved in reflective practice: reflection in action 
(metacognition about situations and can be facilitated through simulations), 
reflection on action (reflections after an event), reflection about impact upon others 
(which can be facilitated through feedback from others), and reflections about self. 
Clinical psychology training programmes offer a variety of methods for the 
development of reflective practice through the use of personal and professional 
development groups, buddy systems, course tutors, personal therapy, and mentoring 
schemes (Gilmer & Marckus, 2003). This study focuses on the usefulness of a 
mentoring scheme at one UK university.
A clinical psychology training programme in the south of England has been running 
a mentoring scheme since 2004. It was devised as a way for trainee clinical 
psychologists to be guided through the three years of training, typically by an 
experienced clinical psychologist through the use of one-to-one meetings. These 
encounters were envisaged to be a forum for reflection upon the demands of clinical 
training, working within the NHS, and the impact of these upon personal and
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professional development, through the use of reflective practice. Trainees are 
allocated a mentor at the beginning of the course, with meetings scheduled once a 
term as a minimum requirement. As the content of the mentoring meetings is kept 
confidential, in order to facilitate open communication and trust between the mentor 
and mentee, there is little communication between the clinical psychology course 
team, trainee clinical psychologists, and mentors about the meetings (unless 
problems arise). Therefore, little is understood regarding the satisfaction levels of 
trainees using the mentoring scheme and only one evaluations of the scheme have 
been undertaken to date (results not available). The current study aimed to provide 
quantitative and qualitative data in order to evaluate the scheme from the perspective 
of trainee clinical psychologists and recently qualified clinical psychologists.
OBJECTIVES
1. To describe satisfaction levels regarding trainee clinical psychologists’ 
perceptions of the mentoring scheme (usefulness, satisfaction with the 
interactions with their mentor, ability to be open with their mentor, and 
whether the scheme should continue).
2. To elicit suggestions for improving the mentoring scheme.
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS
Trainees in the second and final year of training or who had qualified in the last year 
from the university were eligible to take part in the survey. The survey was
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completed by 56 of the eligible 93 participants. As the majority of the participants 
are well-known to the author (GJ) and clinical psychology course team, no 
demographic details were requested during the study in order to maintain 
confidentiality and aid freedom of expression.
MATERIALS
Participants were presented with 12 closed choice questions and two open-ended 
questions regarding their experiences and opinions of the mentoring scheme 
(Appendix A). The questions were devised through consultation with an academic 
tutor and a research tutor who are familiar with the mentoring scheme. The questions 
were further refined and altered to incorporate the retrospective views of the recently 
qualified clinical psychologists. The questions aimed to incorporate a range of 
elements of the mentoring scheme such as satisfaction, frequency of use, usefulness, 
elements of the relationship (e.g. the ability to be open with the mentor), and whether 
the mentoring scheme should continue. All questions were optional to complete.
DESIGN
A cross-sectional survey design was utilised incorporating both quantitative and 
qualitative data.
PROCEDURE
In order to be open regarding the evaluation of the scheme, mentors participating in 
the scheme were contacted by email by the manager of the mentoring scheme
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informing them that the survey would be taking place in the next week and that no 
personal information would be requested.
An email was sent by the course administrator to the potential participants (see 
Appendix B) requesting participation in the survey. A link to the internet-based 
questionnaire was included in the email.
Participants who consented to take part in the survey were presented with two pages. 
The first contained the 12 closed choice questions followed by a second page with 
the two open-ended questions. Upon completing the survey, participants were 
thanked for their participation.
DATA ANALYSIS
The data derived from the closed choice question responses were used to construct a 
series of frequency charts illustrating the responses to each question.
For the open-ended questions, an inductive approach to content analysis was utilised 
where categories were derived from the text (Elo & Kyngas, 2008). A process of 
open coding, creating categories, and abstraction was undertaken. Words, sentences 
and paragraphs of the open-ended questions were grouped into categories, after an 
initial reading of the text. Categories initially created were collapsed into broader 
categories that were similar in content (e.g. initially there was an ‘interests clash’ 
category and an ‘interests similar’ category. These were reduced to an ‘interests’ 
category) through interpretation by the author (Dey, 1993). Each category was then
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named utilising words that were characteristic of the content. Subcategories were 
also established where differences within each category emerged (Robson, 1993).
RESULTS 
CLOSED CHOICE QUESTIONS
In total, 56 participants completed the survey. Of these, 21 were from the second 
year of training, 21 from the third year of training, and 14 were qualified clinical 
psychologists (see Appendix C for results tables for closed questions). The most 
frequent amount of times mentors were visited by trainees was between 3-5 times, 
accounting for 46.4% of the responses (see Figure 1). 60.7% of participants (34/56) 
stated they had visited their mentor as many times as they would have liked during 
their training whereas 39.3% of participants (22/56) indicated they had not.
« 20
« 15
Frequency of contacts with mentor
Figure 1. The frequency o f contacts trainees had with their mentor.
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For the 23 participants who did not feel they had visited their mentor on as many 
occasions as they would have liked, the highest cited reasons were T do not have the 
time available’, ‘mentor is based too far away’, and ‘I do not get enough value from 
the contacts’(Figure 2). Participants cited other reasons such as their mentor going on 
maternity leave (two responses) and difficulty organising meetings or mentors not 
responding to communications (three responses).
Mentor is I do not I do not get I use my I do not see
based too have the enough other tutors the use of
faraway time value from if I want to having a 
available the contacts discuss mentor
something 
Reason for not visiting mentor
Other
Figure 2. The frequency o f  reasons fo r  participants not contacting their mentor.
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Figure 3. Participants ’ ratings o f  the usefulness o f  the mentoring scheme.
Overall, 46.4% of respondents (26/56) found the mentoring scheme ‘somewhat 
useful’ and 44.6% (24/56) of participants found the scheme either ‘moderately 
useful’ or ‘very useful’ (Figure 3).
When asked whether participants thought their mentor was someone separate to the 
course team, 85.5% agreed (47/55), 10.9% disagreed (6/55), and 3.6% did not know 
(2/55). When asked about the level of satisfaction with their interactions with their 
mentor, 46.4% (26/56) were ‘very satisfied’ and 50% (28/56) were either ‘somewhat 
satisfied’ or ‘moderately satisfied’ (Figure 4).
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Not satisfied at all Somewhat Moderately Very satisfied
satisfied satisfied
Level of satisfaction
Figure 4. Level o f satisfaction o f  the interactions with mentors.
Current trainees reported that 72.7% of them (32/44) would continue the scheme if 
given the choice. Whereas 27.3% (12/44) reported they would not like to continue 
the scheme. When asked, ‘if you did not have a mentor during training, do you think 
you would miss out on something valuable?’, 66% (33/50) reported they would miss 
something valuable, 34% (17/50) reported they would not. Participants also reported 
that 61.8% (34/55) of them felt there were things they could discuss with their 
mentor that they could not discuss with other tutors or supervisors, with 38.2% 
(21/55) disagreeing with this statement.
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Approachability
Figure 5. Participant ratings o f the approachability o f their mentor.
In relation to the approachability of their mentor, 87.5% (49/56) of participants felt 
their mentor was either ‘moderately approachable’ or ‘very approachable’ (Figure 5).
30
25
I  20
I .
A
ttHo
d 10 
%
Not open at all Somewhat open Moderately open Very open 
Ability to be open with mentor
Figure 6. A graph illustrating how open participants reported they could be with their 
mentor.
Participants reported that 78.6% (44/56) of them felt they could be either ‘moderately 
open’ or ‘very open’. In total, 3.6% (2/56) stated they did not feel they could be open 
with their mentor at all (Figure 6).
OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS
USEFULNESS OF THE SCHEME
Utilising an inductive approach to content analysis, a series of categories emerged 
regarding the usefulness of the mentoring scheme completed by 36 participants (see 
Appendix D):
Usefulness
Two subcategories emerged from 18 participant comments on the usefulness of the 
mentoring scheme. The first was experiencing the scheme as useful. Participants 
commented on the value they received from the meetings and the increased 
usefulness the more the meetings occurred. The second category was not finding the 
scheme useful. Participants expressed comments around not receiving value from the 
scheme, not seeing a need to visit their mentor regularly, and not being ‘matched’ 
well with their supervisor.
Interests
Seven participants expressed the importance of having similar interests with their 
mentor. Participants with a mentor with similar interests (and/or personality) valued
189
The Role o f Inferential Confusion in Social Anxiety: A Quasi-Experimental study
URN: 6198773
this match; whereas participants who did not, expressed concern regarding the ‘poor 
fit’ with their mentor and how important this was to the relationship.
Gaining new perspectives and ideas
Twelve participants expressed how they were able to gain new ideas and ways of 
thinking about their work. This category was split into four subcategories: 
Information gain (e.g. ‘she can bring her own ideas an experience’), reducing stress 
(e.g. ‘fantastic.. .at times of difficulty’), reflective space (e.g. ‘a nice opportunity to 
reflect’), and new ways of thinking (e.g. ‘allows you to receive an ‘outside’ 
perspective’).
Freedom of expression
A category emerged where three participants felt able to talk freely (e.g. ‘I was able 
to talk freely about any problems I was having’) but also a category where two 
participants did not feel able to freely talk (e.g. ‘when I wanted to talk... it wasn’t in 
confidence’).
Time management
Four trainees commented on the distance they needed to travel to their mentor being 
too far. One participant stated that the requirement to see their mentor three times a 
year was too much.
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Lack of knowledge
Two subcategories emerged from the Tack of knowledge’ category: ‘different to 
expectations’ (trainees had different expectations of the mentoring role to the 
mentor) and ‘the role of the mentor not specified’, where six participants commented 
on aspects such as querying why the mentoring scheme exists or how often they 
should meet.
Being evaluated
One trainee expressed how they thought it appeared to be an evaluative relationship, 
whereas two trainees stated the opposite.
Box ticking exercise
Two trainees used the phrase ‘box-ticking exercise’ and two other participants stated 
it was another demand that they believed was not needed.
Relationship development
Two comments were made regarding the positive relationship they developed with 
their mentor.
Therapeutic
Nine statements made by participants referred to the therapeutic aspect of the 
mentoring relationship (e.g. ‘a non-judgemental, reflective space to explore 
professional and personal development’).
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Ex-Surrey trainee mentors
A category was formed regarding the importance of having an ex-Surrey trainee as a 
mentor, reported by three participants (e.g. ‘my mentor is not a Surrey graduate and 
this makes it difficult to talk about shared experiences’).
WAYS TO IMPROVE THE MENTORING SCHEME
A separate content analysis was carried out upon the open-ended statement, ‘please 
tell us any thoughts you have on how you think the mentoring scheme could be 
improved’. Below are the categories that emerged from the data:
1. Give the trainees choices (e.g. ability to choose mentor/change mentor, 
choose to opt out of the scheme, flexibility with number of meetings) (eight 
participants).
2. Provide training or information about the purpose/content of the meetings 
with the mentor (e.g. explain what the scheme is for, guidance on the 
structure of the sessions, training for mentors) (16 participants).
3. Limit the distance trainees have to travel to meet their mentor (four 
participants).
4. Place meetings with mentors into the timetable (four participants).
5. Match the interests of the trainees with their mentor (two participants).
6. Use newly qualified clinical psychologists who trained at the same university 
as trainees (one participant).
7. Reduce close relationships between placement supervisors, mentors, and 
university tutors (two participants).
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8. Increase the responsibilities for the mentor (e.g. ask mentors to initiate 
meetings and contacts; two participants).
DISCUSSION
This study aimed to gather quantitative and qualitative data on the opinions and 
experiences of trainee clinical psychologists and recently qualified clinical 
psychologists regarding a mentoring scheme. Participants were also asked their 
opinions on how the scheme could be improved.
Trainees have used the mentoring scheme to varying degrees. Some have exceeded 
the recommended amount and some have used the scheme only once or twice. The 
principal reason for not visiting was due to the excessive time and distance 
requirements of the meetings, although 60.7% agreed they had seen their mentor as 
much as they would have liked. Once participants had overcome these barriers, the 
majority experienced their mentors as approachable and open, producing a satisfying 
experience. Many participants commented on the therapeutic nature of the 
interactions alongside an opportunity to explore new ideas and perspectives. Nearly 
all participants (91%) gained some use from the scheme. However, it appears some 
participants were frustrated with the inflexibility of the scheme, especially given the 
high number of demands upon the time of trainees. Others experienced the scheme as 
different to their expectations or were not sure how the sessions should be structured; 
lowering the value they gained from meetings. For these participants, some wanted 
to be able to opt-out of the scheme or limit the amount they visited their mentor.
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CRITIQUE
There are a number of observations that must be attended to when considering the 
results of this survey. Not all trainee clinical psychologists and ex-trainee clinical 
psychologists eligible to complete this survey took part. It is not possible to 
determine how these individuals experienced the mentoring scheme and therefore 
this sample may represent a biased view of the mentoring scheme (e.g. did some 
participants who did not take part not feel able to express that they had not seen their 
mentor once?). Furthermore, as the mentor-mentee experience is a confidential 
relationship, it is not possible to determine how these meetings differ across 
relationships. There is not set structure to the content of these meetings and therefore 
this survey may be requesting descriptions of a scheme that varies greatly between 
participants. This survey was not able to ascertain what those differences may be. 
However, in spite of these limitations, the data presented here is representative of the 
majority of participants eligible for the survey and explore a wide range of areas 
pertinent to the experiences of trainee psychologists using the mentoring scheme.
SERVICE IMPLICATIONS
It is clear that the vast majority of participants gained value fi-om the mentoring 
scheme and therefore it is recommended that the scheme continues. However, there 
are a number of areas that could be addressed to improve the mentoring scheme, 
according to the results of this survey. Firstly, trainee clinical psychologists could be 
given more flexibility in deciding how often they contact their mentor, as some 
participants felt once a term, as stipulated by the course team, was too often.
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Secondly, allowing trainees to have a greater part in choosing their mentor. This 
would allow barriers to the success of the scheme (e.g. the time and distance to travel 
to their mentors or differing professional interests) to be limited, although the 
administration of such a choice would be time demanding. Thirdly, many 
participants commented on the lack of information around what the mentoring 
scheme is for, how the meetings could be structured, and defining the mentoring role. 
Information sessions, in addition to the session provided at the beginning of training, 
providing suggestions for structure of the sessions, an explanation of the role of the 
mentor in the training of clinical psychologists and possibly trainees experienced in 
using the scheme communicating how they benefited fi-om the relationship with their 
mentor, is likely to aid the understanding of the requirements of the scheme. For 
example, these could be arranged at each academic year.
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
Mentors were not included within this sample, and although not a focus of the 
research question, they play a vital part in the experience trainees receive from the 
mentoring scheme. It is possible the mentors would recommend similar points to 
improve the scheme and therefore a research study investigating the experiences of 
mentors would be an interesting addition to this study. Although the qualitative 
aspect of this study has the strength of a relatively large number of respondents, there 
has only been a limited scope to analyse their experiences. A further qualitative study 
interviewing trainee clinical psychologists who have used the mentoring scheme 
would provide a greater depth of data to interpret.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX A - MENTORING SCHEME QUESTIONNAIRE
1. What year of training are you in?
• 2"  ^year
• year
• Qualified
2. How many contacts have you had/did you have with your mentor since the 
beginning of the course?
•  0
•  1-2
• 3-5
•  6-8
• 9-10
•  11+
3. Have you visited your mentor as many times as you would have liked?
• Yes
• No
4. If you answered ‘No’ to question 3, why is that?
• Mentor is based too far away
• I do not have the time available
• I do not get enough value fi-om the contacts
• I use my other tutors if I want to discuss something
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• I do not see the use of having a mentor
• Other (please specify).............................................
5. Do/did you think your mentor is/was someone separate to the course?
• Yes
• No
• Don’t know
6. How useful do you/did you find the mentoring scheme?
• Not useful at all
• Somewhat useful
• Moderately useful
• Very useful
7. How satisfied are/were you with the interactions with your mentor?
• Not satisfied at all
• Somewhat satisfied
• Moderately satisfied
• Very satisfied
8. Do you feel your mentor is/was approachable?
• Not approachable at all
• Somewhat approachable
• Moderately approachable
• Very approachable
9. How open do you feel you can be/could be with your mentor?
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• Not open at all
• Somewhat open
• Moderately open
• Very open
10. If you had a choice, would you continue with the mentoring scheme?
• Yes
• No
11. Are there things you discuss(ed) with your mentor you feel you could not 
discuss with other tutors/supervisors?
• Yes
• No
12. If you did not have a mentor during training, do you think you would miss 
out on something valuable?
• Yes
• No
13. Please tell us any other thoughts you have on the usefulness of the mentoring 
scheme: [open question]
14. Please tell us any thoughts on how you think the mentoring scheme could be 
improved: [open question]
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APPENDIX B -  EMAIL INVITES TO PARTICIPANTS
Email sent to current trainee clinical psychologists:
Hi everyone,
I am a second year trainee at [university] and for my SRRP I am evaluating the 
usefulness of the mentoring scheme. I would like to invite you to take part by 
completing the multiple choice questionnaire provided in the link below. It should 
take no more than two minutes of your time and your participation will be very 
much appreciated.
No personal information is asked for in the questionnaire.
If you have any questions, feel free to email me.
Link to study: httns://www.survevmonkev.com/s/XHVMVPF 
Email sent to qualified clinical psychologists:
Hi everyone,
I am a second year trainee clinical psychologist at the [niversity] and for my Service 
Related Research Project I am evaluating the usefulness of the trainee mentoring 
scheme. I am interested in hearing the views of ex-trainees having completed 
three years of using the mentoring scheme. I would like to invite you to take part by 
completing the multiple choice questionnaire provided in the link below. It should 
take no more than two minutes of your time and your participation will be very 
much appreciated.
No personal information is asked for in the questionnaire.
If you have any questions, feel free to email me.
Link to study: https://www.survevmonkev.eom/s/XHYMVPF
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APPENDIX C -  RESULTS TABLES FOR CLOSED QUESTIONS
Question 1. What Year o f Training are you in?
Year of training No. of participants
2“^  year 21
3’’^  year 21
Qualified 14
Question 2.How many Contacts Have you Had/Did you Have With Your
Mentor Since the Beginning o f the Course?
Number of contacts Frequency of contacts with mentor
0 0
1-2 15
3-5 26
6-8 9
9-10 3
11+ 3
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Question 3. Have you Visited your Mentor as Many Times as you Would 
Have Liked During Training?
Yes or no No. of responses
Yes 34
No 22
Question 4. I f  you Answered ‘no ’ to Question 3. Why is That?
Reason for not visiting No. of responses
Mentor is based too far away 7
I do not have the time available 10
I do not get enough value from the 7
contacts
I use my other tutors if I want to 5
discuss something
I do not see the use of having a 1
mentor
Other 8
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Question 5. Do/Did You Think Your Mentor is Someone Separate to the 
Course?
Answer No. of responses
Yes 47
No 6
Don’t know 2
Question 6. How Useful do You/Did You Find the Mentoring Scheme?
Usefulness No. of responses
Not useful at all 5
Somewhat useful 26
Moderately useful 11
Very useful 14
uestion 7.HowSsatisfled Are/Were you With the Interactions With your Mentor?
Level o f satisfaction No. o f responses
Not satisfied at all 2
Somewhat satisfied 12
Moderately satisfied 16
Very satisfied 2d
Question 8. Do you Feel your Mentor is/Was Approachable?
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Approachability No. of responses
Not approachable at all 0
Somewhat approachable 7
Moderately approachable 14
Very approachable 35
Question 9.How Open do you Feel You Can/Could he With Your Mentor?
Ability to be open No. of responses
Not open at all 2
Somewhat open 10
Moderately open 27
Very open 17
Question 10. For Current Trainees: I f  you Had a Choice, Would You Continue With 
the Mentoring Scheme?
Answer No. o f responses
32
Vo 12
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Question 11. Are There Things You Discuss(ed) With Your Mentor You Feel You 
Could Not Discuss With Other Tutors/Supervisors?
Answer No. of responses
Yes 34
No 21
Question 12. I f  You Did Not Have a Mentor During Training, do You Think You 
Would Miss Out on Something Valuable?
Answer No. of responses
Yes 33
No 17
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APPENDIX D -  CONTENT ANALYSIS OF OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS
Note: Participant number is indicated next to their remarks.
13. Please tell us any other thoughts you have on the usefulness of the mentoring 
scheme:
A. USEFULNESS
Useful
I. i thought the scheme was very useful
2 .1 have found it useful.
10.1 had one useful session
II. Invaluable, especially with a fantastic mentor 
16. They can be helpful
17.1 think the scheme was very helpful
21. really valuable. I have found it incredibly useful so far!
24. As training has progressed I have found these meetings more usefiil than 
at the beginning of training.
28. However, each time we met, our meetings proved really useful
29 .1 feel it is a useful scheme 
Not useful
9, but haven't found it to be of much value. In the end, I have found this to be 
one of the least useful sources of support on training.
10.1 had one useful session
15. It's not ideal
16.1 feel that personally I have not gotten value out of the scheme
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18. Perhaps I've missed the point but I don't really understand why we have it 
23. I'm not sure what it adds beyond supervisors/clinical tutors/ ppd group
25 .1 haven't felt the need to visit my mentor regularly, particularly as I have 
not had significant difficulties with supervisory relationships
32. However I haven't benefited otherwise, but appreciate the mentor role 
might be helpful for trainee's who require someone to speak to outside of the 
course team- although I haven't used my mentor for this.
34 .1 suppose, similarly to supervision arrangements, sometimes it works 
really well and can extremely valuable, but with the less perfect match, the 
value is less.
B. INTERESTS 
Similar interests:
2 .1 have found it useful to have a mentor who works in CAMHS, since I 
hope to work in CAMHS after qualifying
12. Obviously it also depends on a good match of personalities
25 .1 also valued having a mentor in the same area in which I hope to work 
when I am qualified.
Different interests:
1. my mentor had none of the same interests as me (she was forensic and I 
was not) and therefore we did not click.
8. totally depends on the fit with the person to whom you are allocated 
16. this is perhaps because there has been apoor fit between myself and my 
mentor
207
The Role o f Inferential Confusion in Social Anxiety: A  Quasi-Experimental study
URN: 6198773
34 .1 would imagine that it can be very useful when there is a better match 
between a trainee and the mentor in terms of personalities, working- 
communication styles etc
C. GAIN NEW IDEAS/PERSPECTIVES 
Information gain
5 .1 find it helpful that she can bring her own new ideas and experiences 
28. She helped me to think about the process of getting a job, the political 
climite in the NHS, and gave me her views on my MRP. I was able to discuss 
my MRP with someone who had completed one herself. She was able to offer 
ideas and suggestions which I found really helpfiil. She also understood the 
course process very well
Reducing stress
10.1 had one useful session with my mentor where she was able to normalise 
and counter-act some of the effects of the endless evaluation of training.
11. Invaluable, especially with a fantastic mentor and at times of any
difficulties
Reflective space
19.1 have found the mentoring scheme very helpful to thinnk about my 
development over the three years and to talk about my time both on the 
course and on plavement
27. As I see them once a term, it also provides a nice opportunity to reflect in 
a meaningful way on my professional development, at regular intervals.
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New wavs of thinking
4. Very good to get a different perspective
5 .1 find it helpfiil that she can bring her own new ideas and experiences
20. However after our last meeting I found it very helpful to discuss certain 
topics not covered by the course such as career development, therapeutic 
boundaries etc. My mentor is very knowledgeable and this has been key.
22. Allows you to receive an 'outside' perspective on current working 
practices, therapy etc.
31. My mentor is not employed by the NHS and I have found this extremely 
usefiil as the approach is free from the agenda that can become apparent in 
other supervision relationships.
35. It is good to have a fresh perspective on things, away from the supervisor 
role and that of the university.
D. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Able to talk freelv
28 .1 was also able to speak freely about any problems I was having with a 
supervisor or work generally which was very helpful when my own 
placement supervisor was not very good
33. It is also helpful to be able to talk more openly about the difficulties 
experienced on training with someone who is more distant from the course 
than a course team member
36 .1 knew I could have an open and honest relationship with her.
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Not able to talk freelv
6. The difficulty I had was that my mentor was good fiiends with my 
supervisor so when I wanted to talk about negotiating difficulties in the 
supervisory relationship it wasn't in confidence.
9. my mentor was in a team linked to my supervisor and knew her, which 
really meant that I felt unable to be open about anything with her.
E. TIME MANAGEMENT 
Travel demands
1 .1 also had a long commute to get to see her so it would take a whole day
7. The scheme is useful for times when you need it but there are a lot of 
demands on our time
2 9 .1 would use more often without the time / distance constraints
36. and she was based far away so most of our mentoring was over the phone 
Requirement to see mentor
7 .1 think the requirement to see the mentor 3 times per academic year is too 
much
F. LACK OF KNOWLEDGE
Different to expectations
1. It thought that was a same as i had been looking forward to getting 
advice on jobs and support on the nature of the training.
3. It would be more helpful if they encouraged you to think about the wider 
profession of clinical psychology and your future role
16. We seem to have different aims for the mentoring.
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Role of mentor not specified
14. their role is not clear. There are so many supervisors etc involved that its 
confusing what separate issue I would speak to him about thtat I could not do 
with one of my other supervisors.
2 .1 don't know if this was intentional when allocating my mentor.
9 .1 also had no real notion of how often it would be appropriate to see her or 
contact her, and in the end haven't really done so
15.1 think it's a bit of a scatter gun approach. We have mentors, buddies and 
tutors with the hope that you might find someone who you can form a helpful 
relationship with
20. it did not seem clear why we needed them.
28. Seeing my mentor felt a chore when I knew I was due to see her. I think 
this was because it wasn't clear why we were meeting. Whether this is what a 
mentor is meant to do I'm not sure.
G. BEING EVALUATED
10. However, most of the time it felt like another review in which I was being 
analysed.
17. Especially as there was no evaluative aspect of the relationship
21. Good to talk to someone who's not evaluating you
H. BOX-TICKING EXERCISE
7. so it can seem like an added pressure to fit in these meetings, especially if 
you don't really feel you need it.
13. I often felt like it was a box ticking exercise for me.
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15. It's not ideal, particularly at the start when there is much to take on board 
30. it can feel like a box-ticking exercise 
I. RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPMENT
13. My mentor was very nice and I really liked her.
26. Bringing a mentor with me from a previous workplace has been really 
usefiil, as I already had a relationship with them and they knew a lot about me 
and my work 
J. THERAPEUTIC
17. helpfiil to provide a non-judgemental, reflective space to explore 
professional and personal development
32. the mentor role might be helpful for trainee's who require someone to 
speak to outside of the course team
33. It is also helpfiil to be able to talk more openly about the difficulties 
experienced on training with someone who is more distant from the course 
than a course team member
35. It is good to have a fresh perspective on things, away from the supervisor 
role and that of the university.
10.1 had one useful session with my mentor where she was able to normalise 
and counter-act some of the effects of the endless evaluation of training
12.1 think it varies a lot depending on what is going on for you during 
training. If there is a lot going on (either personally or professionally) they 
are probably more likely to be useful.
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16.1 think the scheme was very helpfiil to provide a non-judgemental, 
reflective space to explore professional and personal development 
22. Allows a safe space to discuss issues regarding the course
27 .1 find mentoring very useful as it provides a space to be open and 
reflective, particularly about some of the issues that come at the intersect of 
my personal and professional lives, in a way that I don't really do in any other 
context (except to some small extent in the PPD groups)
K. EX-SURREY TRAINEE MENTORS
5. My mentor is not a Surry graduate and although this makes it more 
difficult to talk about shared experiences etc
27. My mentor trained at Surrey not too long ago, so they know how the 
course works and can give practical advice as well as more general input
33. It has been helpful to be able to speak to someone who has also been 
through the process of being a Surrey trainee as I do not know anyone who 
has trained here before.
Please tell us any thoughts you have on how you think the mentoring 
scheme could be improved:
1. INTERESTS MATCHING
1. matching interests of mentor with interests of trainee
10. It would be more useful if mentors were tied to trainees in terms of
specialist areas of interest.
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2. CHOICE
Making the scheme optional
2. Making mentoring optional as not all trainees have liked the experience
18. Making it optional!
Changing the required number of meetings/increase flexibilitv
6. Reduce the number of required meetings with your mentor
21. It may be more useful for it to be clear that the scheme is flexible so
trainees feel more able to use the scheme appropriately
26. Perhaps outlining an expectation that you might visit them in your first
year but that if you don’t visit in the second or third year then that's ok.
Choice of who mentor is
11. More choice of who the mentor would be/ easier/ more expected to want 
to change mentor at some point during the course
17. Some people have suggested being able to choose who their mentor is and 
being given the option of this before we start the course. People find 
itdifficult to change mentor once you have received one!
30. Trainee's should be given an option to choose their own mentor if they 
wish so - following the guidence suggested by university on who can/can't be 
a mentor.
3. GEOGRAPHICAL LIMIT
5. Limit within 20 miles of where you live
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12. Try to match people so they are closer geographically. It takes me nearly 
2 hours to get to my mentor!
24. Distance and time addressed
28 .1 think that where the mentor is based makes an impact. In my case, an 
hour long meeting with mentor takes half of my study day if I account for the 
commute. I do not feel that this is the best use of my study time (having said 
that, if I felt that I was benefiting more from those meetings, I would not 
mind the long commute).
4. USE NEWLY QUALIFIED PSYCHOLOGISTS FROM SURREY
7. Pair newly qualified up with new trainees if they are interested in being a 
mentor. They have experience of training recently at Surrey and are perhaps 
more enthusiastic about the idea of mentoring someone embarking on the 
process they have have just been through.
5. SCHEME INFORMATION/TRAINING 
Provide training to mentors
3. The mentors could have some training/clarification of their role
7. Ensure mentors attend mentoring sessions at least once every 2 years if 
been mentor and ensure they HAVE to attend initial session if never 
mentored for Surrey trainees before.
22. More guidance for both both mentor and mentee about the type of issues 
that could be bought to these meetings.
Feedback from mentors to course team
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7. Have member of the course contact mentors at end of each year to review 
situation so they dont drop off radar.
Trainee discussion/information session about mentoring scheme 
9. It might be better to formalise existing relationships, or to encourage 
meeting more frequently.
22. More encouragement to bring mentors with you. Some kind of theoretical 
background/teaching at the beginning so that we can see how the scheme fits 
with a leadership framework.
23. Perhaps having people talk about what they found helpful about a mentor 
might help to communicate its usefulness would be good too.
8. Make it clearer to both trainee and mentor what the role of the mentor is.
If there is no clear role or gap that this relationship fills, then perhaps rethink 
the scheme.
13. more clarity on their role and how to get the most out of it
15. It might help to be clearer about the purpose of the metnoring as from 
discussion with other trainees this seems to be different depending on the 
mentor
16. Explain what it's for. If there's no good reason for it then scrap it, or make 
meetings non-compulsory.
18. Better guidelines on the purpose of this relationship
19. More guidance or suggested structure of sessions
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22. More guidance for both both mentor and mentee about the type of issues 
that could be bought to these meetings.
23. a clearer understanding of what the purpose of a mentor is
25. I'm not always sure of the purpose. I always go in not really sure what 
we're meant to talk about - "professional issues" can feel vague
6. REDUCE SUPERVISOR-MENTOR-UNIVERSITY CLOSE 
RELATIONSHIPS
8. Ensure mentors are not connected with current supervisors (at least in first 
year, when this would seem more feasible
20. Have people who aren't affiliated with the course. My mentor teaches us a 
lot so I see him as a course figure and therefore maybe someone who is in an 
evaluative position, even though I know that is not what mentoring is about
7. INCREASED RESPONSIBILITY FOR MENTOR
14. Some responsibility for mentors, as well as trainees, to make contacts and 
arrange meetings would be an improvement. It would have been helpful if 
mentors had tried to get in touch when it appeared that we were struggling to 
do so due to other demands.
29. The onus is on trainees to approach/maintain contact with their mentor. It 
would be good if there was also a sense that a mentor would initiate contact 
with the trainee sometimes so it felt like they 'wanted' to be involved and 
were holding the trainee in mind sometimes
8. TIMETABLE MENTOR MEETINGS INTO DIARY
5. Dedicated slot in timetable perhaps
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23. Having the time to see a mentor timetabled into our diaries might help
24. Planned time set aside for the scheme (i.e. like the pre-placement visits)
27. It might be helpful to have time to meet with mentor put into the 
timetable as it has often meant taking time out of my study day.
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School of Psychology Coursework Form 
PSYCHD Clinical Psychology
Final Reflective Account:
On Becoming a Clinical Psychologist: A Retrospective, Developmental, 
Reflective Account of Clinical Training
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly three years have passed since I began my doctoral clinical psychology 
training at the University of Surrey. During this time, I have moved from a clinician 
who had only worked in adult mental health using cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT) to an applied psychologist with a broad range of assessment and therapeutic 
skills from a range of theoretical backgrounds. I have gained experience of working 
with people from a diverse range of social, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds of all 
age groups. Clinical training has, at times, been highly stressful, with assignment 
deadlines often taking priority over my personal life. However, I have felt privileged 
to have the opportunity to be a trainee clinical psychologist, with all the range of 
experiential learning it brings. This final account is an opportunity to reflect upon my 
development over the course of clinical training and to discuss how this has 
contributed to the emergence of my professional identity as a clinical psychologist. 
As my experiences of clinical training have been numerous, I have decided to focus 
in more detail upon the development of my interest in neuropsychology during this 
time.
ENTERING CLINICAL TRAINING
At the time of commencing clinical training I felt confident of my abilities, having 
worked intensely for the past two years using CBT. However, my confidence levels 
diminished over the first few months as I began to realise how limited my knowledge 
base was (i.e. in only one modality; CBT with adults of working age). In a short 
space of time I was given insight into the wide range of specialities that clinical
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psychology composes and I felt overwhelmed by how much I would need to learn 
over the next three years in order to complete the training. Burch (n.d.) theorised that 
when people attempt to learn new skills, they often begin in a state of unawareness of 
their lack of ability and will often believe that they are proficient at the given skills. 
Burch termed this a state of unconscious incompetence. Once the person becomes 
aware of how much knowledge and skill they lack, they move to a state of conscious 
incompetence. This theory appears to reflect the stages of knowledge regarding my 
competence upon commencing clinical training. It was reassuring at the time that 
many of the other trainees felt similarly, which fostered a sense of shared experience 
and the development of relationships within the group. With hindsight, I think this 
was an important time for me in moving on fi*om working in a job where I felt 
particularly underappreciated to a position where the NHS was funding my training 
for three years, there were tutors and supervisors who were genuinely interested in 
my development, and there were high standards set for the completion of my work: I 
felt the work I was doing was of some importance and I felt very fortunate to have 
the opportunity to be doing it. This was both exciting and daunting and I often went 
back and forth between these two emotions during the early stages of the course.
This was likely to be due to me wanting to succeed on the course, setting high 
standards for myself, but also not being aware of the standards required by the 
course.
One of the main objectives I set myself during training was to find an area of clinical
psychology that excited and invigorated me. I think some trainee clinical
psychologists enter training having a good idea of an area of expertise that they wish
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to pursue. For me, upon entering clinical training, I believed this was offering CBT 
to adults, with an expectation that it would be unlikely that another area would 
interest me to the same extent. I realise now that this was quite a narrow view of the 
experience I would gain during training and I was unaware of how my interests 
would be multiplied into diverse areas of clinical psychology. One such area was 
clinical neuropsychology. The first time during training I came into contact with 
neuropsychology was during the initial training on administering the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale -  Fourth Edition (Wechsler, 2008). This impartial testing of 
cognition provided an interesting blend of biology and psychology; something that 
has always fascinated me. From an early point in clinical training I pursued any 
opportunity to immerse myself in cognitive testing. I was very interested in the idea 
of quantifying areas of cognition in a standardised format although some of the other 
trainees took the view that this was a reductionist approach that had roots in classing 
individuals into categories of intellectual ability. Hermstein and Murray (1994) 
proposed intelligence would largely determine ability to succeed in life (e.g. 
socioeconomic status, career progression), although this caused a huge amount of 
controversy and forced the American Psychological Association to release an article 
explaining its position on intelligence (Neisser et al., 1996). Clinical training has 
been an opportunity to become more aware of such dilemmas and to discuss these 
issues with other clinicians. I think dilemmas such as these gave me the opportunity 
to learn how to discuss and argue a point of view, in spite of others holding a 
differing view. I believe these skills will be important for me to continue to develop 
post-qualification.
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CLINICAL PLACEMENTS
Each of my clinical placements provided me with new ways of working and viewing 
mental health distress. My first placement was in an adult mental health secondary 
care setting where CBT was primarily used to treat the various mental health 
conditions. On the one hand, I had a lot of experience using such an approach and 
therefore felt comfortable in settling in to the work. However, part of me felt that I 
needed to be pushed towards using new therapeutic models and approaches. I was 
very eager at this time to push myself and learn as much as possible, a feeling which 
has waxed and waned throughout the course of my placements partly because, when 
I think about this now, I only felt as if I was doing work that truly interested and 
invigorated me on my specialist placement. Looking back, I wish I had immersed 
myself into the various ways of working that the placements brought. Instead, at 
times, I found myself ‘wishing’ the time away, counting down the days until I 
finished the placement and could move one step closer to finishing the course. For 
example, during my learning disabilities placement, an area that did not appeal to me 
greatly, I feel now that I did not apply myself fully. It makes me realise that 
sometimes I focused more on outcome than the important process that three years of 
clinical training has offered.
I think one of the most important things the clinical placements have provided me 
with is an opportunity to work with people from a wide range of backgrounds, 
cultures, intellectual abilities, with a whole spectrum of mental health difficulties. I 
think this has been invaluable in shaping me into a clinical psychologist who respects
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that people behave in certain ways because of where they have come from and the 
difficulties they faced, not because they are inherently ‘bad’ or ‘good’ people. For 
example, I am currently working with children who are in the process of being 
adopted or fostered who frequently display behaviour that is challenging to their 
parents (e.g. breaking doors, smashing plates etc.). Prior to clinical training and 
during my first placement I think I would have viewed this behaviour more harshly 
than I do now. Having gained knowledge in areas such as attachment theory over the 
course of these three years, I have developed an appreciation of why these children 
might be behaving in such a way (i.e. their use of attachment strategies), allowing me 
to make sense of behaviour that previously I may have viewed as ‘disruptive’ or not 
managed well enough by the parents. This, for me, shows a more developed 
understanding of human behaviour and the basis for such difficulties that I will 
continue to value post-clinical training.
Part of each placement contract is the requirement that trainee clinical psychologists 
must complete two psychometric assessments. During my first placement my 
supervisor and I struggled to find a suitable client to complete a psychometric 
assessment. At the time, many other trainees had similar difficulty, which led me, at 
the time, to believe that neuropsychological assessment was not widely used or 
appreciated in clinical psychology. However, I was able to complete two assessments 
in a service for older people, one of which involved diagnosing an older man with 
vascular dementia. This was an emotive topic and I did not think, at the time, that 
clinical psychologists would be involved in giving such life-changing diagnoses. It 
was a process I only associated with the medical profession and other clinical
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psychologists have commented in lectures that they would never give the diagnosis 
because they see this as the role of the medical profession. Personally, I have 
developed the belief that if as a clinical psychologist I know that they are likely to 
have dementia, then it would be unethical for me to make them wait to see another 
professional to provide the diagnosis. Prior to the session with the client, I felt like I 
was going to be giving him a ‘death sentence’ and it felt like a large burden to be the 
person telling him this news. However, when I did inform him, he was relieved in 
many ways, because he had suspected that dementia was the reason for a lot of his 
difficulties. I felt as if this was an important moment in my development as a clinical 
psychologist. I had undertaken a neuropsychological assessment which required me 
to utilise new skills, to integrate that information with the literature on cognitive 
profiles for dementia, and then to present this potentially emotive finding in a 
sensitive and person-centred way to the client. It felt like an important task, 
something which I had not felt in previous roles I have undertaken. This made me 
feel as if I was advancing in my skill set -  something which has always been 
important to me.
DEVELOPMENT AS A RESEARCHER
At the beginning of clinical training I think I undervalued the importance of research. 
I came into training believing that therapeutic skills were the most important trait a 
clinical psychologist possesses. Looking back now, this idea came from an over 
simplistic view that a clinical psychologist only provides therapeutic treatment. Now 
I have moved to the idea that a wide range of skills and knowledge, including
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research skills, are essential for any clinical psychologist. Clinical training has given 
me the opportunity to develop many aspects of my research abilities from planning 
and designing studies to undertaking analysis of the data using both statistical 
techniques and qualitative methods. Prior to clinical training I was taught research 
methods in a very ‘scientific’ way, where impartiality and quantitative methods were 
valued only. Over three years I believe I have moved to the idea that the research 
methods that need to be used are based upon the question you are attempting to ask. 
Therefore, using a ‘richer’ qualitative approach may provide answers to questions 
that a quantitative study could not explore in such a detailed fashion. For example, I 
conducted my service related research project on the mentoring scheme at the 
University of Surrey for trainee clinical psychologists using both qualitative and 
quantitative methods. I believe this mixed methodology provided me with the detail 
that could not have been obtained using only one of these approaches. I think this 
represents how I have developed in my thinking about research questions and the 
advancement of my knowledge of research over the course of clinical training.
The other main research experience I have gained on the course has been through the 
major research project (MRP). The study I conducted had been devised and 
implemented over the course of the whole three years of training. Upon reflection, I 
feel like I have achieved a great deal by putting this project together into a coherent 
and hopefully useful piece of work. It is interesting to think that all of the seemingly 
small decisions taken during the initial stages of the project have formed the 
groundwork for the whole study. For example, during supervision I was attempting 
to decide between two ideas to base the project upon that, at the time, I only had a
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limited amount of knowledge regarding. My supervisor asked me to decide, and 
within a minute of thought I had made the decision to undertake my MRP 
investigating a reasoning process called inferential confusion. At the time, I did not 
think about the importance of that decision but looking back, it was a big step to take 
in such a quick manner. I was typically the type of person that would think in detail 
about such questions, and to a certain extent I still behave similarly. However, I think 
clinical training has enabled me to make important decisions more efficiently, and to 
be able to hold a particular view point and defend it. In the current turbulent state that 
NHS finds itself in, I have learned that clinical psychologists must be able to defend 
their practice and hold their own ground. I think clinical training has taught me to 
develop and utilise such skills, something that I hope to continue to advance post­
qualification when I will be responsible for greater amounts of decisions.
THE PERSONAL LIFE AND WORK BALANCE
In my previous reflective accounts, I have never brought any of my out-of-work 
circumstances into the writing. This was mainly because I value trying to keep the 
two separate and also because I am relatively private about my home life. However, 
upon reflection, I wish I had thought about the impact of changes in my personal life 
and how they have affected how I practice as a trainee clinical psychologist because I 
feel now that the two are inextricably linked. This has especially become apparent in 
my final clinical placement where I work within a child and adolescent mental health 
service and also in a looked after children (LAC) service. In the second year of 
training my partner and I had a daughter, who at the time of writing this account is
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14 months old. My partner has just gone back to work and we have been leaving our 
daughter in the care of others -  which was a difficult thing to contemplate and my 
daughter struggled with the separation, especially fi*om my partner. Working with 
LAC, where they are repeatedly traumatised through the breakdown of relationships 
and the moving of home to a foreign place, it often brought up similar feelings to 
some of the circumstances at home. Using supervision to talk through and reflect 
upon these feelings was invaluable as at times I found it difficult to manage the 
emotions these situations provoked in me. I think prior to training I would have been 
far less open to discussing these issues with a supervisor. Training has allowed me to 
mature and develop an understanding of how home life can impact upon practicing 
as an applied psychologist.
CLINICAL TRAINING REGRETS
One of the most important skills that clinical training has taught me is to take a 
critical stance of myself and the systems around me. Therefore, I think it is important 
to critique my experience of training and the way in which I have engaged with this 
course. Over the three years I am now aware of the fact I was too focused on passing 
each assignment, constantly planning to hand in work in order for it to get that all- 
important pass. Although this has enabled me to succeed on the course, it also meant 
that I was outcome focused rather than process focused. For example, I noted in my 
Process Account of my personal and professional development group in July 2013: 
“Within my PPLDG, I think the males have taken a practical approach to the 
discussions, focusing more upon outcome (e.g. focusing upon an agenda and specific
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tasks to be accomplished each session) than the process.” The focus on outcome was 
something I became more aware of as time progressed on the course. This was partly 
due to an awareness of the course becoming more time-limited as I moved into 
successive training years of the course (e.g. I was in year two at this point). I also 
believe that the reflective accounts were an opportunity to bring these ideas to the 
forefront of my awareness and therefore act as a method of change in the way I 
approached clinical training, enabling me to focus on the important aspects of the 
process of training.
Up to this point, I have failed one assignment on the course. This was a difficult time 
as this news came three weeks after the birth of my daughter. I felt a sense of failure 
at the time and thought at length about why I had failed and whether this meant my 
future on the course was compromised. It took time to come to terms with the fact I 
had failed. I realised I put very high academic expectations upon myself with a 
belief/conditional assumption that ‘if I work hard enough then I will always 
succeed’. In hindsight, I think this led to the sense of failure I experienced and I have 
since realised that I cannot succeed at everything. Failing objectives is a part of 
everyday life and should be learned from as best they can. After discussions with my 
academic tutor I realised how I had failed with regards to the assignment and I 
realised the way in which the course tutor would have liked me to approach the 
assignment (i.e. taking a critical stance). Thinking now, I believe this information has 
influenced how I have approached future assignments and in turn influenced how I 
approach my work on clinical placements. Failing the assignment has also given me 
insight into how others sometimes feel when they are having difficulties,
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experiencing feelings such as shame and failure. This developed my empathy and 
understanding of how others feel when in a similar situation. I think post­
qualification I will be more critical of my own work, and the care provided in the 
settings I work as a clinical psychologist.
POST-QUALIFICATION IDENTITY
I believe I have progressed significantly in the three years I have been training to be 
a clinical psychologist. One of the main skills I will take forward post-qualification 
will be an ability to think about clients using a variety of theoretical positions. For 
example, using attachment theory, CBT theory, and also thinking about the wider 
system in which the clients are placed. This represents a move in my thinking away 
fi*om placing the ‘problem’ within the individual to thinking about the issue fi*om a 
variety of viewpoints. Part of this way of thinking also incorporates an improved 
ability to formulate using these theoretical viewpoints. Having supervisors 
throughout training that specialise in varying therapeutic approaches has enabled me 
to value different ways of formulating. For example, my first placement was 
primarily CBT-based whereas my current supervisor uses systemic and attachment- 
based approaches. I think this development in my thinking has enabled me to be 
more adaptive in providing formulations and interventions to any client that I work 
with.
Although I discussed earlier that I lost confidence early on in the course, I believe I 
have restored my belief in my abilities as a clinical psychologist, including a new­
found belief in my ability in clinical neuropsychology. For my specialist placement I
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worked in a split placement on an acute stroke ward and in neuropsychological 
assessment at a general hospital. This placement provided me with an opportunity to 
use a variety of neuropsychological assessment batteries and experience in 
progressive hypothesis testing of various areas of cognitive functioning. This 
experience has provoked a keen interest in developing these skills post-qualification, 
hopefully with a view to undertaking a diploma in clinical neuropsychology. The 
combination of biology and psychology is an area I have attempted to pursue since I 
began studying psychology at A-Level. Through studying at degree level, a post­
graduate diploma in low intensity CBT, and three years of training in clinical 
psychology, I believe I have found an area of psychology that truly invigorates and 
excites me. I hope I can continue to develop in this area post-qualification.
One of the main skills I have developed over the course of the three years has been 
an understanding of my limitations. I came onto clinical training believing I was very 
good at what I do, but I think this overly ambitious belief was inhibiting me from 
realising my own fallibility, which at times, I think, stopped me from learning new 
skills and ways of thinking. Over time I have learned to realise that I am at the start 
of a long road of learning. I believe I am able now to be open to thinking less 
judgmentally, and in a more dynamic, adaptive fashion that I was not able to achieve 
prior to clinical training. I think this gives me a confident stance to practice from and 
a base from which to continue to learn and improve my abilities as a clinical 
psychologist.
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CLINICAL EXPERIENCE
YEARl
PLACEMENT 1:
Adult Community Mental Health Team (October 2011 -  September 2012)
I provided interventions for individuals with a range of mental health conditions such 
as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for psychosis, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, 
depression, anxiety disorders, challenging behaviour interventions and I completed 
neuropsychological assessments of dementia.
YEAR 2
PLACEMENT 2:
Adult Mental Health Learning Disability Team (October 2012 -  March 2013)
I provided systemic interventions for families and carers in the network surrounding 
the client. I was able to provide team consultations, challenging behaviour 
assessments and neuropsychological assessment of people with learning disabilities.
PLACEMENT 3:
Older Adult CMHT (April 2013 -  October 2013)
I conducted neuropsychological assessment of dementia and other neurodegenerative 
disorders. I provided Cognitive Behavioural Therapy Interventions for depression, 
adjustment, loss, and bereavement.
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YEARS
PLACEMENT 4:
Department of Neuropsychology at a general hospital (October 2013 -  March 2014)
This placement was split between neuropsychological assessment of outpatients and 
providing clinical psychology input on an inpatient stroke ward. Both of these roles 
included a significant amount of neuropsychological assessments of neurological 
conditions (e.g. Parkinson’s disease, epilepsy, multiple systems atrophy). My work 
on the stroke ward also included mood assessment, multi-disciplinary team working, 
capacity assessment, functional analysis and providing interventions for individuals 
and families post-stroke.
PLACEMENT 5:
Looked After Children and a Child and Adolescent Mental Health Team (April 2014 
-  September 2014)
I had the opportunity to provide Narrative, Systemic and Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy interventions for children and adolescents. I also conducted 
neuropsychological assessments of children with autism and attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder. My work within the looked after children involved a 
significant amount of systemic work, team consultation, and team working. I also 
had the opportunity to do a day of teaching to a multi-disciplinary group of 
individuals from the local authority on ‘child development’.
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Year I Assessments
ASSESSMENTS
P r o g r a m m e
C o m p o n e n t
TITLE OF ASSIGNMENT
Fundamentals of Theory 
and Practice in Clinical 
Psychology (FTPCP)
Short report of WAIS-III data and practice 
administration
Research -SRRP An Evaluation of a Mentoring Scheme for Trainee 
Clinical Psychologists: The Perspectives of the Trainees
FTPCP -  practice case 
report
A Cognitive Behavioural Assessment of a Female 
Parent in her Forties with Agoraphobia and Panic 
Disorder
Problem Based Learning 
-  Reflective Account
PBL Reflective Account
Research -  Literature 
Review
What is the Role of Inferential Confusion in Obsessive 
Compulsiveness?
Adult -  case report Cognitive Behavioural Therapy with a Mother in her 
Forties who has a Diagnosis of Agoraphobia with Panic 
Disorder
Adult -  case report Neuropsychological Assessment of an Older Man who 
is Experiencing Memory Problems
Research -  Qualitative 
Research Project
The Discourse Relating to Media Representations of US 
Marines Urinating on Dead Afghanis
Research -  Major 
Research Project 
Proposal
The Role of Inferential Confusion in Social Anxiety
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Year II Assessments
P r o g r a m m e
C o m p o n e n t
TITLE OF ASSESSMENT
Research - SRRP An Evaluation of a Mentoring Scheme for Trainee 
Clinical Psychologists: The Perspectives of the Trainees
Research Research Methods and Statistics test
Professional Issues 
Essay
What role can the clinical psychology profession make in 
effecting change and how might this contribution be 
received by other managerial professional groups?
Problem Based 
Learning -  Reflective 
Account
PBL Reflective Account
People with Learning 
Disabilities/Child and 
Family/Older People -  
Case Report
Neuropsychological Assessment of a Woman in her Early 
twenties with a Mild Learning Disability and Sexually 
Impulsive Behaviour
Personal and 
Professional Learning 
Discussion Groups -  
Process Account
PPDLG Process Account
People with Learning 
Disabilities/Child and 
Family/Older People -  
Oral Presentation of 
Clinical Activity
Engagement and Formulation with a woman in her 
Eighties, who is Caring for her Husband, and is 
Struggling with Depression
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Year III Assessments
P r o g r a m m e
C o m p o n e n t
ASSESSMENT TITLE
Research - SRRP An Evaluation of a Mentoring Scheme for Trainee 
Clinical Psychologists: The Perspectives of the Trainees
Research -  MRP 
Portfolio
The Role of Inferential Confusion in Social Anxiety: A 
Quasi-Experimental Study
Personal and 
Professional Learning -  
Final Reflective 
Account
On becoming a clinical psychologist: A retrospective, 
developmental, reflective account of the experience of 
training
Child and
Family/People with 
Learning 
DisabilitiesOlder 
People/Specialist -  
Case Report
The Assessment, Formulation and Treatment of a Woman 
in her Seventies Following an Acute Haematoma to the 
Left Posterior Frontal Region who was Displaying 
Distressed Behaviour
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